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In the years following the death of the autocratic ruler Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), the flow of gossip 
surrounding political leaders in China’s urban spheres revealed an open, disorderly yet robust 
arena full of competing voices, agendas, and manipulations. My dissertation examines gossip as 
both a new body of public political knowledge and a means of popular participation in this 
politically-fragmented and transitional era. On the one hand, a wide spectrum of Chinese society 
engaged with this body of political knowledge, which fostered an uncontrolled playful citizenship 
in China’s urban spaces. On the other hand, this new civic participation prompted the fledging 
Republican state to curb the dissemination of information through censorship, legal avenues and 
political propaganda. I argue that political gossip played a constructive role in forming a 
participatory political culture, in developing state mechanisms to discipline popular knowledge, 
and in shaping legal categories of defamation. As opposed to other studies that analyze the 
formation of Chinese citizenship in the process of nation-building, my project contextualizes 
popular political participation in the Republican era within a broader shift in political culture that 
was increasingly shaped by the entertainment media. Lower-class information traders and a 
commoner audience dominated the gossip economy by actively producing and consuming 
narratives and opinions, without being restricted by state education and elite activism. My research 
thus offers a new bottom-up perspective in the study of Republican Chinese political culture.  
 Chapter 1 examines the commercialization of “trivial information” by focusing on the rise 
of a commercially driven and professionalized group of gossipmongers across varying social-
 economic strata in the late 1910s and the early 1920s. The expansion of the community affected 
both the practice and mindset of gossipmongers in the industry. Chapter 2 shows how the 
entertainment interplayed with political significance in the early Republican gossip publications 
to involve more commoner readers in both knowledge production and consumption in this gossip 
economy. This unique mode challenged conventional top-down knowledge transmission and the 
sense of exclusivity in the field of knowledge production. Chapter 3 illuminates state efforts at 
developing a new censorship system and tactics of moral persuasion for re-building knowledge 
and establishing moral authority in the late 1910s. I show that the central government was a 
functional authority in the cultural realm during the period of chaotic and fragmentation. Chapter 
4 turns to the relationship between the mass media and defamation law. It focuses on a 1919 case 
in which the Beijing government sued the Republican Daily for insulting the President. Although 
the state attempted to use the legal instrument to fix a boundary between playful and serious 
political discussion, the Press’ commercial pursuit and insistence on autonomy gradually 
transformed this means of taming into a mechanism of publicity. The last chapter analyzes the 
politics of visibility from the perspective of political leaders who drew on the discursive power of 
gossip by examining Jiang Jieshi’s coordinated effort to control publicity surrounding his romantic 
life and wedding ceremony in 1927. In this new form of official political communication, a striking 
tension persisted between the attempts to use the form and dissemination power of gossip as an 
effective technique of social influence and the unruly commercial adaptation of media narratives. 
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Wind means folksongs and education.  
Folksongs move (the ruler) and education civilizes (the people).  
The ruler civilizes his subjects by means of Airs (folk songs).  
Subjects remonstrate against their ruler by means of Airs (folk songs).1 
 
The classic annotation on a stanza in the Book of Songs (??) concisely describes an ideal 
dialogical relationship between a ruler and his subjects as mediated by folksongs. From the 
viewpoint of literati in ancient China, officials transmitted the voices of the common people to 
the court by gathering political satires, and in turn, they edited them in the interpretative 
framework of orthodox Confucianism to educate the people. This Confucian vision of the 
feedback loop performs the function of remonstration and education, but was hardly realized in 
imperial China. There was a disconnect between the state and non-literati population, and the 
technological disadvantage hindered the formation of efficient political communication. 
However, to some extent, the idea of having folk songs mediate between the state and society 
captures the role of gossip in modern China. In the context of intensified commercial print media 
and ideas of popular education, gossip in the warlord era (1916-1928) formed an integrating 
force that brought together government, political leaders, cultural elites, information experts and 
audiences from multiple social sectors. This connectedness and the instant interactions were 
incomparable with previous communication facilitated by the imperial bureaucratic channels and 
elite activities. And, the dynamics of these players were entirely different from these of the 
Confucian utopia.  
                                                            
1 Mao Heng, Zheng Xuan, Kong Yingda, “Guan zi,” [Preface to Guan Zi], Maoshi zhengyi [The Correct 
Meaning of the Mao Tradition of the Book of Poetry] Juan 1, 1. 
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 In the decade that immediately followed the autocratic rule of Yuan Shikai (??
?,1859-1916), a gossip economy emerged in Shanghai and its surrounding area. Behind-the-
scenes political operations among warlords, romantic affairs between presidents and female 
entertainers, their leisure activities, private possessions, personal grudges and other everyday 
tidbits about leading political figures became popular subjects for newspapers, tabloid papers and 
book collections. Driven by commercial profitability, gossipy accounts of political leaders 
transformed from unofficial political and historical knowledge for a literati community in the 
imperial era to easy-to-digest cultural products of political knowledge easily available in the 
print marketplace. Threatened by wide-spread gossip and rumor, the nascent Republican state 
turned to administrative and legal instruments, such as the newly-established legal code on 
defamation, to discipline the political information sphere and the behaviors of political 
discussion. Seeing the discursive power of gossip in the mass media, the Nationalist Party and 
political leaders also sought to use the public’s interest in the private lives of political elites for 
their own ends.  
Gossiping about the personal behaviors of political leaders became a defining feature of 
the politics in the decade after Yuan’s reign. In their on-going rivalry with serious journalism and 
literary works, publishers and editors categorized these products as market-oriented fun-seeking 
documentations with political importance. Written gossip about political leaders in these years 
served as both a body of popular political knowledge and a means of political engagement. Early 
Republican gossipy products helped generate a popular interest in the national politics and 
facilitated the airing of political voices from the non-elite population. I address and shed light on 
these print products in trivial news columns, tabloids and scandal books collectively as gossip 
referring to their surface characteristics of triviality, primary (if not exclusive) focus on private 
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lives and concentration on frivolity. Analytically, I take these seemingly trivial accounts as a 
form of knowledge and public discussion that challenged the established category of news by 
intentionally blurring the boundaries between the entertainment and politics.  
By examining gossip regarding the leading political figures in the period from 1916 to 
1928, my dissertation reveals a participatory political culture which was increasingly blended 
with and formed by entertainment media as well as the development of various control 
mechanisms formulated by the state and leaders in response to what was emerging to be an 
unruly political force in the early Republican China. Both sides of the story renew our 
understanding of Chinese Republicanism in the late 1910s and 1920s which has usually been 
associated with state efforts and elite activism in past scholarship.2 I argue that gossip allowed 
non-elite people to play a role in forming public opinions, negotiating the boundary of public 
discussion with the state, defining the meaning of a legal category and transforming the publicity 
strategies of the powerful. These different aspects, as will be explored in each chapter of my 
dissertation, attest to the openness, tolerance and discipline of the Chinese Republican political 
culture. 
 
Gossip in the Early Republic and its History 
In the early Republican years, the explicit categorization and inclusion of gossip about 
political figures in a variety of print products reflected the increasing recognition of gossip as a 
source of political knowledge. In these market-driven and entertainment-centered commodities, it 
is increasingly difficult to make a meaningful distinction between obtaining political information 
                                                            
2 For example, David Strand, An Unfinished Republic: Leading by Word and Deed in Modern China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). See more discussions in the following sections.  
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and gossiping about one’s private life as entertainment. The first gossip column “Xinwen xie” 
(News dust, 1916-1920) in a Shanghai-based commercial daily China Times (????), had 
illustrated the unsettling degree to which gossip and political news overlapped. Gossip items in 
the “Xinwen xie” column often closely corresponded with the front-page political news. In 1916, 
it exposed how Yuan Shikai’s family stole electrical equipment from the imperial palace when the 
major political news criticized Yuan’s restoration scheme. In 1917, the column editor created 
another featured sub-column titled “fupisheng zhong zhi xianhua” (casual talks in the royalist 
campaign) to supplement front-page headlines about the militarist Zhang Xun’s royalist campaign. 
An example of this is the story of Zhang Xun persuading the young Manchu emperor to agree to 
his restoration scheme by offering less homework, which ridicules Zhang’s lofty claims of 
restoring monarchism.  In 1919, this column was even occasionally located on pages dedicated to 
domestic political news, which signaled to the dissolving boundary between them. Beyond this 
column, scandal books suggested political meanings for scandals even more explicitly. Editors 
categorized accounts about ministers' concubines and private banquets as government-related 
information, describing them as worthy of textbook inclusion. Moreover, the late 1920s witnessed 
a process of intensified politicization of gossip, as the Nationalist Party and its leader strategically 
turned these frivolous discussions into vehicles of political propaganda. Minute details about 
leaders’ lives proved to be a way of presenting and reading further into the world of high politics. 
The emergence and popularity of gossip in print confirmed the private lives of political leaders as 
an integral part of the political knowledge and a legitimate topic of public discussion. 
To capture the market-oriented nature of these writings, I refer to this body as popular 
knowledge, which relates to the capitalist structure consumed by a vaguely-delineated, non-elite 
yet lettered audience. As argued by Susan Phillips, gossip has the ability to transcend class, religion, 
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and moral boundaries to reach different social groups.3 Private details made complicated, and 
highbrow events made relatable to everyone’s living experiences, attracted those who might have 
originally shown little interest in political news in large dailies. Envisioning an inclusive 
readership of their products, publishers and editors generally addressed readers as "ordinary 
educated people" (yiban shiren) or “ordinary young people.”(yiban qingnian)4 With evidence 
showing that the circulation of gossip collections usually was many times wider than other types 
of popular publications, it is difficult to gauge exact social configuration of readers in the late 
1910s and early 1920s. Arguably, due to the relatively high price of these products, most 
consumers were still confined within the boundaries of being middle class: modestly educated and 
financially comfortable.5 
The expanding community of producers also involved a variety of information suppliers, 
ranging from prostitutes and detectives to journalists and novel writers, all of whom had some 
manner of connection to the political circles in the capital city. But many collections of scandalous 
stories aimed to attract lower social sectors, including the urban poor consisting of more 
sensational stories in coarse language.6 Furthermore, the fluidity of gossip allowed the spread of 
                                                            
3 Susan Phillips, Transforming Talk: The Problem with Gossip in Late Medieval England (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). 
4 Fan Shoukang, “Heimu zhi heimu,” [The scandal of scandal collections] Xi Xiu, no. 2 (1918): 1-3. 
5 Past scholarship has demonstrated a growing middle-class readership of major commercial newspapers 
and in early Republican Shanghai. For example, Tsai Weiping's study on Shenbao's advertisements since 
the late 1910s shows the everyday life of the Chinese urban middle-class readers. Tsai's approach would 
shed light on the readership of tabloid of the same period whose advertisements (of cosmetics, cigars and 
entertainment venues) were similar to those in major commercial dailies. See Tsai Weiping, Reading 
Shenbao: Nationalism, Consumerism and Individuality in China, 1919-1937 (London: Palgrave 
Macmilland, 2010). The gossip industry did not directly reach the working class until the late 1920s. 
News reports show that in 1928 workers and semi-literate readers gained information from tabloid papers 
and such. No. Jianbao/8526, The Nationalist Party Historical Archives. 
6 See more discussions in Chapter 2.  
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information to illiterate commoners in public spaces like tea houses. We may argue that the core 
of this gossip community consisted of literate and economically sufficient urban residents, 
including students, vocational men, resourceful social players such as detectives, along with 
higher-ranking prostitutes, journalists, and other wealthier casual classes. This community was far 
more inclusive and heterogeneous than Wen-hsin Yeh’s definition of the middle mercantile class 
in Shanghai. It did not necessarily share any imagined middle-class lifestyle.7  
The widened engagement, the magnified political dimension, and market-orientation, 
distinguished gossip in the early Republican publications from literati gossip in the past. China has 
a long history of literati interests in accounts of political maneuvering, romantic affairs, and other 
strange occurrences of the political elite.8 In the late imperial period (roughly 1368-1911), biji 
(notebook) memoirs, unofficial histories, current-event novels, and dibao (capital gazetteers) 
issued by private press houses, all served to disseminate gossip about leading scholar-officials. 
The community of gossip production and consumption expanded from a restricted group of 
scholar-officials in the medieval period to a literati of lower status like local degree-holders.9 
                                                            
7 Yeh's notion of moral and material respectability of the middle class in Shanghai talks to managerial 
elites and white-collar salarymen. See Wen-Hsin Yeh, Shanghai Splendor: Economic Sentiments and the 
Making of Modern China, 1843-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). Mao drew on the 
discourse of "middle society" and argues for a consensus popular imagination of middle-class culture in 
popular publications. Peijie Mao, “The Cultural Imaginary of ‘Middle Society’ in Early Republican 
Shanghai,” Modern China, April 13, 2018. 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0097700418766827 
8 These stories could be found in the form of tales in the ninth century, literati memoirs in the 12th 
century, and long-narrative romance and unofficial histories in the sixteenth century.  
9 When commercial printing spread in the Song and Yuan times, gossip about political figures were still 
produced and consumed in a restricted scholar-official circle. See Paul Jakov Smith, "Impressions of the 
Song-Yuan-Ming Transition: The Evidence from Biji Memoirs" In Paul J. Smith and Richard Von Glahn, 
eds., The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia 
Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2003), 71-110. More information about the expansion of 
print industry and the activities of lower class literati in the late imperial period, See Robert Hegel, 
Reading Illustrated Fiction in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University, 1998). Timothy 
Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998). Miu Yonghe, Mingdai chuban shigao [Print History of Ming] (Nanjing: Jiangsu 
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Alongside the development of print technology and market, literati gossip gradually increased 
contemporaneous significance besides their conventional role of being a medium of history or a 
source of reading pleasure.10 Paul Vierthaler’s study of unofficial texts, about the powerful court 
eunuch Wei Zhongxian in the late Ming, argues for the role of this body of knowledge in 
constructing historical imagination. 11   Han Li has noted the growing political significance 
associated with late Ming current-event novels. But he suggests that the dichotomy between 
serious novels about political figures is the medium of political opinion, through which scholar-
officials participated in the political debates and other gossipy novels that only emphasized 
entertaining.12 Paize Keulamans recently argued that gossipy accounts, in popular histories and 
novels about the fall of Ming, should be seen as “news reports” that mediated the communication 
between a ruler and his subjects in the seventeenth century as a type of political knowledge, which 
the Dutch integrated into their global knowledge.13 However, it is not until the twentieth century 
that Chinese literati affirmed the political significance of gossip as they saw the value of this 
                                                            
renmin chubanshe, 2000). Paul August Vierthaler, “Quasi-History and Public Knowledge:  A Social 
History of Late Ming and Early Qing Unofficial Historical Narratives” (Ph.D., Yale University, 2014). 
Cynthia Joanne Brokaw, Commerce in Culture: The Sibao Book Trade in the Qing and Republican 
Periods (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
10 Literati gossip in written and print forms in Tang and Song dynasties usually served as a medium of 
history to express scholar's private views. Sarah Allen, Shifting Stories: History, Gossip, and Lore in 
Narratives from Tang Dynasty China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014), 70-118. 
Paul Jakov Smith, “Impressions of the Song-Yuan-Ming Transition: The Evidence from Biji Memoirs” In 
Paul J. Smith and Richard Von Glahn, eds., The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 71-110. 
11 Paul August Vierthaler, "Quasi-History and Public Knowledge:  A Social History of Late Ming and 
Early Qing Unofficial Historical Narratives" (PhD dissertation, Yale University, 2014).  
12 Han Li, “History, Fiction, and Public Opinion: Writings on Mao Wenlong in the Early Seventeenth 
Century,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, no. 1 (March 2014): 69–88. 
13 Paize Keulemans, “Tales of an Open World: The Fall of the Ming Dynasty as Dutch Tragedy, Chinese 
Gossip, and Global News,” Frontiers of Literary Studies in China 9, no. 2 (April 2015): 190–234. 
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information in carrying out political reform.  
With a strong reformist goal to publicize popular sovereignty, the late Qing vernacular 
newspapers started to incorporate imperial gossip into the operation of modern news making. 
These easy-to-read, cheap, and compact vernacular newspapers, emerging in the last decade of the 
Qing Dynasty, aimed to convey ideas of popular sovereignty to readers with limited reading 
abilities and to further broaden public participation beyond the literati circle, although their actual 
influence was still confined to a fairly elite audience.14 Vernacular newspapers thus exhibited a 
new conceptualization of political education and entertainment via popular products unlike the late 
imperial view of popular literature as moral instruction.15 In the column of "capital news"  of these 
newspapers, the emperor and empress's daily routines were juxtaposed with neighborhood gossip, 
                                                            
14 Literati-journalists who were devoted to vernacular newspapers included future May Fourth leading 
intellectuals such as Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, as well as active scandal book editors and tabloid writers in 
the late 1910s including Wang Dungen and Zhang Danfu. Chen Duxiu wrote for Anhui Suhua Bao  
[Anhui Vernacular Paper]. Wang Dungen, Zhang Danfu, and Hu Shi was the chief editor of Jingye 
Xunbao [Dedication Ten-day Report] in Shanghai. They made efforts to raise racial identity, patriotic 
sentiments, scientific and technological knowledge. To list some representative Chinese-language studies 
on vernacular newspapers: Li Hsiao-t’I, Qingmo de xiacen shehui qimeng yundong [The Late Qing 
Enlightenment Movement for the lower Society] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 
1998). Hu Quanzhang, Qingmo minchu baihua baokan yanjiu  [A Study on Vernacular Periodicals in the 
late Qing and early Republican China] (Beijing: Shehuikexue chubanshe, 2011). For more information 
about the spread of popular sovereignty and the confined definition of popular sovereignty within the 
imperial system around and after the 1898 reform, see Joan Judge, Print and Politics: “Shibao” and the 
Culture of Reform in Late Qing China (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1996). Seungjoo Yoon, 
“Literati-journalists of the Chinese Progress (Shiwu bao) in discord, 1896-1989,” in Rebecca E. Karl and 
Peter Gue Zarrow, eds., Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing 
China (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 2002), 48-76. A recent PhD dissertation also argues for the role played 
by official gazetteers in nurturing the public interest in political affairs in the late Qing. Emily Carr 
Mokros, "Communication, Empire, and Authority in the Qing Gazette" (PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins 
University, 2016). As reflected by the authorship and readership of these newspapers, their views of 
"public" or "popular" still confined with a narrow literati circle, which the vernacular newspapers took 
efforts to move beyond.  
15 McLaren argues for a discourse of popular literature as moral instruction in the seventeenth century 
China. See Anne E. McLaren, “Constructing new reading publics in late Ming China,” in Printing and 
Book Culture in Late Imperial China, ed. Cynthia Joanne Brokaw and Kai-wing Chow (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 152-183. 
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criminal incidents, and other strange events in the city. Such juxtaposition challenged the existing 
political and social hierarchy, sharply contrasting the rigorous taxonomy found in earlier hearsay 
collections that respectfully grouped and ordered entries according to the political position of the 
featured protagonists.16 However, vernacular newspapers continued to emphasize the allegedly 
apolitical function of gossipy news by delineating the line between the social and the political. In 
1913, a leading vernacular newspaper, the Group Strength Newspaper (???), established the 
binary of political and social news: “the section on “yaowen” (major news) replete with reports on 
government operations, was meant to cultivate people’s consciousness of political participation. 
In contrast, the section on “suowen” (trivial news), included hearsay concerning miscellaneous 
social affairs, serving to attract more readers.”17 The paper identified the government as the 
exclusive arena for politics and separated entertainment from politics.  
Although it bore similarity to the name “suowen”, the emergence of the News Dust column 
in 1916 marked a turning point where newspapers no longer saw “trivial” information as 
necessarily apolitical. Gossip about political figures in the warlord era was characterized by the 
ever-widening reach of information to diverse social sectors, highly commercialized production 
and consumption of news, and the entanglement of contemporary politics and entertainment. The 
flourishment of the gossip industry and its growing social influence were closely related to the 
particular historical setting of the warlord period. 
 
                                                            
16 Take the late Ming book Gossip Collected from the Field in the Wanli Era for example. The first two 
volumes discuss the emperors and empire-wide political events, followed by the accounts of the inner 
chamber of the palace, princes and regional governors, princesses, civil officials and so on. Shen Defu, 
Wanli yehuobian [Gossip Collected from the field in Wanli era] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 
1997). 
17 “Lun bao,” [A Discussion on Newspaper] Qun Qiang Bao, February 28, 1913. 
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The Shanghai Gossip Economy in a Period of Transition and Disorder 
Compared to other realms of cultural production, the commercialization of political gossip 
and its impact upon popular knowledge were more sensitive to political changes. The gossip 
industry thrived in the period between Yuan Shikai’s stifling press policy, and the Nationalist 
installment of strict pre-publication news censorship in 1929. In this period, which is often 
addressed as the warlord era, the new Republic of China continued to include powerful personal 
and institutional elements of the old regime, particularly the political and military conflicts among 
various cliques that fragmented the country. Meanwhile, the introduction of western republicanism 
brought to China the view of politics as public matters, putting greater emphasis on equality.18  
The print media rapidly developed in tandem with other forms of civic engagement that put the 
newly imported republicanism into practice. The circumstances of political disintegration, an open 
political culture, and media development conditioned the boom of China’s gossip industry.  
After Yuan Shikai died, the Beijing government devolved from a powerful political center 
to a nominal central government. Not only did the local military governors disobey Beijing, but 
the central government also suffered from constant power shifts amongst different military cliques. 
On one hand, political competition overwhelmed the pursuit of establishing social order: The 
Beijing government abolished tight regulations declared during the reign of Yuan to rally social 
support, new official institutions that aimed to establish a new order were under development and 
in transition.19 On the other hand, regional warlords and the power relations among them radically 
                                                            
18 A group of scholars in Hong Kong built up a database to study Chinese intellectual history from 1830 
to 1925. They found the term “Gonghe” (Republicanism) had frequently appeared since 1905. They 
further argue that Chinese intellectuals laid stress on politics as public affair, public morals, patriotism 
and equality. Guantao Jin, Qingfe Liu, and Lap-wai Lam, “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy’: 
China’s Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924),” 
History of Political Thought 26, no. 3 (2005): 468–501. 
19 Continuing the late Qing reforms, this decade was crucial in the establishment of many administrative, 
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challenged the old political order along with the career path of the political elites. In the warlord 
era, diverse personalities, odd behaviors and the anti-intellectual pathways to the power of political 
elites also provided fodder to the burgeoning business of privacy revelation that valued the 
humorous and the bizarre. Minimal political control and snowballing public attention to the chaotic 
power struggles and political personalities grounded the rising gossip industry. 
With the fall of the imperial state, the first two decades of the twentieth century were also 
characterized by unprecedented openness and informality. The ideas of popular sovereignty and 
the widespread practice of political engagement in the early Republic ousted the late Qing court-
set agenda of administrative renovation and broadened literati political participation.20 In the 1910s, 
the May Fourth intellectuals lifted the banner of western democracy and aroused nationalist 
sentiments in response to the nation’s diplomatic and domestic frustrations. Civic engagement as 
a political ideal was diffused to an array of social groups through public speeches, print media, 
and school education programs.21 In practice, people participated in the boycott of the national 
product movement or national day ceremonies to express their patriotic sentiments.22 Workers and 
                                                            
educational, and judicial institutions. For information of new school system, see Tze-Ki Hon and Robert 
Joseph Culp, eds., The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China (Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2007), 19-108. Xu Xiaoqun examines the establishment of the modern court system in her 
book Xiaoqun Xu, Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China, 1901-1937 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
20  Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow, eds., Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural 
Change in Late Qing China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
21 David Strand, An Unfinished Republic: Leading by Word and Deed in Modern China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011). Robert Joseph Culp, Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and 
Student Politics in Southeastern China, 1912-1940 (Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University 
Press, 2007). 
22 Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge: Distributed by 
Harvard University Press, 2003). Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political 
Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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students entered the political arena and articulated their demands through public protests.23 Most 
protests were organized through informal connections in an absence of order. The politicized 
society and its demand of public expression provided context for, and interacted with, new trends 
in the realm of popular cultural production.  
In this robust openness, the powerful news media in Shanghai precipitated the formation 
of a gossip economy. The presence of many gossip publications, which disguised themselves as  
Shanghai-based publishing houses, attested to the market recognition of Shanghai’s centrality in 
the gossip industry.24 Shanghai was the information and cultural center of Republican China, 
owing to the relatively free press environment of the foreign settlements under the protection of 
treaty port extraterritoriality. The press, taking full advantage of its unique location at the 
intersection of news flow from both home and abroad with the presence of headquarters of leading 
Chinese and foreign wire services, flourished in this highly commercialized urban setting.25 A 
large body of literature on the print media in Shanghai has demonstrated the industrialization of 
print enabled by western machinery, mature commercial writing, and increasingly professional 
journalism since the Christian missionaries introduced modern journalism and technology in the 
nineteenth century.26 Various publications, including women’s journal emerging in the 1910s, 
                                                            
23 Fabio Lanza, Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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26 Christopher A. Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937 (Vancouver: UBC 
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served as a device for accessing the possibility of integrating multiple social segments into larger 
political projects. 27 In particular, western-style newspapers introduced the category of “news” as 
the new convention of organizing information. This brought about public attention to current 
affairs, an epistemological shift toward factuality, and the press’s articulation of public opinion.28  
The entertainment publishing also benefited from the growing market, and plenty of 
commercial writers suggested new commercial and political directions to the news media. The 
business of selling pleasure grew out of an existing literati culture of play that was informing a 
new urban lifestyle since the late Qing.29  Moreover, studies demonstrate that in this seemingly 
flippant world, the spirit of anti-establishment and an impudent attitude toward authority dwelled. 
Accordingly, Wang showcases how the late Qing literati criticized officials in the form of funny 
talks, while Rea argues that Republican intellectuals re-discovered the joke in the 1920s as a tool 
of deriding and satirizing political arenas. 30  The early Republican tabloid and small-scale 
                                                            
Associations in Shanghai, 1912-1937 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Barbara Mittler, A 
Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872-1912 (Cambridge, 
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(Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2015). 
28 Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 
1872-1912 (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004); Rudolf G. Wagner, ed., 
Joining the Global Public: Word, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870-1910 (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2007). Andrea Janku, “The Uses of Genres in the Chinese 
Press,” in From Woodblocks to the Internet: Chinese Publishing and Print Culture in Transition, circa 
1800 to 2008, ed. Cynthia Joanne Brokaw and Christopher A. Reed (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 111-
158. 
29 Catherine Vance Yeh, Shanghai Love: Courtesans, Intellectuals, and Entertainment Culture, 1850-
1910 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). Andrea S. Goldman, Opera and the City: The 
Politics of Culture in Beijing, 1770-1900 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012); Joshua 
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University of California Press, 2007); Di Wang, The Teahouse: Small Business, Everyday Culture, and 
Public Politics in Chengdu, 1900-1950 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008).  
30 Christopher G. Rea, The Age of Irreverence: A New History of Laughter in China (Oakland, California: 
University of California Press, 2015); Juan Wang, Merry Laughter and Angry Curses: The Shanghai 
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publishing companies channeled energies of a wider array of social groups beyond literati and 
intellectuals to include journalists, novelists, prostitutes, detectives, and officials. Envisioning a 
larger market, they incorporated the politically newsworthy into the popular pursuit of pleasure. 
As a result, it opened up new possibilities of political publicity. Therefore, a close analysis of 
gossip in early Republican Shanghai will show how, despite a long tradition of gossiping about 
public figures in Chinese history, this new array of social groups took advantage of unprecedented 
political and institutional spaces to pursue their interests.  
 
Publicity and the Popular Shift in China’s Republicanism 
The continuous scholarly interest in early Republican political culture has advanced our 
understanding of republicanism and political activism in different forms. Most works revealed the 
persistence of elite leadership in cultivating citizenry and hammering out the meanings of 
republicanism. Culp argues that elite activists incorporated a coherent concept of national 
community and political participation into middle school curriculum and extracurricular activities 
of self-government associations.31 Strand locates the civic life of the early Republic in political 
leaders’ face-to-face public speeches while observing face-to-face communication as an indicator 
of people’s liberation from hierarchical social orders.32  In her study of people’s daily lives and 
political rituals, Harrison astutely observes that people heavily relied on the state, against which 
they protested or resisted for the inspiration and resources to formulate their actions.33 Scholars 
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tend to emphasize the state and the frameworks and practices of the elite in terms of Chinese 
Republicanism, which often envisioned the mass of ordinary people as the objects of education 
and transformation.  
By studying the gossip production and consumption, this dissertation captures the vital role 
of non-elite players in pushing forward a more radical popular shift in the political culture. 
Empowered by the rapidly growing gossip industry, commercial writers, publishers and 
even ordinary chatterers replaced intellectuals and reformists in the position of knowledge 
producers. For commercial reasons, editors who drew from and adapted raw materials from 
detectives, prostitutes or ordinary readers, willingly kept grassroots tastes and popular beliefs in 
their gossip publications. Consequently, clusters of fragmented yet amusing stories about national 
and regional political leaders linked national politics with individual everyday communication. 
These clusters abandoned the supercilious educational tone associated with traditionally elite 
genres, entrusting ordinary people’s cognitive and moral capabilities, and reconfiguring power 
relations among the people, the elites, and the state. Through gossip about affairs, such as President 
Li Yuanhong’s romance with opera singers, and regional warlord Zhang Zongchang’s bizarre 
family banquet, both the educated middle class and illiterate idle talkers could exercise agency in 
questioning or confirming the trustworthiness of politicians and militarists attacking the 
truthfulness of official messages; thus influencing public opinion and even the behavior of public 
figures. The industry thereby significantly lowered the social and cultural barrier to enter the public 
discussion, promoting multi-directional, lateral communications on an everyday basis. In this 
fashion, Republican value and practice, such as the right of free expression and popular 
engagement, became more popular among commoners. 
                                                            
1911-1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
 16 
The literature on gossip has expanded its definition from a private oral activity limited 
among intimate groups to a new understanding of written gossip as public communication via print 
media. Accordingly, scholars have expanded their exploration of gossip's function from shaping 
social value, facilitating social bonding, forming group identity, to generating discursive power.34 
Tebbutt’s study on the social function of gossip in the working class shows this earlier focus on 
communication in private spaces and intimate ties.35 Earlier interest in gossipy stories as a political 
medium, represented by Robert Darton, scrutinized the political messages and production of 
stories about the King under the old regime adhering to a strong sense of secrecy.36 Shifting the 
focus away from a literary underground, Nicole Parsons credits print texts about the Queen’s 
pregnancy and sexual relationships with public political effects in 18th century England.37 She 
argues that in the negotiation between secrecy and publicity, gossip gave rise to the emergence of 
the public sphere.38 Republican Chinese entertainment media also attached political meanings to 
                                                            
34 Anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists and historians have explored the role of gossip in a wide 
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the social lives of public figures and their everyday indulgence, making these tidbits public matters 
and communal concern. Given the presence of players from a wider range of social and political 
sectors, the leading role played by entertainment media, and the coexistence of old imperial 
tradition and new political ideas, gossip in early Republican China manifested the dual-function 
of mediating between the powerful and various social sectors. It also established a new relationship 
between the private and the public. It changed the practices and implications of publicity by 
blending entertainment with politics. For instance, when an array of non-elite social actors started 
giving political meaning to the publicity of political leaders’ private lives, the leaders themselves 
had a common understanding to formulate their own strategies of using privacy as a form of 
political publicity a decade later.  
A study of the early Republican gossip industry allows us to trace the historical formation 
of sensationalized entertainment media as a legitimate ground for publicity. Contrary to 
Habermas’s description about the degeneration of the public sphere, the public arena opened up 
by the gossip industry resonated with the irrational urban publics in Farge and Lean’s cases. 
Habermas’s German model of the public sphere defines publicity as a process of consensus 
formation, in which critical discussion purified opinions full of self-interests into rational public 
opinion, thereby influencing the exercise of power. He condemns the changing concept of publicity 
from this process of opinion making, to “staged and manipulative publicity” without any critical 
discussion.39 Arguing against Harbermas' emphasis on the bourgeois rational criticism, Farge's 
study on various rumors circulating among lower-class Parisians in the 18th century, argues for the 
existence of irrational and fragmented public arena where undereducated ordinary people made 
                                                            
39 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 
208. 
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their own judgment.40 Lean’s examination of the trial of a revengeful 1930s murder case in China, 
brought historical inquiry into China’s mass media era. She further raised the importance of the 
sentiment for public participation and demonstrated how the Confucian moral authority 
legitimized the public opinion, which supported violent revenge and refuted the rule of penal law.41 
Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on the irrational public of an earlier period in China along 
with publicity as a form of political communication bolstered by commercial forces and constituted 
by a multitude of fragmented views.  
The process of publicity involving gossip communication allowed a complex of elements 
including reason, emotion, desire and imagination to interplay and coexist. In the 1930s Shi 
Jianqiao case discussed by Lean, public emotion was legitimized by the authority of filial piety, a 
moral concern that appealed to the majority as a solid reason for extraordinary treatment of 
leniency for the female assassin.  But the expanded gossip community did not forge a collective 
view to endorse certain moral authority. Nor did it display neutralized moral views commonly 
found in late Qing opera plays, as revealed by Goldman.42 When the entertainment media and 
people’s political voices displayed a mutually reliant relationship, the process of making gossipy 
accounts became a living — and often random — the interplay of intuitive judgments and 
emotional charges, unlikely to result in any coherent and consensual opinion. Nonetheless, these 
lighthearted and disjointed acts of publicity challenged the elite and official authorities. As a result, 
gossip collections indiscriminately recorded a multitude of views, including anti-corruption 
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criticism, the envy for a leader’s amorous experience, mockery of awkward behaviors and the 
pursuit of pure sensational pleasure. 
The prosperous gossip industry certainly did not result in any permanent institutional 
manifestation and had little impact upon the formation of the democratic structure that organized 
public debate and political election. The commercial and cultural forces behind the gossip 
production did not have the capacity to retain their independence in the face of a strong political 
power and its patronage in the late 1920s. According to intellectuals, and the government that 
stressed on national identity and serious political discussion, this mixture of entertainment and 
politics constituted as an obstacle to the cultivation of Chinese citizenship. Intellectuals and 
educators warned against the danger of such market-oriented trivialization of political occurrences 
distorting the picture of national politics. They were also worried about the fragmented and 
amusing messages averting public attention from major national and political issues. The 
intellectual denouncement, the state’s suppression of scandalous accounts, and official instructions 
on where to find political information, all reflected the persistent rivalry between producers of self-
described serious political knowledge and those of politically-related popular knowledge. This 
rivalry did not change until the late 1920s when the Nationalists attempted to mend the distracting 
effect of gossip. They introduced more rational thinking in terms of national political interest in 
the public discussion of a political figure's private life.  
 
Varied Control Mechanisms and an Early Republican State Revisited 
The unprecedented political openness and vigorous engagement fueled the state’s attempt 
to control the range and practice of public discussion. With the establishment of a new state 
apparatus for information regulation including the police, censorship system, and propaganda 
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bureau, the early Republican state surveillance became far more effective than the dual-system of 
imperial memorials and secret reports that gathered information for the central government of the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).43 But very little research has addressed the control of information 
flow in the years before the rise of the Nationalist Party in 1927. Studies examining the early 
growth of the modern Chinese state focus on the Nationalist state’s use of top-down mechanisms 
of information control and manipulation including propaganda and censorship regulation.44 They 
demonstrate that, under the rule of the Nationalists, information control was not only a means to 
secure centralization but also crucial to the ideological unification of a disciplined social body.45 
Historical narratives of the growing state penetration into societies tend to skip the warlord 
period. The second half of my dissertation looks into information policy and strategies of the 
young state from 1916 to 1927 and shows that the warlord conflicts did not interrupt the 
disciplinary tendencies. While arguing against the earlier misconception of China merely having 
a nominal center during the warlord era, I also shed light on various ways that the early 
Republican government sought to build a Republican polity. 
The central government—also known as the Beiyang government (1912-1928) because it 
was dominated by the militarists originated from the Beiyang Army— had to cope with many 
problems in their attempts to discipline unruly public discussion. The boundaries of state were 
vague in late imperial China because of the absence of a coherent civil society, the court’s 
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limited control over local bureaucracy, and the mediating roles played by the gentry class.46 The 
shape and exercise of the state authority became even more complicated in the politically 
fragmented early Republican period. Powerful militarists, senior officials, and the bureaucratic 
body of different levels under the control of various powers all competed to present themselves 
as a force of state authority. There was also fluidity of power because of the constant shifting of 
alliance among the multiple military and political cliques. This fluid situation made the central 
government relatively weak but at the same time more flexible and able to experiment with 
various techniques of governance and to wield power from different coalitions. The fledgling 
state also had to handle two unprecedented problems related to regulating information and 
knowledge production. The first one was related to the issue of the popular sovereignty that 
emerged from its claim to being a Republican polity. After overthrowing Yuan Shikai’s 
notorious Monarchy Restoration plan, the new Republican central government under the 
leadership of Anhui clique militarist Duan Qirui denounced Yuan’s stifling press policy and 
announced their support of the freedom of expression. The second major difficulty was the 
presence of extraterritoriality that legally prevented Chinese authorities from interfering in the 
affairs of the foreign settlements, where most publishers were registered. 
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To re-claim its authority over public political knowledge, one measure the central 
government took was to collaborate with cultural elites and local book-seller associations to 
construct a censorship system in the name of popular education. In 1915, the central government 
reorganized the Popular Education Research Society, a scholarly institution, into a state 
apparatus to supervise the production of popular cultural products ranging from print books and 
theatrical performances, to public speeches. Through this organization, the state attempted to 
define “proper” popular knowledge by ranking all the popular works and legitimizing serious 
political news as the venue for citizens’ political knowledge. Given its limited sovereign power, 
the state relied on the prestige and expertise of educators and governed in coalition with local 
book sellers associations by means of moral suasion to place pressure onto publishers and 
writers. Different from the late imperial model of state-gentry collaboration, and more than 
having these elites function as mediators of state power, the central government borrowed the 
power from well-established cultural and social elites to legitimize its rule and expand its 
sovereignty into the foreign settlement. The strong efforts to institutionalize and formalize the 
collaboration with educators framed the elite practice directly under the state authority and 
organization. Although the reach of the Beiyang government was limited due to strong local 
forces, this strategy generated an authoritative effect that made the presence of a state visible to 
an unruly society.  
To penetrate into the foreign settlement while conforming with the rule of law, the central 
government also depended on the foreign judicial system to curb unfavorable descriptions of 
political personalities in Shanghai-based newspapers. In Republican China, prior to the 
emergence of a libel law as part of the 1928 Nationalist Penal Law, the criminal category of 
“insults to officials” replaced the Qing criminal code’s focus on punishing those who 
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disseminated traitorous words about the emperor. English-language literature on the defamation 
laws examines the power relations reflected in the conflicts between reputation protection and 
freedom of expression. Most scholars have argued for the wide latitudes the defamation law gave 
to censors and the states.47 But a 1919 defamation lawsuit between the Beijing government and 
the Shanghai Republican Daily over the newspaper’s playful description of the President 
suggested a more equalized relationship between the state and media institutions, as well as the 
entanglement of legal and media practices. The legal dispute revealed the boundary between 
serious political knowledge and the playful popular knowledge allowed by the state. The press’s 
utility of the defamation lawsuit as a source of amusement further help elucidate how the 
media’s exploration of the publicity dimension of defamation litigation transformed the meaning 
and effect of a lawsuit.  
The dominance of the mass media was eventually checked by a new control mechanism 
from within the industry invented by the rising Nationalist regime. In 1927, the merging of 
political party and political leader as one force behind the gossip production in the tabloid press 
prompted a tendency of nationalizing gossip. The Nationalist Party adjusted their propaganda 
methods so as to mobilize the masses in a style and language that were familiar and attractive to 
them. Cooperating with a leading tabloid paper and novelists, they advocated an interpretive 
approach to gossip: to imbue revolutionary ideology in the narrative of the party leader’s love 
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life as a means of party propaganda and leadership construction. This approach diminished the 
entertainment value of tabloid articles and changed them into a vehicle of political opinion. 
However, the attempts to use gossip for propaganda and the unofficial fun-seeking aspect of 
gossiping collided when the media-savvy couple, Jiang Jieshi and Song Meilin, took advantage 
of the commercial force and the diffusive effect of gossip to publicize their prominent political 
and social status. The coopted way of propaganda, which derived its openness and power from 
unofficial communications, marked the decline of the gossip industry. 
These administrative, moral, and legal measures proved the presence of a central 
government and its attempts to intervene, in the warlord era. But the Nationalists were more 
astute enough to utilize and penetrate the gossip industry when they lacked the power to police it. 
The different policies of the Beiyang government and the Nationalist Party illustrated a shift 
from the official means to an unofficial one. If in the late 1910s the gossip industry could 
reinforce its discursive power and autonomy in the antagonist relation with the central 
government, the official voices against which the gossip industry defined itself sought to 
collaborate with and hence to rein in unofficial communications in the final years of the warlord 
period. The collaborative relationship between a leading political party and gossip publishers 
attacked the foundation of the industry. With this experience, the Nationalists later applied this 
successful strategy of control from within onto literary censorship in the 1930s.48 
 
Chapter Outline 
I take a broadened interdisciplinary view in the dissertation to reveal the connectedness 
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among different agents and facets of the early Republican gossip surrounding political leaders. 
Chapter 1 reviews the socioeconomic aspect of gossip production before unpacking different 
themes of knowledge making, state censorship, defamation law and party propaganda in the four 
succeeding chapters. Among various types of print products, I have narrowed my focus to 
commercial newspaper columns, tabloid news and a new genre of heimu (scandal) for they 
manifested new characteristics of published gossip in the early twentieth century. 
Chapter 1 focuses its inquiry on the practice of a commercially driven group of gossip 
producers, who ranged from old-style literati to under-educated opportunists. Gossip production 
in the early Republican period differed from late Qing news reportage in scale, content, 
participators, mode of sharing, and driving forces. I show that the gossip industry in the late 
1910s was shifting away from a traditional system structured by literati values and reformist 
agendas to a more professionalized and highly market-oriented information retail business. 
Commercial profitability and informal interactions defined the intersection of elites and non-elite 
informants. The expanded community of gossipmongers differed from the past when people with 
different social, educational, and vocational backgrounds formed segregated information 
communities. The new community and commercial-driven approaches influenced the practice 
and identity of tabloid writers. For example, the practice of Bao Tianxiao (包天笑, 1875-1973), a 
contracted writer of the Crystal, reveals the vocational norm of a tabloid man and his ambivalent 
relationship with this occupation.  
Chapter 2 turns to the content, editorial claims, generic style, and marketing strategies of 
gossip products to examine how they constituted popular political knowledge and gave agency to 
information consumers. The early Republican editors promoted gossip about political leaders as 
an entertaining and reliable form of political knowledge. The dual association with entertainment 
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and political significance helped construct a new link between commoners and political 
knowledge. Special attention is paid to the mass production mode and interactive consumption 
encouraged by the new genre of heimu writing. The blurred line between producers and 
consumers contributed to an unprecedentedly open and vibrant participatory culture. Popular 
engagement in the process of knowledge producing and consuming suggests a transformation 
from top-down, one-way knowledge transmission to one of multi-directional information 
exchange. The audience influenced knowledge production not only indirectly through “public 
taste,” but also as direct agents who brought in new information. 
 Chapter 3 argues that the central government assumed crucial functions during this period 
of constant shifts in power and political fragmentation. For example, it monitored public 
knowledge and constructed its own ability to shape knowledge by collaborating with cultural 
elites and key social organizations. The working reports (1916-1919) of Popular Education 
Research Society (the de facto authority over national popular education under the Ministry of 
Education) shed light on these government practices. The central government recognized the 
value of gossip as a vehicle to disseminate popular knowledge even as it constantly questioned 
gossip’s legitimacy as an information source. The government also sought to sanction knowledge 
for the masses through the practice of censorship and state-sponsored open lectures. Like its 
imperial predecessor, the central government insisted that it was the sole arbiter of knowledge 
and morality. By evaluating gossip collections, vetting publishers and writers, and 
institutionalizing so-called open lectures, the central government sought to penetrate the realm of 
knowledge production and discipline the circuits of distribution and reception of knowledge.  
 In Chapter 4, I turn to a 1919 case in which Duan Qirui’s (段祺瑞,1865-1936) government 
sued the Republican Daily for insulting the President and senior officials to illustrate the 
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government’s use of legal instruments to curb playful reports in the realm of serious political 
news. The direct source of the friction was an article published in the newspaper that derides the 
personal relations between the statesmen and their political connection to the Japanese by 
playfully fabricating a family lineage. The debate surrounding the nature of the article allows us 
to see how the state and media negotiated the shifting boundary between political discussion and 
entertainment. The Beijing government won its litigation, but ultimately failed to rehabilitate its 
reputation. The press demonstrated its leverage in constructing public opinion by turning the 
litigation itself into an extra layer of amusing stories. Gossip refused to be framed in legal terms 
and further drew on the publicity dimension of defamation litigation to make more profits. 
Defamation litigation in the 1920s was increasingly seen as a mechanism to manage one’s 
publicity rather than a means to tame the mass media.  
 The last chapter examines the Nationalist Party and its leader’s accommodation of the 
communication reality and the emergence of a type of authorized gossip to increase political 
visibility in 1927. If leaders in the early 1910s attempted to set up a positive public image in 
newspapers to rectify unfavorable gossip and rumors, the Nationalist Party and Jiang Jieshi 
(A.K.A. Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975) drew on the discursive power of gossip to make self-
exposure into a form of organized political propaganda. Official publicity intensified the 
politicization of the gossip industry and changed gossip into an interpretive tool to convey state-
sponsored political meanings. In particular, I investigate Jiang Jieshi’s coordinated effort to 
control publicity surrounding his romantic life and wedding ceremony in 1927. Jiang re-modeled 
himself into a national embodiment of the revolutionary spirit in a fictional account, tabloid 
reports, and a wedding newsreel, while still allowing these media narratives to become 
commercialized. The publicity of the eventful Jiang-Song wedding was fraught with tensions 
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between propagandist political meanings, the commercial interests of cooperating entrepreneurs, 
and the public desire for entertainment. This persistent tension characterized the self-
contradictory form of authorized gossip and doomed its short-lived fate. Closing with a 
discussion of the rising consciousness of political visibility among political figures in the late 
1920s, the project also explains why the early Republican openness quickly became subjugated 





Gossipmongers in the Early Republican Gossip Economy 
 
Introduction 
In the decade immediately after Yuan Shikai’s reign (1912-1916), gossip about political 
leaders proliferated in Shanghai’s commercial print media. A myriad of trivial matters concerning 
political elites were adapted to meet the needs of gossip columns in commercial dailies, tabloids, 
and novels described as “unofficial history.” Gossip production in the late 1910s and early 1920s 
was shifting away from the late Qing system, which was structured by either reformist agendas or 
literati values, to a more professionalized and highly market-oriented, information-retailing 
business. This chapter examines the commercialization of gossip production by focusing on the 
connections and practices of the early Republican gossipmongers. I argue that the 
commercialization of gossip about political leaders greatly expanded the community of knowledge 
production and professionalized the practice of information collecting and processing under the 
organization of media institutions such as tabloids. Gossip for its commercial values became a 
force that integrated and mediated the interaction of people from different social sectors. The 
expansion of the gossip production community not only challenged the old knowledge authority 
established by the elite class, but also formed an open vision of public knowledge. 
The chapter commences with an overview of the scope and operation of the gossip 
economy. It shows that the high profit and low investment of the gossip trade encouraged 
individuals and publishing institutions to participate in this business. The tabloid press and small-
scale publishing companies were two major types of leading institutions that boosted this gossip 
economy and functioned as a glue to coordinate among different information traders. The 
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following two sections explore the community and practices of gossip producers, specifically, the 
informant network and hired media practitioners of a leading Shanghai tabloid The Crystal (晶報). 
Section two foregrounds an inclusive information web of gossipmongers across varying 
social-economic strata. Through social and financial means, the Crystal integrated correspondents, 
old-styled literati, popular novelists, officials, grassroots private newsagents, and Japanese 
journalists into a loose information-sharing community. This early Republican network was 
characterized by a more complicated social composition and profit-driven practices, and 
subsequently, the marginalization of literati ethics and reformist agendas. It was significantly 
different from the past when people with different social, educational, and vocational backgrounds 
formed segregated information communities. Commercial profitability and informal interactions 
defined the intersection of elites and non-elite informants. The network suggested a heterogeneous 
community of knowledge production in the early Republican era with tolerance for disparate 
voices and alternative facts. 
The final section takes a closer look at the practice of tabloid writer and reformist editor 
Bao Tianxiao (包天笑, 1875-1973) in this media institution and its network. Bao’s diary records 
his networking activities, working load, responsibilities for the tabloid, and the numerous titles of 
the articles he composed in the mid-1920s. It reveals his treatment of gossip writer as an occupation 
despite of his ambivalent identity in the new media environment. Bao’s practice revealed the 
influence of serious journalism upon the development of some vocational norm in the tabloid press 
and the impact of an expanded community onto the identity of a commercial writer. Bao’s use of 
multiple pennames to hide his real identity in the Crystal also showed a reformist’s hesitation to 
whole-heartedly embrace purely profitable writings. The commercialization of gossip for 
practitioners like Bao was met with reservation and required more justification. 
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The Gossip Economy 
After 1916, Shanghai witnessed an eruption of gossip-in-print about leading military and 
political figures from state ministers to regional warlords. Daily commercial newspapers such as 
China Times (時事新報) experimented with different columns of tidbits about political figures. 
Inspired by the newspaper supplements, the tabloid press staged a comeback in 1919 with a much 
bolder commercial approach. Book publishers quickly followed to invest in gossip publications of 
various types, among which scandal collections had achieved incredible market success. Popular 
magazines joined later but specialized in lengthy featured reports of the private lives of political 
individuals. A magazine New Moon (??) could freely put stories about President Li Yuanhong 
(???, 1864-1928) on the first page that gossiped about why he treated his concubine better than 
his wife, his favorite opera actress and the friction between him and another official in the opera 
house.1 These texts were not produced for moral education but to motivate impulse purchases once 
readers opened the cover.  
Gossip became more profitable business than advocating an enlightenment project, 
expressing literati political view, or displaying cultivated knowledge. In the late imperial period, 
disseminating political gossip was largely conducted in an exclusive community of like-minded 
literati, but in the twentieth century this practice had gradually developed into a specialized 
publishing industry targeting a much larger and impersonal audience. In the early Republican 
period, reformist vernacular newspapers as the vehicle for imperial gossip waned.2 Shanghai 
                                                            
1 “Li Huangpi Yishi,” [Anecdotes of Li Huangpi] Xin Yue no. 3 (1926): 1–2. 
2 Overall, some vernacular newspapers were still popular in Beijing and reached lower segments of 
society including prostitutes and rickshaw pullers. But threatened by with the violent intrusion of 
militarists, vernacular newspapers exposed very few warlord stories. Instead, they retained their focus on 
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publishing entrepreneurs saw the profitability of this information business and took over the 
market. Market popularity determined the price of information. Compared to other popular cultural 
products, publications focused on gossip and inside stories about political celebrities were highly 
priced. In 1918, a poster made by Qinghua Bookstore (清華書局) put together advertisements for 
a variety of popular books. Warlord stories and palace anecdotes were the most expensive among 
the seven titles, selling eight jiao per book. Romantic and martial art novels were half the price 
and a multi-volume collection, after a discount, only cost one yuan two jiao.3 The well-known 
editor and novelist Bao Tianxiao commented on the profitability of scandalous accounts when he 
surprisingly found that relatively higher prices did not affect market demand.
4
  
Information about political figures’ private affairs also had a hidden price in the “off-the-
table market” as some publishers wielded this power in activities bordering on blackmail. In the 
late 1910s, publishers often advertised gossip-oriented books in major commercial newspapers to 
solicit pre-orders. Advertisements with the names of political figures and the occasional pre-
publication sample prints served to test market demand while functioning as a form of blackmail. 
In 1917, a retired senior official received a sample collection of political scandals and discovered 
an “inner chamber” secret about himself and his concubine. He communicated with the book 
publisher and made a payment of five hundred yuan in exchange for the publisher withholding his 
                                                            
the former imperial family and Manchu royalists. Maintaining their reformist agendas, early Republican 
vernacular newspapers in Beijing emphasized serious political news and serialized fiction that reflected 
social problems. 
3 No. S313-1-121, Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
4 Bao Tianxiao. “Heimu,” originally published in Xiaoshuo huabao (1918), in Zhongguo chuban shiliao 
jindai bufen [Sources for Chinese publishing history: modern Section] 3, ed. Song Yuanfang (Wuhan: 
Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004), 276.   
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name from the public.5 By removing a name, the publisher made profits beyond the sales of the 
book. The popular novel Unofficial History of the Old Capital City (春明外史) serialized from 
1924 to 1928 also describes such underground trades for information blockage. The protagonist in 
the novel revealed that a minister paid five hundred yuan to buy out the copyright of a book that 
threatened to expose a family incest case between his concubine and his sons.6 In reality, a current 
minister had paid much more to prevent the impending disclosure of embarrassing information. 
Another example comes from the newspaper publisher Lin Baishi, who disclosed a minister’s 
indulgence in gambling in the 1920s after the minister had ceased sponsorship of Lin’s paper. It is 
said that the minister reluctantly paid Lin 20,000 yuan to silence him.7 The price of information in 
this underground exchange fluctuated from case to case according to the individual negotiation 
between the public figure and the publisher. A minister in office was willing to spend a fortune to 
prevent stories from destroying his political career, whereas a retired official was worth 
comparatively less for only for preserving his reputation as a well-behaved gentleman. Such 
blackmailing was one of the official reasons why the Nationalist Government in 1933 investigated 
all the small papers and issued a restrictive ban.8  
Among the three types of media institutions in the industry—newspaper supplements, 
tabloid papers, and small-scale publishing houses specializing in short story collections—the 
                                                            
5 “Heimu xiaoshuo,” [Scandal stories] in Zhongguo chuban shiliao jindai bufen [Sources for Chinese 
publishing history: modern Section] 3, 277-278.   
6 Zhang Hengshui, Chunming waishi [Unofficial history of the old capital city] (Shanghai: Shijie shuju, 
1931), Chapter 5. 
7 “Lin Baishi beisha shimo,” [The complete story of Lin Baishi's death] in Gao Baishi, Guchunfeng lou 
suoji [Trivial records from the old spring-wind studio] 2 (Taipei: Taiwan xinshengbao, 1960), 378-382. 
8 No. J181-020-10507, Beijing Municipal Archives; No. 2-1-37, Guangdong Provincial Archives. The 
Nationalist regulation of tabloid press will be discussed in the Epilogue. 
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tabloid press confirmed its leadership in the 1920s. In 1916, China Times started a column for 
trivial news about political leaders, and, over the next 10 years, gossipy information became 
important for the commercial success of the newspaper. 9  The tremendous profitability of 
seemingly unserious information in the supplementary columns inspired a newspaper manager to 
turn supplement pages into independent tabloids. Represented by the famous tri-daily tabloid the 
Crystal (晶報), which was founded in 1919, these tabloid papers became a popular press in the 
new age and differed from the late Qing literati tabloids that comprised literati political criticism 
with commercial writings.10 Confident gossip experts with stronger commercial incentives learned 
methods of newsgathering and news-making from major dailies and surpassed their supplement 
pages in the 1920s. A commemorative article in 1923 claimed that more than 100,000 readers were 
reading the Crystal and its sales volume ranked third among newspapers of all kinds.11 Market 
success helped them achieve economic independence while many dailies had to rely on subsidies. 
The low production cost and almost immediate monetary reward encouraged many small 
profit-driven publishing houses to join this thriving business. It was common for commercial 
enterprises to immediately follow the most popular forms invented or content sold in newspaper 
supplements and tabloids. With access to a large cache of published stories, compilers appropriated 
and loosely re-organize selected pieces under marketable concepts of “fun” or “secrets.” 
Duplication and free recycling led to the wide circulation and low cost of trivial information in the 
region around Shanghai. Tabloid editors’ complaints about plagiarism were powerless to stop the 
                                                            
9 Chunhua, “Shishi xinbao de xiaolaopo qiang,” [China Times' concubine tone] Jing Bao, May 24, 1927. 
10 Catherine Yeh, Shanghai Love: Courtesans, Intellectuals, and Entertainment Culture, 1850-1910 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). 
11 “Sizhounian chuangkan jinian,” [Fourth year commemoration] Jing Bao. October 6, 1923. 
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century-long practice of copy-and-paste, which continued into the new era and drove this new print 
industry.12 But, unlike the late imperial literati’s pursuit of a comprehensive compilation to display 
their knowledge, the early republican publishers were motivated by the bigger commercial rewards 
of very little capital investment and labor input. Lu Yunqi (魯云奇) initiated the book project of 
Panorama of scandals in China (中国黑幕大观) when he was an ordinary clerk at the Heji Book 
Company (和記圖書公司). He managed to cut down the budget for information gathering by 
calling for public contributions, which he learned from the newspapers, and effectively raised 
money for the project by promoting pre-order sales for half the price. The tactic of frequent re-
prints in a short period was another common practice among small companies. Rewards earned in 
the first round of distribution could cover the cost of re-printing. In addition, the high re-print times 
advertised on the cover page could demonstrate the popularity of the book. Republican 
intellectuals described these publishing companies as “opportunists” (滑頭書店) for their risk-
avoiding and trend-following traits.13 Book publishers were less creative and less resourceful than 
tabloids but nonetheless still sensitive to market demand of the larger segments of the society. 
Some of them were good at vulgarizing popular content to meet the need of semi-literate gossip 
consumers.  
Rapid development of tabloids and the proliferation of gossip books demanded a constant 
supply of new stories and therefore writers with access to sources were highly valued. A 
                                                            
12 The practice of copying and pasting had already been common since the Ming Dynasty when literati 
blended entries from other biji works into their own. See Yue Yong, “Lun Siku quanshu zongmu zhong 
de biji guan,” [A discussion on the view of Biji in Siku quanshu bibliography] Xinjiangdaxue xuebao 
[Journal of Xinjiang University] 6 (2013): 122-125. 
13 “Shenghuo quanguo zongshumu bianli,” [LIFE: national bibliography] in Zhongguo xiandai chuban 
shiliao [Primary Sources of Modern Chinese Publishing History], ed. Zhang Jinglu (Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1955), 329. 
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successful writer could earn his living only by writing for gossip columns. Occasional 
contributions to a tabloid might be paid 20 yuan per month in the 1920s.14 Regular writers 
received a lot more. In 1925, the Crystal offered tabloid writer Bao Tainxiao (包天笑) a monthly 
salary of more than 120 yuan in exchange for his steady supply of written stories within 2000 
characters every issue. This extra income could cover the living expenses of his family in 
Shanghai for two to three months.15 In mid-1920s, this amount was almost twice as high as the 
income of a municipal-level civil servant and five times higher than that of an ordinary editor. An 
ordinary editor working in a midsize publishing house earned only 20 yuan per month and a 
valuable journalist in a profitable news agency received a monthly salary of 40 yuan.16 The 
lucrative business engaged more social and cultural agents ranging from amateur players to news 
experts, and from elites who upheld literati lifestyles to modern-minded newspaper managers. 
The growing literacy in the early Republican era and subsequent expanding urban market 
for popular cultural products bolstered this gossip industry. The consumption of frivolous books 
in the commercially prosperous lower Yangzi region could be, at latest, traced to the early sixteenth 
century, when a surge in the commercial publications of low quality vernacular prints indicated a 
broadened reading public including relatively unlearned people.17 But limited primary sources 
could not clearly delineate this broader audience. Extant primary materials allowed quantitative 
                                                            
14 “Baoyu huabao,” [Talking about newspapers in its supplements] Fu Er Mo Si, August 13, 1936.  
15 Bao Tianxiao, Chuanyinglou huiyilu [Chuanyinglou reminiscence] (Beijing: Zhongguo dabaikequanshu 
chubanshe, 2009), 324-325. 
16 Zhang Jinglu, Zai chubanjie ershi nian [My twenty years in the print industry] (Shanghai: Shanghai 
zazhigongsi, 1933), 101. 
17 Cynthia Brokaw, “Reading the Best-sellers of the Nineteenth Century: Commercial Publishing in 
Sibao,” in Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China, eds. Cynthia Joanne Brokaw and Kai-wing 
Chow (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 184-189. 
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analysis on the size of the reading public and its growth in the modern era. Des Forges made an 
optimistic estimation that more than 60 percent of adult males and 10 to 30 percent of adult women 
in Shanghai could read novels and newspapers in the late nineteenth century. Servants, factory 
workers, and coolies were among the readers of popular novels.18 Based on Leo Ou-fan and Perry 
Link’s studies, Xu Xiaoqun has estimated that, in Shanghai, the readers of vernacular texts 
amounted to 2 to 4 million in the 1910s and reached more than 15 percent of the city population 
in the early 1930s.19 That is to say, from 1916 to 1928, local readers who could read easy-to-read 
tabloids, political novels, and scandal collections increased and accounted for approximately 3% 
to 15% of the general population.  
In the late 1910s, the consumers of scandal collections revealed that middle class readers 
including businessmen, salary men, and middle school students formed the majority of gossip 
publication purchasers. They were better educated, well trained, and supported by stable income 
to afford cultural entertainment. But by the mid-1920s at least tabloids had attracted socially 
diverse readers including the urban poor. Some oral performers at entertainment quarters also 
subscribed to tabloids to update themselves with the freshest materials.20 In 1925, a popular 
magazine noted that “it is more often seen that a rickshaw coolie poring a sight over a scrap of 
newspaper while awaiting his passenger.”21 In 1928, the nationalist senior adviser Wu Zhihui’s 
congratulatory text addressed the role the tabloid press played in assisting semi-literate people to 
                                                            
18 Alexander Townsend Des Forges, Mediasphere Shanghai: The Aesthetics of Cultural Production 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 10. 
19 Xiaoqun Xu, Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in 
Shanghai, 1912-1937 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 47-48. 
20 Ni Zhongzhi, Zhongguo xiangsheng shi [A history of Chinese cross-talk performance] (Wuhan: wuhan 
daxue chubanshe, 2015), 182. 
21 Chinese Recorder, 5 (1925): 293-394.  
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learn as he observed that workers and patrons in small shops and teahouses all read tabloid 
papers.22 From the late 1910s to the late 1920s, the readership of gossip publications expanded 
from the urban middle class to a more inclusive community including shop staff, lowbrow 
comedians, and rickshaw pullers.  
The industry developed in the chaotic era with minimum regulatory forces because of 
political decentralization and extraterritoriality. All of the aforementioned publishers registered in 
foreign settlements, which protected their businesses from direct intervention by the Chinese 
authorities. The customary rules that were used within households to limit the competition of 
family-centered printing industries for popular texts in the nineteenth century were no longer 
applicable in this new context.23 Public criticism, the bookseller associations, and the mechanism 
of the market had some effect on the content, yet did little to police business operations.24 The 
early Republican gossip economy thus was characterized by the proliferation of products, 
disorderly competition, and the prevalence of blackmailing. Under competitive pressures from 
within the industry and other news media, participants fought to uncover more fresh stories or 
invent new genres to sell their products. The expansion of the gossip network to integrate a wider 
range of society should be attributed to the market forces and commercializing efforts. 
 
                                                            
22 Nationalist Party Archives. No. Jianbao-8526. Original article: Danweng, “Wuzhilao peng xiaobao,”  
[Mr. Wu holding small papers] Jing Bao, July 12,1928. Teahouses in Shanghai were occupied mostly by 
the lower society. According to travel guidebooks, two major leisure activities for ordinary citizens were 
going to teahouses and playing mahjong at home. For more information about the lower class activities in 
teahouses, see Ma Jianxing, Lao shanghai jianwen [Observations in the old Shanghai] (Shanghai: 
Guoguang shudian, 1947), 49-50.  
23 For more information about how the nineteenth century household printing industries manage copyright 
issues and competitions, see Cynthia Brokaw, Commerce in Culture: The Sibao Book Trade in the Qing 
and Republican Periods (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 177-188. 
24  See more discussions in Chapter 3. 
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An Inclusive Information Network 
The tabloid press not only provided the platform of publication but also gave institutional 
support to its editors and writers. On the one hand, the Crystal exploited the national news 
channels of major newspapers by hiring correspondents as part-time contributors, and used 
transnational channels of the Japanese news agency by exchanging information. On the other 
hand, it developed working relationships with the old literati circle as it continued into the 
Republican era, as well as with prostitutes who could easily approach political elites. Moreover, 
personal ties with officials brought in by chief editors and writers were also a constituent part of 
this extendable network. The boundary-less network revealed an enlarged and inclusive 
gossipmonger community.   
This section from the perspective of the Crystal, delineates a network in which the tabloid 
paper served as the hub connecting different informants. It was a part of an interlinked web of 
information traders and suppliers, in which other players such as newspaper correspondents also 
served as nodes bringing together informants. The expandability and inter-linked status of 
information exchange were in stark contrast to the late Qing segregation of communication 
communities. In her examination of the rumor flow in the Yang Naiwu Case in the late 19th 
century, Dong Yue identified three information communities including the local community of 
“long-tongued women,” the elite community represented by the Shanghai News (申報) and its 
readers, and the official communications that served the judicial need. Surrounding the same 
case, these different communities circulated information and specific values within themselves 
and very seldom overlapped with one another.25 The early Republican gossip network witnessed 
                                                            
25 Madeleine Yue Dong. “Communities and Communication: A Study of the Case of Yang Naiwu, 1873-
1877.” Late Imperial China no. 1 (1995): 79–119. 
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the convergence of newspapermen and local information communities. Involvement of multiple 
social sectors detached gossip production and circulation from the old culture of a closely-knit 
cultural community that shared values, language, or geographic location. Coordination of 
individual interests and ideas among these players by the market forces and network power 
replaced a membership manner in shaping the multiple conversations that crossed political, 
social, and cultural boundaries. 
Different from an earlier model of hybridity, I argue for an integrative model to look at 
this merging information community. Bryna Goodman’s framework of alternate identities and 
networks emphasized how different elements in Chinese news production coexisted and 
contended in the late Qing and early Republican era.26 But the openness and interconnection 
entailed by early Republican tabloids did not reveal any inconsistencies or contentious 
relationships. Instead, different political and cultural identities of professional correspondents, 
newsagents, and people from other walks of life did not prevent them from forming 
complementary working relationships. Neither did their activities prove Arif Dirlik’s suggestion 
that newcomers carved more boundaries.27 Instead, boundaries between communities were 
dissolving, when, for example, a prostitute became a private newsagent.  
The Crystal’s information network provides a window into the early Republican 
intersection of elite and non-elite social groups in which social status, cultural prestige, and 
wealth played less of a role. A group of scholars in the field of Shanghai studies have explored 
the Republican social networks crossing boundaries in this urban society of remarkable diversity. 
                                                            
26 Bryna Goodman, “Networks of News: Power, Language and Transnational Dimensions of the Chinese 
Press, 1850-1949,” China Review 4, no. 1 (2004): 1–10. 
27 Arif Dirlik, “Transnationalism, the Press, and the National Imaginary in Twentieth Century China,” 
China Review 4, no. 1 (2004): 11–25. 
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In the state-society relationship, they found that mercantile elites served as middlemen who kept 
many divisions of the Shanghai society together and whose wealth legitimized their power.28 The 
gossip industry suggested the existence of a broader public space in which commercial interests 
dominated the mechanisms of coordination and gossip sharing prompted communication. 
Since the early Republican tabloid press originated from newspaper supplement pages, it 
naturally relied in part on the news supply of large daily newspapers and news agencies. In the 
process of news filtering, professional correspondents sorted out trivial stories. They then 
forwarded reports of major occurrences from Beijing stations (news processing centers 
established by large dailies) to home newspapers while reserving the rest for the gossip press or 
for their own novel projects. For example, the China Times’ Beijing station was an important 
gossip supplier for the tabloid press in Shanghai. The newspaper’s correspondents Zhang 
Hengshui (張恨水, 1895-1967) and Hu Hanzhu (???) occasionally supplied stories to 
Shanghai tabloid press.29 Zhang was an invited writer for the Crystal in 1919 and his article 
exposed secret love affairs of capital officials’ concubines.30 Hu Hanzhu gathered gossip about 
militarists and ministers for another tabloid the Holmes (????). His pen names, “detective 
reports” (???) and “background actor,” (???) reveal his self-perception as an invisible 
secret exposer and temporary information supplier.31  
                                                            
28 Nara Dillon and Jean Chun Oi, eds., At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and 
State-Building in Republican Shanghai (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
29 Zhang Henshui, Xiezuo shengya huiyilu [A memoire of my career as a writer] (Beijing: 
Zhongguowenlian chubanshe, 2005), 66.  
30 Zhang is better known for weaving gossip into his novels. His practice of novelizing news has been 
well-researched by Eileen Chow, “Serial sightings: News, Novelties and an Unofficial History of the Old 
Capital.” In Carlos Rojas and Eileen Chow Eds. Rethinking Chinese Popular Culture: Cannibalizations of 
the Canon (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
31 Meng Zhaochen, Zhongguo jindai xiaobao shi [A history of modern Chinese tabloids] (Beijing: shehui 
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The Crystal was also able to induce true insiders from previously privileged political 
knowledge circles to write for gossip columns. One such invited insider was Yuan Kewen (袁克
文, 1890-1931), the second son of Yuan Shikai and a renowned master of traditional literature, 
calligraphy, and Kunqu opera. Starting from October 1920, he launched an anecdotal column, 
“Unknown stories of the Powerful,” (辛丙秘苑) in the Crystal disclosing secret stories about the 
Yuan family and the surrounding militarists.32 The column’s title “Xinbing” is an implicit 
semantic pun, referring to both the time period of Yuan Shikai’s reign and a sign of power and 
wealth in Daoist sayings, which commercial gossip editors would have avoided.33 Yuan intended 
“to document my father’s good will and to correct the misleading hearsay” and blamed Yuan’s 
faults on his mental instability and other people’s manipulation.34 It was a unique gossip column 
of the time given its use of classic language, purely personal perspective, and explicit goal of 
defending the Yuan family, by targeting a traditionally educated social group. But his identity and 
narrative style gave a strong personal tone to this featured column as a commodity for 
consumption. In addition to the commercial potential of the stories, the fact that Yuan Shikai’s 
willingly divulged family secrets served as an extraordinary selling point. The column suddenly 
stopped two months later because frictions erupted between Yuan and another editor over antique 
collecting, which reveals the role of personal relations between the writer and tabloid editors in 
                                                            
kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 187-189. 
32 “Xinbing miyuan,” [Unknown stories of the powerful] Jing Bao, October 15, 1920. 
33 In Chinese calendar, 1911 is the year of Xinhai and 1915 is the year of Bingchen. 
34 Hanyun, “Xinbing miyuan xu,” [Preface to unknown stories of the powerful] Jing Bao, October 24, 
1920. 
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this commercializing the literati gossip.35 
The unstable supply of information from newspaper correspondents and literati 
contributors were not adequate to sustain the running of a tabloid. To expand the pool of sources, 
the tabloid also institutionally maintained connections with prostitutes both financially and with 
long-term business relations. The manager and editors frequently arranged working dinners to 
gather juicy stories, instead of relying on unsound personal ties as those between the late Qing 
tabloid literati and courtesans. The Crystal took great pride in its access to this valuable source: 
“(serious) newspaper materials come from the government and warlords themselves. In contrast, 
the best materials for us were picked up in brothels. Especially when the brothels and warlords 
intersect, they could make the ultimate best stories.”36 Brothels stood at the crossroad of gossip 
flows about parliament men, high officials, and military leaders, who were popular topics of 
tabloid speculation. Numerous reports uncover Zhang Zongcang’s frequent visits to 
entertainment quarters and Cao Kun’s favorite concubines who originally came from brothels, as 
well as a militarist’s cruel break-up with top courtesans.37  
Moreover, some prostitutes dabbled in the business of private news agency to convert 
personal connections with political elites into political and economic benefits.38 Journalist Xu 
                                                            
35 Yuan Kewen, Xinbing miyuan [Unknown stories of the powerful] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 
chubanshe, 2000), 140. 
36 Danweng, “you lai le,” [Coming again] Jing Bao, March 27, 1925 
37 Xingyun, “Lu shaoshuai zhi huomai,” [Burying General Lu alive] Jing Bao, August 27, 1925; 
Mengchong, “Zhang zongchang yishi,” [Anecdotes of Zhang Zongcang] Jing Bao, January 31, 1925; 
“Liu furen,” [Mrs. Liu] Jing Bao, January 9, 1925. 
38 Private information enterprises mushroomed in Beijing around the late 1910s and early 1920s to supply 
political news to newspapers all over the country. A news agency only required a small amount of 
investment, about 200 yuan, to become established. A Japanese investigatory report shows that there were 
at least 42 registered news agencies in Beijing by 1926. See Nanmantetsu kabushikikaisha [South 
Manchuria Railway Company] ed. China shinbun yichiran hyu [A table of Chinese newspapers] (Beijing, 
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Zhucheng (徐鑄成, 1907-1991) documented a notorious affair widely circulated among editors 
and journalists in the 1920s. A retired militarist who could not find a job elsewhere set up a news 
agency in Beijing. His lover Ms. Wen, a former prostitute, served as the chief agent who 
acquired stories from inside the President’s Office by taking advantage of her secret sexual 
relationship with President Li Yuanhong. This female correspondent not only obtained inside 
information for sale but also secured her fiancé a position in the government, which further 
facilitated their information collecting.
39
 The prosperous information industry inspired and 
provided opportunities to grassroots players from other walks to profit from their social capitals.  
 In Shanghai’s colonial settings, the Japanese were also a part of this dense web of gossip 
supply. As early as the early 1910s, when political news was blocked by the central government, 
publishers alternatively gained information from Japan.40 The Crystal collaborated with the 
Japanese for the political protection from the Japanese Consul and the trans-national information 
channel. The manager Yu Daxiong’s acquaintance with the manager of the Japanese East News 
Agency (東方通訊社) was key to the paper’s access to another pool of data coming from 
Japanese news agents.41 For instance, they were well-informed of a Japanese draft collection of 
                                                            
1926). Bao Tianxiao. Chuanyinglou huiyilu [Chuanyinglou Reminiscence] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
dabaikequanshu chubanshe, 2009), 518. 
39 “Wuren molu,” [The Last Choice of a Militaryman] in Xu Zhucheng, Baohai jiuwen [Old stories in the 
sea of newspapers] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2010), 233-38. 
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secret interviews with Chinese top leaders entitled “Ultimate secrets” (??).42 In return, the 
tabloid editors fulfilled requests from the Japanese for local information.43 The new propaganda 
policy of the Japanese foreign office pursued this collaboration with the goals of information 
gathering and manipulating the news in China.44 The commercial interest of the Chinese press 
and political interest of the Japanese were conditions that gave rise to the two-way flow of 
stories.  
This large network not only brought together people from multiple socioeconomic 
statuses, but also integrated local, national, and transnational communities. From the viewpoint 
of the Crystal, the commercial motivation facilitated its tolerance for different commercial, 
political, or social goals. Political and cultural identities were not the prime aspects in 
consideration for alliances in the gossip business; these were often seemingly irrelevant to the 
gossip sharing. Gossip as a medium also more or less smoothed the encounters between different 
cultures and practices. The casual interaction shaped flexible working relationships between 
these different actors. The sense of closeness and informality coming along with the tidbits 
exchange explained that many business connections of these gossipmongers overlapped with 
their social connections. But in the new context of commercialized publication, gossip providers 
were aware of the public and trading nature of the information exchange. They factored in more 
economic and political interests in their calculations of the values of the gossip in exchange. The 
players’ efforts to ensure commercial gains and the informality of gossip communication 
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Hegemony and Imperial Japan] 3 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2013), Chapter 3.  
 46 
altogether brought about this peculiar status of the absence of boundaries supporting the free 
flow of agents and information. 
The inclusion of players from outside the field of cultural production, such as prostitutes 
and other grassroots correspondents, brought new energy, voices, and a flexible approach into the 
industry. Non-literati social forces had engaged in woodblock carving and text piracy for 
commercial profit as early as in the eighteenth century when print commerce penetrated small 
towns.45 But they were excluded from the privileged community of political knowledge 
production. In the early Republican period of political and social disarray, the lower-status 
cultural agents benefited from their close encounters with various people and the new 
opportunities opened by the print industry. As market-driven, entertainment-centered media 
institutions tended to favor extraordinary and even vulgarly attractive stories, accounts about 
political elites from grassroots sources became more appealing to common readers. They were 
often characterized by weaker education, random career choices, and the absence of occupational 
rules. Their ardent pursuit of individual gains without ethical restrictions made them the most 
daring information leakers. Their activities pushed the gossip economy to further depart from 
both the late imperial literati activities and the late Qing reformist reportage.  
The Crystal became a leading tabloid in the industry for its capacity of weaving together 
these different informants, who were diverse in educational backgrounds, social experiences, 
identities, working modes, and even nationality. As an information hub in this open network, the 
Crystal had no power to monopolize the business or control the information flow against its 
competitors, but its assessment of the commercial value of stories would lead to shifts in power 
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(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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relations among informants. Nonetheless, as the major information filter, processor, and 
publisher, the tabloid determined the value of stories and sources for its own product. The 
Crystal apparently saw more commercial value in accounts from prostitutes than those from 
officials. The attitude manifested that the commercialization of political gossip for the popular 
market had dismantled the imperial knowledge hierarchy that valued sources from officials or 
literati insiders. Opposite to the late imperial unofficial histories whose legitimacy was still 
rooted in the authority of official sources, the early Republican preference over the unofficial 
placed more power in the hands of well-informed prostitutes.46 In contrast, stories from officials 
and elites were no longer associated with authority, but were only one type among many that 
appealed to certain readers. 
The loosely structured community of gossipmongers changed the social ecology of 
politically related information transmission and knowledge production. Communication across 
social classes and cultural backgrounds gave rise to a new vision of popular knowledge that 
tolerated disparate values and different versions of facts. In the past, both the public knowledge 
produced by late imperial literati in forms of popular novels and dramas and the vernacular news 
used by the late Qing reformists to promote popular participation, were elite-made coherent 
knowledge for the commoner audience with moralizing or educational purposes.47 In the early 
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Republican gossip industry, voices from informants were often mediated by publishers and 
editors but not eliminated. The emergence of many heterogeneous gossip collections, which 
carefully separated editor’s personal political opinion from the compilation purposes to preserve 
multiple voices, evinced this openness. In An interesting history of the Anfu clique (????), a 
collection of gossipy accounts of Prime Minister’s political clique published in 1920, the 
editorial mediation was minimized to the extent that they avoided altering the messages in 
original stories. Only in the preface, did the editor exhibit his resentment at this political clique, 
but he soon stated that: “I resort to the power of words, though I do think it useless to criticize 
them on paper. Instead, this collection records true stories in a playful way.”48 Notwithstanding 
the self-contradictory statement about the editor’s attitude toward political criticism, the preface 
indicated that “the power of word” resonated with the public opinion that gathered in the 
collected stories. The collection included many accounts apparently from Duan Qirui’s (???, 
1865-1936) supporters who complimented his virtue.49 The ideas that legitimated the circulation 
of gossip about political figures was changing, from a past elitist tone of educating the Chinese 
commoners to a more liberal vision of recording popular knowledge.50 
 
 
                                                            
minchu baihua baokan yanjiu [A Study on Vernacular Periodicals in the late Qing and early Republican 
China] (Beijing: Shehuikexue chubanshe, 2011). 
48 Hong Yinsheng, “Xu,” [Preface] in Anfu qushi [An interesting history of the Anfu clique] (Shanghai: 
Hongwen tushuguan, 1920). 
49 Duan Qirui was the leader of a major military and political clique Anhui clique. He served as the Prime 
Minister of the Beiyang government from 1916 to 1920. 
50 Chapter 2 will discuss in more details about this body of popular knowledge by examining the content, 
style, its formation, and consumption. 
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Performing a Tabloid Writer: The Case of Bao Tianxiao 
Before taking the shape of published articles, raw materials from various informants had 
to go through a process of selection and embellishment under the hands of editors and writers. 
These actors played a key role in deciding the published content and generic styles. An analysis 
of tabloid writers who collected and processed acquired information shows whether the 
commercial motivations and expanded community changed the working mode and self-identities 
of practitioners in this industry. Bao Tianxiao, a reform-minded editor and also a contracted 
writer for the Crystal, could represent educated and experienced gossip writers incognito. Bao’s 
extant diary in 1925 provides the first-hand material for us to pry into his daily working status. It 
records him as a responsible, but not ardent tabloid writer, who sold gossip for economic benefit 
while still identifying himself as a reformist intellectual. 
In the dense network and pressure of producing more stories, Bao’s practice differed from 
his late Qing predecessors. The late nineteenth century gossip producers were traditionally 
educated literati who took on new careers as tabloid writers after the abolishment of the civil 
examination system.51 They made their livings in the new media enterprise by selling literati 
writings while remaining adherent to Confucian view of a clean politics.52 As a previous 
reformist editor who also promoted new political ideas in a vernacular newspaper, Bao hid away 
his political thoughts and only produced impersonal writings with a playful tone in the Crystal. 
His daily practice elucidates the required skills for this occupation, which included access to 
sources, the ability to network, specialized knowledge of past and current affairs, and sensibility 
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to market demand. Because of the key role played by these experienced media professionals, 
gossip collecting and content editing in tabloids overall was influenced by the journalistic 
profession. However, taking no pride to be grouped with other gossipmongers, tabloid writers 
like Bao marginalized themselves as the practitioners in a deviant occupation within journalism. 
Compared to the formation of profession and the pride stemming from the restrictive 
membership of journalistic associations at the same time, the lack of boundaries in the 
community had a somewhat negative effect on educated people’s identity and on shaping 
occupational standards.53  
Bao Tianxiao was a renowned translator, a prolific butterfly novelist, and the editor of a 
commercial newspaper, a fiction magazine and many textbooks for the Commercial Press. His 
working experience typified a shift from a traditional literatus, to a reformist, and eventually to a 
commercial writer. Bao was a degree holder and private teacher in his early years. Influenced by 
constitutionalist newspapers during the late Qing reform era, Bao showed strong interest in 
western learnings and was devoted to reformist publications since 1900. In 1901, like many other 
pro-reform youth, Bao participated in publishing a vernacular newspaper in his home town after 
graduating from middle school. The Suzhou native started his journalistic career in Shanghai in 
1906. Since then, he accumulated his experience and social connections as the editor of 
commercial newspapers, popular magazines, and as a popular novelist.54 He witnessed the 
booming print industry in the highly-commercialized setting of Shanghai and its growing 
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intimacy with popular culture, increasingly catering to commercial need. His contribution to a 
women’s periodical in the early 1910s, according to Judge, displayed both a reformist 
commitment and commercial approach. As a chief editor, he explored everyday experiences for 
commercial purposes and led the discussion of women’s suffrage, Japanese imperialism, and 
revolution to press his reformist agendas.55  
Bao’s role as a contract writer of the Crystal was not well known among the public. His 
diaries record himself as an industrious and resourceful gossip expert unceasingly providing 
pieces on political figures ranging from regional militarists to ministers. In 1925, bound by a 
contract detailing his responsibility of providing at least 2000 characters each issue, Bao eagerly 
expanded his potential informants. Bao asked his journalist friends, took notes from other 
writers’ manuscripts, talked with acquainted officials in Beijing, attended dinner with prostitutes 
and even solicited stories from a random individual who happened to sit next to him on the train 
to Beijing.56 A contact book appended with his diary showed his nationwide connection from the 
capital city to Hong Kong.57 He kept notes of the stories he heard, the purposes of keeping them 
and articles he completed for the Crystal. He edited tidbits into articles for immediate publication 
and saved more complicated stories for his political novel. The large number of stories and 
carefully-crafted working plans shows that for him gossip writing was not a mere casual activity 
that happened to make extra pocket money, but was a serious job requesting continuous 
investment of energy and time.  
Bao’s practice indicated the requirement of tabloid writer as an occupation. Class 
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boundaries or nationalistic sentiment should never bond their active search for materials or hinder 
the maintenance of business connections. As one of the chief writers of the Crystal, Bao was also 
responsible to maintain connections with prostitutes and nurture good relationships with the 
Japanese. His diaries record his purchase of scandal collection for the Japanese Consul and his 
reception of the Consul’s request for investigatory reports on Chinese social thoughts after 
different political events. It is unclear if Bao fulfilled all these requests, but he did spend three days 
making a detailed report on Chinese media institutions in Shanghai for the Japanese.58 Despite 
occasional complaints about the tedious work, he treated these works as his obligations and 
completed them without showing any reluctance in the diary. The tabloid’s expanding information 
network was the result of these writers’ effortful connection building and its availability also 
guaranteed his productivity. 
Hiding from his critics and sentiments, Bao’s tabloid articles were plain, descriptive 
narratives with some playful tone. For the Crystal, Bao usually describes events straightforwardly 
with an ostensibly neutral political stance. One of his articles on General Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥, 
1882-1948) only describes a dish of pickle and a plate of beans that Feng treated a journalist for a 
private dinner.59 His account of President Cao Kun (??, 1862-1938) requesting financial aid 
compares the deaf ears of his relatives to a generous courtesan who offered to help, without giving 
concluding remarks.60 He sometimes used playful or slightly satirical wording to add a note of 
levity to cater to the assumed popular taste, such as addressing Yuan Shikai’s daughter-in-law as 
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the “empress” in the article title.61 Such fun making certainly served as a strategy to give meanings, 
in this case “empress” made a mockery of Yuan’s monarchy restoration. But this slight satire as a 
means of humor differed from his strong critic of corruptive officials and sentimental portrayal of 
a militarist’s love affair with a courtesan in his novel Remnants of fragrance (???) published 
in the same year.62 This rhetorical style was the norm in the Crystal, which still diverged from the 
late Qing choice of political criticism from their own political standing in the literati tabloids.63 
The tabloid’s preference of documentation rather than critics paralleled the journalistic turn 
away from editorials to news in the 1910s. Mittler has noted the increasing professional conduct 
of news making in the Shanghai press in the 1910s, marked with the adaptation of objective 
reporting and the emergence of journalist textbooks. The objectivity in the early Republican period 
did not mean professional ethics that emphasized truth verification but the epistemological turn 
that separated facts from opinions.64 The close ties between the major dailies and tabloid press, as 
well as the writer’s working experience in major dailies resulted in the influence of journalistic 
narrative upon gossip production. Given the new commercial setting where the sales became major 
aspect of evaluation, this documentary approach worked perfectly for the heterogeneous market 
and diversified readership. Amusing fact-based narratives appealed to more audience regardless of 
their political beliefs and cultural values.  
These journalistic ways of information processing did not fully justify Bao’s role as a 
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tabloid writer. Previously as a reformist publisher and progressive novelists, Bao remained 
unwilling to entangle his reputation with a motley crew of gossipmongers. He intentionally kept 
his activities for the Crystal under wraps by using multiple pen-names to conceal his real 
identity. He felt ashamed about this experience and never mentioned it in his autobiography.65 
For Bao, there was a difference between the job of a gossip processor and that of a serious 
journalist. Similarly, in 1920, his colleague and the chief editor of the Crystal, Zhang Danfu (?
????1868-1937) analogized himself to the role of clown characters in a drama in contrast to 
serious journalists playing a role of main characters.66 Zhang’s analogy revealed their self-
perception of being a deviant position within the larger field of journalism. Like Bao, Zhang was 
also experiencing the transformation from a reformist vernacular newspaperman to a commercial 
tabloid editor. Their degrading self-perception reflected their doubt of the cultural and political 
value of this occupation, aside the economic gain. Bao saw the job as a ghost-occupation that 
haunted their public roles as editor, journalist, and writer. 
Bao represented a type of media professional who were concurrently journalists, editors, 
novelists, and sometimes publishers. The shifting roles on one person resembled Rea and 
Volland’s notion of “cultural entrepreneurs.” By “cultural entrepreneur,” I am quoting Rea and 
Volland’s term with which they emphasize a new entrepreneurial turn to culture adopted by 
transformative cultural agents who took on fluid careers such as newspapermen, novelists, and 
                                                            
65 Perry Link, Chinese Middlebrow Fiction: From the Ch’ing and Early Republican Eras (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 1984), 241-254. 
66 Danweng, “buque de xiewen he buque de yanlun,” [Unverified Amusing News and Unverified 
Opinions] Jing Bao, September 6, 1920. 
 55 
businessmen.67 In the mid-1920s, experts like Bao benefited from his good relationships with 
different publishers, which provided platforms for him to transfer information capital and literary 
talents into monetary rewards and cultural reputation. His job as a tabloid writer not only gave 
him extra income, but was also a powerful advertising medium to promote his popular novels.68 
Although the late Qing reformists’ responsibility of educating the public and guiding the nation 
lost their ground amid the increasingly commercialized gossip realm, Bao’s embrace of 
commercialization compromised with a concern about his public image as a reformist. Bao’s 
case was valuable for understanding the inconsistency between practice and the self-identity and 
the complexity of the self-perception of such occupational shifters. Vacillations, ambivalence, 
and hybridity characterized the practice of media professionals at the beginning of the 
commercial shift in Chinese cultural production. 
 
Conclusion  
The early Republican Shanghai witnessed a commercial turn of gossip production. The 
flourishing gossip economy, boosted by market-driven, entertainment-centered tabloid press and 
its earnest following of small publishers, legitimized and prioritized the market value of gossipy 
accounts about political leaders. The pursuit of profits stimulated the growing demand for fresh 
and attractive stories, which contributed to the significant expansion of the community of gossip 
production.  
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The early Republican network of gossipmongers encompassed remarkably diverse social 
groups. One characteristic was the active role played by non-elite players in transmitting and 
making facts about political leaders. The other major characteristic was the integration of people 
who belonged to separated information communities. This enlarged and inclusive community 
replace the enclosed literati circle of the late Qing and challenged the hierarchical relationship 
between the elite and popular sources. Meanwhile, the practices of gossip production also revealed 
the complexities of commercialization. Literati gossip writing encountered the tabloid gossip 
column and many reformist writers benefited economically from this gossip industry, but felt 
shameful for wearing a mask.  
Nonetheless, the overall retreat from conventional political expression and reformist 
enlightenment marked the emergence of an open attitude toward popular political knowledge. The 
comprehensive collections and fact-based narratives of gossipy news allowed readers to digest 
received stories and assess their political leaders on their own terms. The change led to a radical 
reconceptualization of the agency of the general populace in making and consuming knowledge 





A New Body of Popular Political Knowledge 
 
Introduction 
 On February 26, 1923, a commercial newspaper in Shanghai published an open letter by a 
policeman in Tianjin to President Li Yuanhong (???, 1864-1928), complaining about the 
President’s invitation to a famous opera singer from Tianjin to perform for him. In the letter, the 
policeman indicated that as the nation was still in chaos and that many people were suffering, 
President Li should not indulge himself with singing girls. He questioned the president, “There are 
plenty of famous opera actresses in the capital city. Why do you like this particular girl in Tianjin?” 
Towards the end of the letter, the policeman suggested that the president never invite performers 
again to curb the rumors about his fondness for opera singers.1 This letter illuminates at least two 
points. First, gossip and rumors about the recurrent association of Li with female entertainers 
influenced the public assessment of the political leader. Second, a lowly constable could directly 
communicate with the office about the president’s behavior in his private life. As shown by the 
letter, the gossip industry in the 1910s and 1920s contributed to the formation of a new association 
between the people and high politics. On the one hand, the entertainment-centered gossip, with its 
political significance, engaged commoners in political discussion in a playful and informal way. 
On the other hand, people’s enthusiasm for more information about the personal lives of political 
elites and their active contribution to the story-gathering process stimulated the growth of the 
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gossip business. This chapter argues for this mutually reliant and productive relationship between 
the entertainment media and a participatory culture of political discussion. 
The engagement of gossip producers and consumers in the political discussion was an 
integral part of the broadened political sphere of participation in the first decade of the Republican 
era. The idea of popular sovereignty had been put into practice and was no longer confined to the 
literati or intellectual communities. Harrison saw political culture as the mechanism by which 
politics interacted with everyday life. She pointed out that in the 1910s, Chinese people 
participated in the process of creating nationalism and republicanism rather than having a 
developed ideology imposed upon them.2 Harrison’s examples of national ceremonies and the new 
Republican customs that symbolized equality were not the only means by which to engage in 
national politics. Civic life developed in activities such as public speeches, national product 
movements, and street protests.3  
Unlike political engagement in most of the above cases organized or restricted by the state 
and elites, creating and consuming trivial amusements animated the popular participation outside 
the nationalist framework of the state and elite activism. I contend that political gossip in 
commercialized forms, more effectively than political propaganda and formal civic education, 
constituted the public knowledge of state affairs. An examination of the gossip products and the 
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way how they addressed readers allows us to understand how gossip formed a body of popular 
political knowledge and means of political participation. I bring attention to a short-lived genre of 
gossip publication called heimu (?? scandal; literally, “black curtain”) that emerged and 
flourished in the late 1910s. The heimu writings’ involving gathering methods and suspending 
narrative technique gave more agency to readers by turning them into story suppliers and content 
reproducers. In the intermingling process of knowledge production and consumption, consumers 
influenced knowledge production not only through shaping “public taste” indirectly, but also as 
direct agents who brought new information. The blurred line between producers and consumers 
contributed to an unprecedentedly open political discussion and vibrant participatory political 
culture. 
This chapter begins with an overview of a dual emphasis on entertainment and political 
significance in gossip columns, tabloid declarations and editorial prefaces to collection. 
Entertainment value in those market-oriented representations dismantled seriousness and 
systematic argument but brought about popular interests in politically-related information. Tabloid 
and book editors continuously legitimized their cultural products and define gossip as a body of 
popular political knowledge as opposed to serious political news and textbook knowledge.  The 
following sections closely examine the stylistic and generic particularities of the heimu genre. Its 
adaptation of an inclusive production mode effectively advertised book projects and invited 
readers into the gathering process as contributors. Writers, publishers and advertisers also 
developed an interactive narrative technique, like missing information, to stimulate readers’ 
curious inspection of the texts and further exchange with other sources for piecing together a full 
story. Advertisements and prefaces to these collections revealed a different conceptualization of 
authorship and readership from other popular products of the time.  
 60 
Similar to many other studies in Chinese literary history, my analysis centers on the 
expected activities of “notional readers,” since it is difficult to prove how readers exactly engaged 
with these texts.4 Nonetheless, the expectation and design of heimu products still pointed to the 
rise of an engaging political culture among urban, non-elite readers. The primary motivation was 
not nationalist consciousness. Instead, the entertainment-centered texts affected people's attitudes 
and reactions to politics. We see a playful citizenry characterized by wild enthusiasm driven by 
the pursuit of pleasure, contempt for any authority, minimal interest in developing any official 
expressional channel and greater agency of commoners.   
 
Interplay of Amusement and Political Importance 
To explain how tidbits of gossip reached a wider audience as a body of popular political 
knowledge, we must first make an overview of the entertainment value and political aspects of  
gossip products. Fully dependent on the market, the gossip press manifested its tremendous 
intervening power by remodeling political leaders into consumable personalities as entertainment 
for commercial profitability, anchoring them in triviality. This entertainment-based approach to 
trivial matters resulted in a fragmented reading experience with serendipitous encounters for the 
readers and a casual tone of the accounts. Meanwhile, the categorization of political gossip in 
newspaper supplements, the declarations of tabloid editors and supportive preface written for 
collections, all emphasized the political significance of gossip products. Comparing gossip with 
serious news and textbooks, editors identified gossip as more reliable and accessible political 
information.  
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This section covers the gossip columns of supplement pages, tabloid articles, and books 
from 1916 to 1925. Information from story content, titles, advertisements, preface and editorial 
words tell how trivial accounts about political leaders were presented, categorized, defined and 
packaged together. I argue that the accentuation of political meanings did not alter the 
entertainment value in the texts. Rather, the dual emphasis on political significance and 
entertainment ensured greater market success, defied the elite supervision of knowledge making 
and created a link between ordinary people and the knowledge about the high politics. 
The commercial and political meanings associated with the early Republican products 
differed from literati leisure pursuits and political criticism in an earlier period. In the late Qing, 
the concept of play was central to the business interests and lifestyles of men who ran Shanghai’s 
tabloids in the market economy. As argued by Catherine Yeh, salaried men of letters adopted a 
playful attitude to transform themes in the literati culture into consumable subjects.5 Playful 
portrayals of official’s eccentric habits and funny anecdotes about political celebrities also 
became the medium to express critiques of the government.6 As the early Republican market 
expanded to include middle- and lower-class urban residents, popular demand for more vulgar 
and straightforward fun gradually overwrote the more refined literati leisure pursuits and affected 
the social perceptions of political personalities in the print media. The expanding community of 
gossip producers also opened up the knowledge to multiple values and political beliefs which 
replaced the literati political values. A new element of journalistic documentation emerged in the 
                                                            
5 Catherine Yeh, Shanghai Love: Courtesans, Intellectuals, and Entertainment Culture, 1850-1910 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). 
6 Christopher Rea, The Age of Irreverence: A New History of Laughter in China, 23-24; Juan Wang, 
Merry Laughter and Angry Curses: The Shanghai Tabloid Press, 1897-1911 (UBC Press, 2013), Chapter 
2. 
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gossip press. Instead of a conversation between the literati and the government, newspapers and 
tabloid papers framed gossip either as a piece of news and some collection saw gossip as the 
political voices of ordinary people. In the early Republican era, gossip’s political significance 
rested on the people’s right to know and participation. 
Gossip columns and story collections exposed amusing personalities of high-class people, 
their embarrassing moments, secret affairs with entertainers and inappropriate or bizarre activities 
to ordinary readers. For example, it was said that politicians in Duan Qirui's political clique dug a 
secret tunnel underneath the brothels in the Eight Great Hutongs (the red-light district in the capital 
city) to escape arrest.7 Depicted as ignorant, Duan’s favorite subordinate Xu Shuzheng (???, 
1880-1925) was unfamiliar with the renowned Cantonese dish paper-wrapped-chicken and he 
swallowed the chicken with the paper still on it.8 Tidbits were prized for lifting the veil on hidden 
authenticity and for allowing a peep into the foibles of the rich and famous. Perry Link explains 
the popularity of these accounts among commoners from the perspective of psychological effect. 
He suggested that some stories provide comfort to readers by telling that the powerful also lack 
virtue or happiness.9 Reading pleasure was derived from the gap between their public projection 
as heroic men and their daily indecent behaviors. 
The choice of book titles and acts of intensive advertising, moreover, reflected a liberal 
attitude of assuming names of political figures as entertaining news. In the past, titles of anecdotal 
collection only featured the reign names, such as Hearsay from the unofficial realm in the reign of 
                                                            
7 Hong Yinsheng ed., Anfu qushi [An interesting history of the Anfu clique] (Shanghai: Hongwen 
tushuguan, 1920), 26. 
8 “Xu Shuzheng yu zhibaoji,” [Xu Shuzheng and paper-wrapped chicken] Jing Bao, May 6,1926. 
9 Perry Link, Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies: Popular Fiction in Early Twentieth-Century Chinese 
Cities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 
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Wanli (?????), or the author's studio name, for example, Notebook from the Yong Hut (?
???). As late as in 1914, titles of gossip collections still often included the period name, such 
as Unofficial History of the Republic (????). However from the late 1910s, titles such as A 
Secret history of Duan Qirui (?????) and Anecdotes of Li Yuanhong (?????) appeared 
on the market. Book titles stated to highlight the name of the specific political leader to make the 
content attractively transparent. Advertisements in the 1920s also promoted gossip collections by 
listing the names of key figures involved. The early Republican marketing practice magnified the 
entertainment dimension and transformed the social implications of these political personalities.  
It is increasingly difficult to make meaningful distinctions between political information 
and entertainment in these market-driven and entertainment-centered products. These everyday 
details conceptualized one’s understanding of the rise and fall of a political force. Stories such as 
how prostitutes covered up for political elites spread information about the fall of Duan Qirui’s 
political clique from the center of power. Some used Duan Qirui’s hobby of playing the game of 
go to explain why an official obtained a promotion.10 Private details trivialized interpretations of 
political occurrences and made originally complicated events relatable to everyone’s living 
experiences.  
The meaning of triviality changed from insignificance to politics to the small scale of the 
matters. Commercial newspapers were the first to treat trivial matters as a supplementary and 
recycled form of political news. In 1916, one of the four major commercial newspapers in 
Shanghai, the China Times (時事新報) , initiated a new column carrying the heading of “News 
                                                            
10 Xuannan liyin, Minguo guanchang xianxing ji [Republican officialdom unmasked] (Shanghai: 
Zhongguo diyi shuju, 1922), 1. 
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Dust” (新聞屑) to recycle less-serious information regarding the private lives or secret operations 
of political leaders that had been left out by front pages. The column included President Li 
Yuanhong’s patronage of a famous actor, the rivalry between two warlords over the affection of a 
courtesan, or conflicts between Yuan Shikai’s sons competing for the heritage. The word “dust” 
precisely captured both the triviality of these accounts and the procedure of gossip production. The 
“News Dust” column was placed on the page of “Collected talks in supplement” (報餘叢談), 
alongside a daily serial novel and later, a scandal column. Despite its function as light reading, it 
was included in a major commercial paper that had already become a major site for political 
expression and debate. The placement reflected the fact that the China Times elevated the position 
of so-called trivial information and deemed it legitimate, newsworthy information. During the 
chaos of the Zhang Xun (張勛, 1854-1923) Restoration Incident in the summer of 1917,  a Qing 
royalist warlord’s campaigned to restore monarchism, the column fed readers with behind-the-
scenes stories on a daily base such as the young Manchu emperor was persuaded to support the 
restoration solely for the benefit of no more schoolwork.11 Keeping pace with headline news in the 
front pages, the gossip column repeatedly echoed a strong anti-monarchist message, serving the 
political interest of the force behind the newspaper.12 Divergent from the vernacular newspaper’s 
categorization of imperial gossip as social news, the News Dust column was located at the 
intersection of political news and trivial matters.  
 The leading tabloid the Crystal also defined its articles as news but more explicitly 
articulated amusement and news reportage as the two key ingredients. From 1920 to 1925, their 
                                                            
11 Shi Shi Xin Bao, July 8, 1917. 
12 Liang Qichao and his new Progressive Party were the sponsor of the China Times. 
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explanatory emphasis had shifted from amusement to documentation. In 1920, when the chief 
editor Zhang Danfu (張丹斧) raised a new category of xiewen 諧聞 (amusing news) in contrast to 
serious news, he intended to highlight the entertainment centered approach so as to justify 
misinformation contained in their articles. He did not confine this category within the practice of 
tabloid press but broadly referred to gossip columns in major commercial dailies, entertainment 
periodicals and rumors included by gossip collections entitled with “interesting history”. He gave 
some examples of types of titles that would fall into this category, such as “someone hid himself 
behind his concubine’s toilet,” or “some others bought a theater costume to entertain himself”. 
According to Zhang, xiewen was a special genre of news characterized by a distinct entertainment 
value reserved for unverified and incomplete information. In this notion, “news” assigned a 
meaning of the contemporary relevance and newsworthiness while amusement defined one 
technique of news production that journalists adopted.  He described all xiewen reporters, including 
many renowned journalists working for large newspapers, as content embellishers and distributors 
who played up the frivolity of their stories instead of fact-checking the details.13 But the priority 
given to amusement at the expense of veracity seemed to contradict the attribute of news, which 
usually offered information more reliably and with more authority than any other form of 
communication.  
The tension between entertainment and news was solved five years later when the paper 
imputed a political meaning to the act of documenting gossip. The Crystal declared itself to be 
devoted to uncovering what the newspapers “disdain, dare not or do not have space to publish” 
                                                            
13 Danweng, “buque de xiewen he buque de yanlun,” [Unverified amusing news and unverified opinions] 
Jing Bao, September 6, 1920. 
 66 
and the paper had published articles “possessing both entertaining and documentary traits”.14 The 
tabloid stated that they searched for and published facts that were concealed, manipulated or 
marginalized by major newspapers and the unscrupulous politicians behind them. The statement 
confirmed Zhang Danfu’s mixture of amusement and news but further stressed the political 
impartiality and honesty vis-à-vis the news reportage polluted by partisan and mainstream 
commercial dailies. This stance painted its commitment to documentation of an anti-partisanship 
tint against the backdrop of the social distrust of political news from official channels in the 
warlord era.  
The political factionalism gave rise of partisan newspapers in the information sphere since 
the beginning years of the Republic. Political parties, cliques and regional warlords competed to 
invest in newspapers and news agencies to rally public support. In a Japanese intelligence report 
about major newspapers and their political sponsors, only two newspapers out of 16 were marked 
as “neutral”.15 This newspaper environment was the result of both the continuation of late Qing 
modes of news production, which viewed newspapers as a vehicle to advocate political ideas, as 
well as the increasing awareness of the importance of publicity among political figures. In 1923, 
the Shanghai Journalist Association encouraged journalists to arouse public sentiment by 
expressing their political views. Newspapers had yet to differentiate between facts and opinions.16 
The penetration of partisan politics was not a secret to the reading public. In the preface to a 
contemporary edition of the novel Unofficial History of the Capital City, the writer recalled the 
                                                            
14 "Jing Bao yinian zhi huigu," [Jing Bao's Year in Review] Jing Bao, March 3, 1925. 
15 Japanese Foreign Office Archives. No.1.3.1 32. The China Times was under the control of Liang 
Qichao’s group of constitionalists, Public Voice Daily was the mouth of Duan Qirui’s clique and 
Republican Daily served the interests of the Nationalist Party. 
16 Xiaoqun Xu, Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in 
Shanghai, 1912-1937 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 172. 
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1920s as a period “when disreputable deeds of the political leaders had already spread widely in 
society, and yet news reports did not speak a single word.”17 There were economic and social 
reasons why the tabloid stayed away from partisan politics.18 Unlike most major newspapers, 
which had to live on subsidies, the market success of the Shanghai tabloid press guaranteed its 
financial independence. As discussed in the previous chapter, the gossip industry involved diverse 
players, including a large portion of non-elite contributors, and remained much more tolerant with 
different voices. Like Western journalistic departure from partisanship, to maximize readership 
constituted a key reason why they adopted a generalist market strategy. 19  The commercial 
motivations shaped their aims of appealing to a broad audience as possible rather than constructing 
any coherent public opinion. Moreover, the declared uncovering of facts and voices buried by the 
powerful also served as a market tactic in their competition with serious newspapers.  
The Crystal’s distinction between serious newspapers as the mouthpiece of officialdom and 
itself as an unofficial representative of the buried truth established the public nature and the 
political significance of its own product. The associations and comparison between gossip and 
serious political news revealed that serious journalistic genres not only influenced tabloid narrative 
styles but also their understanding of gossip. But the changing role of supplementary political news 
in the “News Dust” in 1916 to the independent voice of tabloid gossip in 1920, however, was 
indicative of the diminishing serious journalism’s representation of public opinion. The emphasis 
                                                            
17 Zuo Xiaohong. “Shi yeshi,” [This unofficial history] In Chunming waishi [Unofficial history of the 
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on “documentation” by the tabloids gave meanings to facts and voices buried by mainstream 
newspapers and powerful political leaders. From the perspective of social stratification, the Crystal 
foregrounded voices from an inclusive society and an expansion of the Republican participation 
beyond political elites.  
The tabloid’s dual emphasis on entertainment and documentation of hidden facts indicated 
a tendency towards a new conceptualization of popular political knowledge. Its constant pursuit of 
hilarity undermined the alleged greatness of high-class people, making them more appealing and 
approachable for the ordinary readers of different literacy levels, especially those who found 
serious news difficult or boring to follow. The implicit and explicit claims of the political 
significance of such accounts further legitimized the spread of gossip as a popular form of political 
communication. Heimu writings illustrate particularly well how this new knowledge conceptually 
challenged a top-down version of political knowledge made for the public and gave more agency 
to commoners in the process of production and consumption.  
 
Heimu as a Frame of Political Gossip  
 
 The effect of expanding gossip circuits in the early Republic was not limited to the 
emergence of low-class news experts and expansion of the audience, but also reflected to vision 
of ordinary non-professional people as the embodiment of political knowledge. In the following 
sections, I analyze heimu (黑幕 ) books as a communication medium that affected political 
engagement in a society where the idea of citizenship was yet to be fixed. By ways of selecting, 
styling and framing, different genres furnished new and recycled stories with various features and 
interpretations.20 I argue that heimu as a genre of gossip publication combined political criticism 
                                                            
20 Scholars in the field of print culture have argues for the importance of genre as a specific analytical 
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and entertainment consumption which fueled readers’ enthusiasm of making assessment of their 
leaders.  
“Heimu” was one of the most successful printing genres in the late 1910s that featured 
social and political gossip. The term “heimu” literally refers to the black stage curtain that masks 
backstage operations. It is a metaphor for previously hidden and disreputable conduct. Previous 
scholarship commonly translates heimu into scandal, since the meaning of heimu in the early 
republican context did not differ so much from our understanding of scandal elsewhere in terms 
of the discursive power to discredit its subjects and the publicity nature. But heimu as a generic 
category and writing practice differentiated from the notion of scandals as mediated public event 
defined in historical and political science scholarship.21 As the organization of stories in a heimu 
book usually resembled other gossip collections, the fragmented topics and figures prevented 
public attention from focusing on a single character or event. Therefore, heimu stories could not 
be developed into any event with sequential structure or to generate large impact. Many studies on 
political scandals in modern societies emphasize the public demand for a punishment to the 
behaviors in question to be a key element to define a scandal.22 The early Republican heimu stories, 
however, did not aim to elicit public response to rule on political misbehaviors. Instead, the story 
producers called for information sharing while employing narrative techniques to add on an aura 
of secrecy to increase sales. Toward this end, heimu writers’ handling of the relationship between 
                                                            
category instead of a too broad category such as the print media. See Lisa Gitelman, Paper Knowledge: 
Toward a Media History of Documents (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2014).  
21 John Thompson, Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2000). William A. Cohen, Sex Scandal: The Private Parts of Victorian Fiction (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1996).  
22 Nancy E. Marion, The Politics of Disgrace: The Role of Political Scandal in American Politics 
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secrecy and publicity differed from scandal reporter’s endeavor to fully uncover the secrets. More 
recently, Nicola Parsons’s work on British secret history distinguished scandals from gossip by 
defining scandal as a definition mechanism that associates negative meanings onto certain affairs 
and gossip as a participatory discourse.23 This dimarcation does not apply to the early Republican 
heimu products, as they exhibited a desire to control moral values but nonetheless remained open 
to different stories and interpretations.  
The period from 1916 to 1920 were the heyday of heimu genre: the term appeared 
everywhere - as titles for the column, fictions, and collections, as well as in the keywords for other 
book advertisements. In Oct. 1916, a supplementary column in the China Times applied the 
concept of heimu to feature the disclosure of behind-the-scene deeds. A surge in sales encouraged 
the column to produce bi-weekly monographic compilations of published stories and to make a 
radical move towards exposure of political secrets the next year. 24  Seeing such tremendous 
commercial success, many other publishing houses immediately followed and developed varied 
print products ranging from short story collections to coherent novel-styled long narratives. In 
1918, a massive edition of Panorama of scandals in China (??????) was published. 
Scandals in officialdom comprised the first and most eye-catching section and were prominently 
featured on the cover page as a selling point. The popular literary magazine Saturday also favored 
heimu fictions during these days - a sub-genre of heimu writing, which takes the form of literary 
narrative yet aligns itself closely with the news release. These fictions used fictitious names of the 
protagonists but, as claimed by authors, were based on the real private activities of political figures. 
                                                            
23 Nicola Parsons, Reading Gossip in Early Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
24 According to the newspaper’s announcement. The sale of the newspaper increased several thousand 
copies thanks to the heimu stories. Shi Shi Xin Bao, August 7, 1917, 1. 
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Contemporaneous writers and editors such as Zhou Zuoren, addressed all these forms collectively 
as “heimu casual readings” (????).25  
Here, I treat heimu columns, short stories in heimu collections, and heimu fictions as sub-
forms of this same media for popular political communication. Earlier studies adopting the 
conventional literature taxonomy singled out heimu fiction and analyze it as another genre of 
popular fiction, paralleled with sensational butterfly fictions of the beauty-scholar theme.26 This 
view prevents us from seeing the the heimu writings as a dynamic and changeable practice in the 
continuum ranging from news making to novel writing. As will be shown in the below, the 
operation of heimu columns inspired the gathering measures of heimu collections. Fiction writers 
also inscribed the practice of news reporting and news reading into their narratives. These works 
shared the same subject matter and marketing strategies. Only by placing them together do we see 
how this genre functioned to open up new communication channels for exchanging political 
knowledge. For introducing this genre, I use the highest selling and most monumental collection, 
Panorama of Scandals in China, as an example to explain why I consider heimu writings as a 
genre of gossip publication. 
The genre’s narrative interests in sexualized aspects of political individuals is indicative of 
its gossipy nature. The political section of Panorama of Scandals in China consists of two types 
of stories: they are either about domestic matters of leading political figures, or private behaviors 
                                                            
25 Zhongmi, “Lun heimu,” [A discussion on heimu stories] Mei Zhou Ping Lun no. 4 (1919). 
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in relation to the abuse of political power. The stories by themselves did not differ from other 
gossipy accounts, such as the one about General Duan’s bribery with beauty and the way a 
minister’s wife pleased the president’s relatives. Collections were filled with stories like 
president’s illicit relationship with a minister’s wife, minister’s bedchamber stories, love affairs 
between warlords and prostitutes, and so on. Take for example the first page in the political section 
of Panorama of scandals in China. The first story tells how a militarist and Yuan’s political 
follower shamelessly ordered four-legged pants especially for sex games. An appended illustration 
depicts an official trying on the pants with two concubines standing nearby. The second story 
recounts how Duan used to bribe Manchu princes with his concubine. The narratives 
sensationalized and vulgarized insignificant private sexual behaviors in their attempts to appeal to 
non-elite readers. This is the reason why Zhou Zuoren sharply rebuked the genre as a 
miscellaneous combination of “irrelevant trivial matters and amorous stories.”  
Compared to the late Qing usage of the term heimu in newspapers, the genre had narrowed 
and trivialized the notion of heimu from exposure of political corruptions to the corruptive 
lifestyles. The term of heimu had already appeared in serious political news to expose bureaucratic 
corruption and abuses of political power in the late Qing.27 A cartoon illustration in the Anhui 
vernacular newspaper (?????) in 1909 depicts journalists unveiling official corruption 
behind the construction of national railway. In the picture, vernacular newspapers use their pens 
to raise the curtain that concealed the officials’ embezzlement of the funds for public transportation 
infrastructure (figure 1). The uncovering of government corruption aimed at shaping public 
debates and influencing political process. But the heimu collection defined political scandal as 
                                                            
27 Around the same time, novels such as Li Boyuan’s Guanchang xianxingji [Officialdom Unmasked] 
also reveals government corruption. The early Republican genre was developed from this late Qing 
“unmasking” literature. 
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follows: “Once one person obtained an official position, all his relatives share the rank and honor. 
They travel in high carts drawn by four horses, wear luxurious clothes, entertain with elaborate 
feasts, own beautiful concubines and surround themselves with servants. They satisfy their desires 
by ruthlessly exploiting ordinary people. These are government scandals.”28  
 
 
Figure 1. The caption reads: disclose the inside story. Cartoon provided by Renren. (Anhui Bai 
Hua Bao 1909, No. 2, 1.) 
                                                            
28 Liu Dahuo, “Zhongguo heimu daguan xu,” [preface to Panorama of scandals in China] in Zhongguo 
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The different editorial goals and consequently different scope of readership explain this 
change. Unlike the late Qing efforts at publicizing reformist agendas, heimu as a genre of gossip 
publications was born out of the pursuit of maximum commercial interests. Book editors 
envisioned a larger body of intended readers including educated gentlemen, innocent teenagers, 
and poor people.29 Satisfying the social craving for “inside” sensational stories, the popularity of 
heimu books was indeed unprecedented. The huge sales even surprised book producers. 
Intellectuals complained that there were three or four advertisements of different heimu 
publications every day in newspapers in 1919. 30  Panorama of Scandals in China had been 
reprinted six times in three years and was sold even in the remote province of Yunnan.31 Middle-
school students particularly favored pocket-sized heimu collections for the convenience to read 
covertly in class hidden behind a textbook.32  
In catering to a noticeable diverse readership, the heimu collection framed the consumption 
of gossip in terms of political complaints and moral indictments but did not shape the critiques 
into a particular political direction. Take for example Panorama of scandals in China. The prefaces 
and letters from educators, novelists and local governors all over the nation constituted a large 
collection by themselves in the beginning pages to explain the editorial purposes of the book. Some 
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30 Song Yunbin, “heimu shu,” [heimu books] Xin Qing Nian 6, no. 1 (1919): 85. 
31 The cover page of the collection provides information of local distributors. The book stores selling this 
collection ranged from northeastern provinces to remote provinces such as Shanxi and Guizhou. See 
Zhongguo heimu daguan, 581.  
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prefaces attributed anti-corruption message to the collections. Editors criticized the exercise of 
political power for personal interests and reprehended the unrestricted personal desires of the 
statesmen that transgressed the moral codes.33 Others blamed the deceitful ideas of freedom and 
equality advocated by the May Fourth intellectuals for deteriorating moral decadency. A few 
supporters read it as plain facts simply to equip the readers with more knowledge about social and 
political realities.34  
Notwithstanding the multiple and sometimes conflicting interpretations in the prefaces, 
heimu writings facilitated the spread of political messages to less-educated and unserious readers: 
commoners had the right to monitor and judge contemporaneous political leaders. For readers who 
probably skipped the prefaces and flipped directly to the accounts of illicit affairs and bedroom 
farces, it was the term “heimu” in the book title or advertisements that drew their initial attention. 
The subject matter presupposed public disapproval. It declared the right to uncover concealed facts 
in high places and to investigate the behavior of current power holders. By centrally featuring 
trivial matters, the genre affirmed the overlap of the pursue of entertainment and political 
knowledge. It announced that a playful motivation would never disqualify a commoner from 
making his judgment about the high class. The genre thus was able to involve a new social group 
who had little interest in serious political news. 
 
Heimu as a Driver of Public Involvement  
 
 I look at the heimu not only as textual narratives but also as a force that developed upon 
the genre’s inherent tension between unveiling and concealing to activate readers’ role as 
                                                            
33 “Xu,” [Preface] in Zhongguo heimu daguan. 
34 “Xu,” [Preface] in Zhongguo heimu daguan. 
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knowledge producers, truth investigators and information disseminators. The heimu genre’s 
distinctive marketing strategies and a set of narrative techniques generated a force that stimulated 
readers’ participation. Publishers’ calls for public contributions placed less emphasis on the single 
author but claimed to collect voices from low society. The semblance of secrecy that fuzzified 
identifying details also turned readers into detectives and stimulated more public discussion. The 
genre engendered multi-way conversations among readers, writers and editors. Des Forges draws 
on Benedict Anderson’s notion of the “imagined community” to suggest a model of shared 
understanding to analyze the relationship between authors, readers, media and genres in the late 
Qing and republican Shanghai. Des Forges established his model on an examination of the reader’s 
engagement with media text by imagining the urban modernity. 35  The heimu publications 
manifested a relationship between readers, printed texts and media players including editors and 
advertisers, in the real world engagement. It is the pleasure rather than any patriotic sentiment or 
specific moral claims that drove the popular participation in political discussion. This informal 
discussion, as not fully institutionalized, granted the common readers sufficient freedom to 
develop political opinions on their own terms. 
From its inception, this genre directly connected the public to knowledge production. When 
the China Times called for public contributions to its heimu column in 1916, readers’ letters 
exposing ugly secrets poured in.
36
 In May 1917, the column ambitiously renewed its concentration 
on political scandals in Beijing. In its attempt to replicate the previous successful intelligence 
gathering mode, the column printed an announcement welcoming information classified into 16 
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(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007). 
36 Shi Shi Xin Bao, July 15, 1917, 1. 
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categories, including: officials, political parties, politicians, the inner palace, Qing royalists, the 
monarch, actors, prostitutes, etc.
37
 Other small cultural entrepreneurs also followed the columnist 
way of compiling collections. Sources of their books comprised of public contributions and invited 
composition from anonymous writers.38 As for book publishers and sellers, this gathering method 
was both useful as an attention-getting device and an effective, yet cheap way to collect many 
stories.  
Furthermore, announcements calling for public contribution attest to an unprecedented 
openness of expressing opinions and a new way of engaging the public in discussions about 
political figures. Inviting every reader to participate as a contributor, they distinguished a body of 
collectively-made knowledge from the prepared knowledge for public. This production mode 
involved a different public from the late Ming case of haoshizhe (idlers who liked to gossip and 
meddle) as collectors of tales about contemporary events or the recent past. According to 
McLaren’s investigation, literati publishers sometimes compiled materials collected by haoshizhe 
into a vernacular book in the sixteenth century. These earlier idlers were a group of village 
schoolteachers, village pedants and ally scholars.39 The enlarged authorship in this late imperial 
case reveals the expanding membership of the elite due to the commercialization of culture. But 
the knowledge of state politics still moved from the privileged literati producers to the non-elite 
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populace in the form of popular novels, current-event dramas and vernacular newspapers.40 The 
general public was never permitted to engage in the production, nor did they have any means to 
do so. The early Republican call for public contributions was not merely a continuation of 
conventional practice. The meaning of the public had transformed. In principle, the gossiping 
public now contained all Chinese citizens regardless of class, gender, profession or educational 
background. Anyone literate who overheard whispers about a militarist’s proclivities from a 
prostitute or saw a governor’s car passing by could share his knowledge by participating in the 
book-making process.  
The newspaper and popular magazine editor Wang Dungen (???, 1888-1951) saw 
heimu collections as a cluster of voices from those who were suppressed and jeopardized by the 
deteriorating political surroundings. In his preface to Panorama of Scandals in China, Wang 
defines the genre as a peculiar way of communication that facilitates the powerless to express their 
grievance. He asserted, “Stories were told by those who suffered from despicable and deceitful 
conduct, yet were unable to achieve justice. Lettermen took them down and preserved them. Heimu 
stories are those notes taken.”41 Certainly, publishers and editors did not merely play the role of a 
recorder and loudspeaker, as they still held the power for selecting, rephrasing, organizing and 
framing the gathered stories. Nonetheless, Wang expected a turn in the routes of transmission away 
from one-way communication from a few journalist-writers to the commoners. Wang further 
                                                            
40 In addition to the previous example of haoshizhe, the late imperial novels and current-event dramas all 
conveyed political knowledge to ordinary people. See Wu Jen-shu, “Mingqing zhiji jiangnan shishiju de 
fazhan ji qi suo fanying de shehui xintai,” [The development of drama on current events and the social 
mentality in Ming-Qing Transitional Period] Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 31(1999): 
1-48. Paul August Vierthaler, “Quasi-History and Public Knowledge: A Social History of Late Ming and 
Early Qing Unofficial Historical Narratives” (Dissertation, Yale University, 2014). 
41 Wang Dungen. “Xu yi,” [Preface one] in Zhongguo heimu daguan. 
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promoted the stories gleaned from below as a legitimate source of knowledge for ordinary 
people.42 Wang held that stories about disgraceful statesmen in the recent decade of political 
instability have filled the gap left by serious newspapers to expand ordinary people’s knowledge 
about high politics. In particular, he highly praised the collection as an good extra-curricular 
textbook to impart supplemental knowledge for the young generation.43 In Wang’s vision, the 
heimu collection was knowledge both from and for the populace. 
The heimu writings challenged the existing power relations in political knowledge 
production by recognizing the radical conversion of conventional receivers into active producers. 
Readers’ engagement was not rare in the realm of cultural production in Shanghai, as shown by 
the popularity of reader-completed narratives in the 1910s and 1920s. Butterfly fiction writers 
sometimes organized a compositional circle to finish a book project collectively. They started a 
narrative and then solicited contributions from readers to continue it.44 The heimu collective 
production was significant for it brought the practice into the realm of political knowledge. 
Statesmen were publicly listed as one of the topics that the ordinary readers could compose a story 
on. Publishers and editors now permitted and encouraged the multi-directional flow, placing 
themselves onto converging and exchanging nodes in a less hierarchical information network. The 
agency of the general readers as information processors and narrators began to be counted as one 
real parameter, rather than as the concept of a perceived public taste that influences the editor's 
choice.  
                                                            
42 Wang worked as an editor at the Shanghai News starting in the late Qing. He also edited popular 
magazines such as Saturday. 
43 Wang Dungen, “Xu yi,” [Preface one] in Zhongguo heimu daguan. 
44 Haiyan Lee, “All the Feelings That Are Fit to Print: The Community of Sentiment and the Literary 
Public Sphere in China, 1900-1918,” Modern China 27, no. 3 (2001): 291–327. 
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 To hook the readers, the genre also adopted some narrative technique to added an aura of 
mystery onto the portrayal of real-life individuals and events. Publishers were selling both the 
hidden information and the pleasure of decoding, which led to more interactive and productive 
reading experiences. Book producers played with omitted vital information to increase the tension 
between veiling and unveiling in advertisements and book contents. In 1919, a new book titled, 
“Record of Old Crab Walking Sideways” (?????) was advertised as having documented the 
secret relationship between leading political figures and prostitutes. The advertisement substituted 
the first names with blanks in order to arouse the curiosity of the potential book purchasers.
45
 
Stories in Panorama of scandals in China also depicted contemporaneous figures in a transparent 
disguise that enabled readers to decode. Editors removed first names of characters but provided 
sufficient information including the surnames and their official titles. The introduction page stated 
that names were obscured in order to give the protagonists an opportunity to turn over a new leaf, 
as the editorial goal was to disclose the events, rather than attack any individual.46 Although the 
forewords advised the readers not to conjecture the exact persons, the specified guidance 
authenticated the contents and ironically suggested readers to identify the texts’ real-life referents.  
                                                            
45 Xiong, “Wo zhi huashi tan,” [My Views on Prostitute Affairs] Jing Bao, December 9, 1919. 




Figure 2. One page in the political section of Panorama of scandals in China (Lu Binsheng ed. 
Zhongguo heimu daguan, 3) 
 
 This tension-building mechanism also helped to transform a plain piece of gossip into an 
enticing plot. Beijing’s Secrets (北京之秘密) was a typical heimu fiction published in the end of 
1916.47 The fiction was a loose collection of stories told by the narrator, a butterfly whose physical 
form disguised his furtive glance into the lives of prominent people in Beijing. This surrealist and 
fictional narrator did not provide an interpretative framework that links stories or suggest their 
                                                            
47 Dieye. Beijing zhi mimi [Secrets in Beijing] (Shanghai: Dasheng Tushuju, 1916). 
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significance, but only canopied real-life contents, including ministers' domestic secrets and the 
under-the-table operations of political clubs, as it toured the city. In one chapter, the butterfly 
oversaw a newsagent uncovering a secret. A politically ambitious minister reportedly utilized the 
famous Peking opera singer Mei Lanfang as a sexual allure to approach Yuan Shikai's elder son. 
The story came from a news piece about Liang Shiyi (???, 1869-1933), the minister of 
communication in Yuan Shikai’s government, in the China Times’s “News Dust” Column.48 The 
author blanked out the name that had been conspicuously printed in the original news article but 
added abundant information regarding his career path, political clique, residential district, hobbies 
of gambling and obsession with prostitutes. Simply concealing the names instead of using fictitious 
ones conveyed a stronger sense of reliability and confidentiality. By giving more referential 
information, the author invoked more gossip to add favor to the original story. 
 This case of transplantation from news pieces suggests that the omission of information 
was not a tactic employed to circumvent state prosecution, but to nurture a dialogical reading 
practice premised on the existence of common knowledge. The success of the heimu genre attested 
to the wide circulation of political information and readers’ familiarity of principle figures. Only 
when readers were equipped with the basic knowledge of contemporary political affairs were they 
capable of construing the narrative’s references and relocating it in relation to other occurrences. 
Given its collective production mode, many heimu collections reiterated gossip already in 
circulation but adapted them in a different narrative device. The heimu writers presumed the 
readers to know as much as the authors to fill intentional gaps in the narrative. The innuendos 
invited readers to fill the blanks and thereby created the pleasure of solving a riddle and re-
                                                            
48 Beijing zhi mimi, 118-121. “Mei Lanfang yu dizhi,” [Mei Lanfang and the Monarchism] Shi Shi Xin 
Bao, June 15, 1916. 
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affirming themselves as insiders.  
 The deliberate information withholding would also stage the psychological setting against 
solo reading and instead suggested the readers to either resort to other relevant text or to other 
people in order to piece together the puzzle. The large pool of gossip formed a referential structure 
of the political knowledge to help identify political individuals and contextualize these 
identifications within a broad picture of contemporary national politics. Other gossip collections 
also explicated the cross-referentiality of gossip. In the preface to An Interesting History of the 
Anfu Clique, the editor reminds readers of the abundance of gossip collections elsewhere to be 
used as references.49 When readers agreed with someone else’s interpretation or disputed their 
identification, they were involved in exchanging information and opinions of political figures with 
others. The butterfly narrator in Beijing’s Secrets explicitly encouraged readers to read and share 
the secret stories while socializing with people: “Once these mysteries are elucidated, they should 
suffice to facilitate conversations by the drinking table.”50 The work therefore placed its readers in 
private and public gathering spaces to communicate with other idle chatterers, and linked the 
printed text to oral channel to encourage multi-directional gossip exchange. 
 Much evidence shows that the active discussions and exchange occurring on oral sites 
extended the gossiping community to include illiterate people. Teahouses and theaters in the 
republican urban settings served as the site that linked the print stories with lowbrow performances 
and idle chatters. In 1920, a writer ridiculed the ignorance of an old countryman who heard people 
gossiping about the decline of the Anfu clique in the teahouse, but misunderstood Anfu as some 
                                                            
49 Hong Yinsheng, “Xu,” [Preface] in Anfu qushi [An interesting history of the Anfu clique] (Shanghai: 
Hongwen tushuguan, 1920).  
50 Dieye, Beijing zhi mimi. 118. 
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inauspicious signs.51 The article revealed the active discussion of political affairs among teahouse 
patrons and the reception of stories in different lights when gossip reached the grass-roots who 
cared less about high politics.  
 Readers’ engagement with different texts and one another resulted in various versions of 
the hidden “truth” depending on their speculations. That is to say, the dialogical practice not only 
performed the act of uncovering but would also produce more facts and meanings by fixing the 
contents on different suspicious figures. When people discussed suspicious characters with 
surroundings, these new facts dispersed. The readers became producers and disseminators of 
derivatives of heimu stories.  
 The public production and interactive consumption showed changing political attitudes and 
behaviors. The marketing strategies and narrative techniques stimulated readers to process 
received stories, communicate with others for missing pieces of information and contribute their 
own versions. Here, we see how gossip consumption contributed to the unruly participation in 
disseminating, digesting and reproducing political knowledge through active public exchange.  
 
Conclusion 
 The commercialization of gossip about political leaders in the early Republican print media 
bridged the visible few and the commoners. The dual emphasis on entertainment and political 
significance led to the continuous and recurrent exposure of trivial aspects from the lives of 
political figures. Coordinated by the free market and flowing nature of gossip, the press and their 
socially diverse readers were inseparably connected and cooperated in producing this new body of 
popular political knowledge. 
                                                            
51 Han Qiu, “Anfu,” Jing Bao, August 24, 1920. 
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 The fluid boundary between the gossip production and consumption requires a revision of 
prevalent understanding of knowledge making. The gossip economy not only engaged a group of 
information experts and traders across varying social-economic strata but also retained an open 
network that invited the audience from the general public to contribute. The growing agency of a 
common audience inevitably amounted to a change in power dynamics of knowledge production 
and information control. Non-elite players in the gossip economy challenged conventional top-
down knowledge transmission and the exclusive production mode. The conventional top-down 
and one-way knowledge transmission was transformed into a multi-directional information 
exchange and the sense of exclusivity in the field of knowledge production was challenged. In fact, 
transformations of communication that have been attributed to the rise of internet today can be 
traced back to the early Republican era.  
The implication of the gossip economy for the Chinese citizenship was significant. These 
new forms of engaging in both knowledge production and consumption transformed passive 
audiences to active speakers, disseminators, and reactors. They influenced the knowledge 
production, not only indirectly through “public taste” but also as direct agents, who contribute new 
information and turn the print media into a platform that allowed different narratives and opinions. 
They crafted an alternative citizenship that view politics in the lens of play. This popular 
engagement was propelled more by the commercial interests and the need of pleasure, rather than 
political commitment or any sense of patriotism. Disrespecting the political authority of any 
government prevented any further intention of utilizing or constructing official channels for 
political communication. Such unruly citizenship stood in the way of state civic education. The 
enormous popularity, the lowbrow taste, wild political implications and threatening power of 
involvement eventually made this new genre a target for intellectual criticism and state suppression.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Presence of a Central Government 
 
Introduction 
 The production and consumption of political scandals and gossip in the late 1910s 
undermined the dominance of the elite in the realm of cultural production and state authority 
over knowledge production. Frivolous and derogatory discussions about presidents, ministers 
and provincial governors bedeviled the politically powerful and impaired the political authority 
of the central government.  Duan Qirui once bitterly complained to foreign envoys that “Chinese 
people are good at fabricating stories.”1 The state's attitude towards gossip and rumors about 
political elites was changing.  In late imperial China when emperors controlled a network of 
royal secret agents, information from unofficial channels was a crucial part of the state 
surveillance networks. Special commissioners or secret police forces used to gather political 
rumors as supplementary intelligence to extend the knowledge of the emperor.2  But in the early 
Republican era, as the media landscape expanded, public discussion about highly ranked officials 
threatened the Chinese state’s information control and its century-long authority over knowledge 
and morality.  
 This chapter inquires into the Beijing government’s strategies to curb the dissemination of 
unfavorable information under the framework of the state-led popular education. Previous 
scholarship on the Chinese press in the treaty port environment usually regards the development 
                                                            
1 Xiamen University Library ed., Qian riben moci yanjiusuo qingbao ziliao [Intelligence Reports from 
Suetsugu Research Institute] 1 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan chubanshe, 1997), 155. 
2  Shih-shan Henry Tsai, The Eunuchs in the Ming Dynasty (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1996), Chapter 5. 
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before the ascent of the Nationalist state in 1927 as a stage of print capitalism largely unregulated 
by the government.3 However, this chapter finds that these state efforts included installing a new 
censorship system to screen popular cultural products, directing communicating with the writers 
by means of open letter and nationalizing the practice of open lectures to disseminate state-
sanctioned knowledge. As explained in the first section, at the core of this dual-pronged solution 
was the institutionalization of a collaboration between the state and intellectuals, the Popular 
Education Research Society (????????or PERS?, to serve as the national center of 
popular education in the late 1910s.  
 The Beijing government’s effort at popular education and combating the stream of gossip 
and rumor reveals the function of a central government with limited coercive power. After 1916 
when power fell to an assortment of militarists, bureaucratic bodies, and local gentry, the 
ongoing military competitions and faction struggles vying for dominance had already rendered 
the state power in a rather fluid status and weakened its control in the cultural realm. Recent 
research has illuminated the disciplinary power of the early Republican state by concentrating on 
local government agencies such as the police, the local court and the training workshops.4 These 
studies presume the deficiencies of Beiyang as a nominal central government.5  By organizing 
cultural elites, screening public knowledge, communicating with independent writers and 
                                                            
3  Christopher Reed summarized the observations of many scholars including Mittler, Hockx, Gimpel and 
his own. See Cynthia Joanne Brokaw and Christopher A. Reed, eds., From Woodblocks to the Internet: 
Chinese Publishing and Print Culture in Transition, circa 1800 to 2008 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 23. 
4 David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993).  Janet Chen, Guilty of Indigence. 1900-1952 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). Xiaoqun Xu, Trial of Modernity: Judicial Reform in Early Twentieth-Century 
China, 1901-1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
5  The Beiyang government was internationally recognized as the legitimate central government of 
Republican China from 1912 to 1928. Because it was in place of the capital city Beijing, it was called 
Beijing government by people of the time. 
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institutionalizing open lectures, however, the PERS insisted on the presence of the central 
government, rather than individual warlords or any regional powers, as the only state authority 
over the realm of moral guidance and knowledge production.  The attempted regulation revealed 
the persistence of a centralized cultural view in the early Republic. 
 The operation of the PERS demonstrates how the central government used cultural elites 
and social forces to rebuild its own moral and knowledge authority. By organizing the PERS, the 
central government formalized and institutionalized state cooperation with cultural and social 
elites and thus changed the late imperial nexus pattern of state-society cooperation in local 
societies.6 The state authorization rose to an overarching position to structure and systemize its 
cooperation with cultural and social elites. The first section of this chapter looks into the nature 
and organization of the PERS to demonstrate the state authority and administrative framework 
that contained the cultural elites in addition to its reliance on the expertise of independent 
intellectuals to formulate policy and censor popular products. The rest of the chapter explores 
how the state through the PERS defined popular knowledge for the public, constructed its 
suasive force to interfere in knowledge making and diffusion, and instructed citizens on how to 
participate in political discussion. The PERS acknowledged the diffusing effect achieved by 
unofficial narratives but rejected gossip as a legitimate source of public political knowledge. It 
set up the censoring criteria of factuality and morality as the resolution to the ramifications of the 
industry’s pursuit of entertainment value in the realm of cultural production. The practice of 
moral persuasion and open lectures aimed at establishing a nationalist basis for political 
participation. 
                                                            
6 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State : Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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 Facing the reality of being a weaker and less resourceful power in the face of commerce 
and unleashed social forces, the central government also asserted its moral and knowledge 
authority by expanding its ruling base. I do not mean it relied on the prestige and power of 
cultural elites, which was a continued practice since the late imperial era, but the state 
acknowledged citizens’ moral agency and compromised to popular political engagement. Middle 
and lower ranked popular novelists together with the cultural and social elites became 
constitutive elements of the multiple sources of legitimacy that the state experimented with in its 
transition from an absolute imperial state to a republican one. 
 
The Popular Education Research Society 
 Situated in the epistemological shift in the late 19th century and early 20th century, 
official attention to published political gossip was tied to a new emphasis on popular education. 
The Qing authoritative hierarchy of knowledge relegated literati small talk  the lowest rank: “oral 
literature” under “anthology.”7  The late imperial state cared very little about popular knowledge 
except when it needed useful techniques from popular religion, for instance, to pray for rain.8 
The late 1910s and early 1920s brought increased scholarly and state interest in popular 
knowledge. The incipient Republican state started to conceptualize knowledge as either popular 
                                                            
7 Andrew Plaks argues that the biased rank of these genres is more a specifically Qing phenomenon. In 
the late Ming, they were an integral part of serious literary heritage. See Andrew H. Plaks, “Full-Length 
Hsiao-Shuo and the Western Novel: A Generic Reappraisal,” in China and West: Comparative Literature 
Studies, William Tay, ed. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), 168. 
8 For example, local governments sought out techniques from popular religion to pray for rain. See Jeffrey 
Snyder-Reinke. Dry Spells: State Rainmaking and Local Governance in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).  The late Ming regulation over commercial book market 
subjugated literati practices of promoting personal fame and their vulgar strategy rather than supervising 
the influence on popular mentalities. See Suyoung Son, “Writing for Print: Zhang Chao and Literati-
Publishing in Seventeenth-Century China.” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2010), Chapter 4.  
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or scholarly, and saw the former as crucial to cultivating a national identity and modern 
citizenship.9 Prepared by the late Qing idea of popular education with the socially inclusive 
concept of citizenship, the Republican government institutionalized and led popular education.10 
The founding of the divisions of Social Education under the educational departments in central 
and local governments in Republican China marked a new phase in the development of  
education outside the school curriculum. Public libraries and lecture halls were erected in cities 
and towns.11 The study of folklore as a field of scholarly learning and as a means of connecting 
to the people gained prominence among New Culture intellectuals from 1918 to 1926.12  The 
shared goal of knowledge popularization and citizen education brought the two together under 
the PERS to promote officially sanctioned popular knowledge. 
 In need of assistance from educational experts,  in 1915 the Ministry of Education re-
established the Popular Education Research Society as a state apparatus to oversee popular 
cultural products and occasionally to assist in intelligence gathering as part of policy-making. 
The organization set up its headquarters in the capital city and nationwide. Three sections in the 
organization instructed practices of publishing, performing and lecturing, each section directly 
                                                            
9 “Jiaoyu buzhang fuyuanshu zhici,” [The speech by the Minister of Education Mr. Fu Yuanshu] in Tongsu 
jiaoyu yanjiuhui disanci gongzuo baogao [The third working report of the Popular Education Research 
Society]. Special Document, 1. 
10 In the late Qing, early reformist activists firstly spread the concept of popular education with the 
ideology of all-embracing national community.  Learning from Japan and German, reformers engaged in 
activities such as organizing private lectures for the public. Late Qing reformists also had started practices 
of social education such as organizing private open lecture to disseminate western knowledge including 
political ideas to the public. Some of the leading activists entered the Republican government and became 
officials in the division of social education.  
11  In many cases, the state and social elite cooperated in establishing libraries for popular readings. See 
Zhuang Yu, “Canguan beijing tushuguan jilue,” [A sketchy record of the visit to Beijing Library] in 
Jiaoyu zazhi, no. 4 (1914): 101-104. 
12 Jie Gao, “Promoting ‘Low Culture’: The Origins of the Modern Chinese Folklore Movement,” 
Canadian Journal of History no. 1 (2015): 3–29. 
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reporting to the Ministry of Education (MOE). The section of xiaoshuo (small talk) inspected the 
content and language of short stories, novels, travel guides, magazines and supplementary pages 
of commercial dailies.13 The drama section supervised stage scripts, movies and phonograph 
records. The lecture section took care of lecturer training programs and lecture contents.  
Although the stated objective of PERS was to improve people’s intelligence, personality, and 
morality, an investigation of popular cultural products performed the dual function of 
information overseeing and fact gathering as a reference for policy-making. Before the 
government launched nationwide social surveys in the 1920s, the PERS kept the central 
government apprised of current social tendencies and people’s concerns.14 The Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs at times requested assistance from the PERS in collecting and reporting on 
popular literature.15 The PERS showed the government vision of the society as a  site of 
information rather than legitimate knowledge producers. 
 The PERS presented another model of censoring power that differed from both the 
Qing’s reliance on the bureaucratic system to supervise the publishing world and social 
communications and what Michel Hockx calls the literary autonomy under state authority in 
1930s.16 The early Republican government lost supervisory control of the local administrative 
                                                            
13 Tongs jiaoyu yanjiuhui diiici gongzuo baogao [The First Working Report of the Research Association 
of Popular Education] (Beijing: Jinghua chuban gongsi, 1916), 9-10. The section’s coverage shows the 
meaning of xiaoshuo in the early Republican context was different from the western genre of novel. See 
Andrew H. Plaks, “Full-Length Hsiao-Shuo and the Western Novel: A Generic Reappraisal,” in China 
and West: Comparative Literature Studies. ed. William Tray et al (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1980). 
14 More information about the social survey movement in the 1920s and 1930s, see Tong Lam, A Passion 
for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-State, 1900-1949 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011). 
15 Tongs jiaoyu yanjiuhui disanci gongzuo baogao [The third working report of the Popular Education 
Research Association] (Beijing: Jinghua chuban gongsi, 1918), Conference Minutes, 22-24. 
16 Timothy Brook, "Censorship in Eighteenth-Century China: A View from the Book Trade," Canadian 
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branches. It was also powerless to penetrate the print industry so as to regulate it from within. An 
examination of the composition and operation of the PERS reveals the ambition and actions of 
the incipient central government to use non-state actors to build a professional and centralized 
censorship system. 
  The Society members consisted of educators from educational institutions in Beijing, 
officials from the Department of Social Education and Beijing municipal education bureau, and 
policemen. Unlike imperial scholar-officials who were limited to the bureaucracy, scholar 
members were financially and intellectually independent. The MOE had no right to nominate 
anyone. But its firm rejection of Peking University’s perfunctory recommendation of a proctor in 
1917 shows that the ministry held the possession of pedagogical knowledge as a key nomination 
criterion.17 The Society eventually gathered prestigious scholars in Beijing like Lu Xun. It was a 
wise choice for the short-staffed and financially constrained central government.18 By drawing 
upon cultural elites who were familiar with educational and cultural practices, the government 
inexpensively solved its staffing problem. The use of scholars and educators not only contributed 
to the decision-making process but also made their social networks available, smoothing the 
implementation of decisions in places that administrative hands were unable to reach.  
                                                            
Journal of History vol. 23. no. 2 (1988): 177-96; Philip Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 
1768 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Michel Hockx, “In Defense of the Censor: 
State Authority and Literary Autonomy in China, 1930-1936.” Journal of Modern Literature in Chinese, 
no. 2(1): 1-30. 
17  Ibid., Document 1, 7. 
18 In the late 1910s, the Duan Qirui government spent more than 40% of its annual budget on military 
expenses and just 1% on education. In 1918, the annual allotment to the PERS was 12,712,392 yuan. 
Beiyang zhengfu dangan 90, 37.  Timothy Weston briefly discussed the fiscal difficulty of the government 
and its low investment on education, see Timothy Weston, The Power of Position: Beijing University, 
Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898-1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 
217. 
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 The PERS showcased a model of culture governance, based on the collaboration of 
leading New Cultural intellectuals, late Qing reformist officials and the state power that 
reconstructed the social and political steering of practices in the area of low cultural production. 
Unlike in an ordinary bureaucratic organ, cultural more than political capital determined the 
power relations among these members from academia and officialdom. The internal meetings 
provided a platform for negotiations among different reformative agendas and practical concerns. 
The head of social education department in the central government, Gao Buying (????? had 
been a renowned popular educational activist in the late Qing and a moderate reformist compared 
to New Cultural intellectuals. Gao did not dominate internal procedures despite being a senior 
official. For example, in the discussion of the heimu writings, other members voted against his 
view of treating them as benign practices continued from the late Qing political novels.19 
Nonetheless, the organization was an extension of the government organs in which the MOE had 
a say in the basic principles and offered administrative support. If elite participation was 
indicative of social forces’ entanglement in statecraft, official authorization backed the operation 
of the Society and conferred executive power upon intellectual ideas. Political authority backed 
the transfer of power between cultural and political forces and institutionalized their mutual 
dependence. The ambivalence at the junction of officials and independent scholars makes the 
PERS more flexible than other administrative offices in handling issues concerning the print and 
entertainment industry while safely remaining under state control. The PERS with its multiple 
sources of legitimacy possessed the power to monitor and interfere in the flow of discourses and 
narratives from above. 
 
                                                            
19 Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disanci baogaoshu, conference minutes, 22-24. 
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Delimiting Good Popular Knowledge  
 By imposing censorship to weed out transgressive works, the PERS made stories about 
political affairs and political figures a crucial component of Republican public knowledge. As 
stated in the PERS internal censorship guideline: “As for works regarding political affairs, those 
containing wrong themes or unverified statements should all be ranked to the lowest. They 
should be circumscribed in distribution or completely prohibited.” The rationale is that it is 
improper to assess political leaders who are still in office and that their vilification might cause 
political danger.20 But both the Society and the central government publicly supported political 
discussion. In 1916, Duan’s government declared its support for freedom of expression and 
terminated Yuan Shikai’s notoriously strict political regulation and violent administrative 
interference.21  To keep the balance between the protection of press freedom and information 
regulation, the guideline became rather elastic. In a review of A Record of Three Kingdom Ghosts 
Reviving, a critic wrote that “the author should write in vague and equivocal terms about these 
contemporary figures so as to allow readers to perceive the connotations.”22 The note implies the 
boundary of public criticism set by the PERS: translucent criticism of political figures was 
acceptable. The public discussion of statesmen, intellectual’s support for political participation 
and the central government’s identification with Republicanism all contributed to the 
unprecedented tolerance of public discussion of political figures. 
                                                            
20 Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui diyici gongzuo baogao  [The First Working Report of the Research Association 
of Popular Education] (Beijing: Jinghua yinshuju, 1916), 40.  
21  The Second National Historical Archives ed., Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian  [A 
collection of archival sources of Republican Chinese history ] 3. Culture (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji cubanshe, 
1994), 315. 
22 Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disici gongzuo baogao  [The Fourth Working Report of the Research 
Association of Popular Education] (Beijing: Jinghua chuban gongsi, 1919), 40. 
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 In 1917, the Ministry of Education also acknowledged anecdotal collections as a 
legitimate form of popular knowledge and a useful educational vehicle. At the annual conference 
of PERS, Minister of Education Fu Zengxiang (?????1872-1949) said that “anecdotal stories 
in and out of the court in the late Qing” pique people’s interests because they were plausible. Fu 
expressed that vulgar content that could be harmful to the youth should be subject to 
censorship.23 He requested the PERS to learn the skills of topic selection and delivery method 
that draw favorable attention from these works so as to produce healthier and competitive 
readings. While affirming the value of the form, the minister discredited socially constructed 
knowledge about recent history and national politics for its inaccuracy and vulgarity. In the same 
speech, he set the guidelines for the PERS: to raise nationalist and scientific consciousness and to 
purify social customs by eliminating obscene and absurd content. The government made national 
identity, scientific attitude and moral propriety as the premises of the PERS’s censoring 
procedures.  An examination of the organization’s annual evaluations of popular publications 
shows how these values set the boundary between improper and officially sanctioned knowledge. 
 The 1918 PERS working report includes a complete list of reviewed titles. Books with 
titles like Secret History, Secret Record, or Hearsay, tell stories about late Qing and early 
Republican political figures. The PERS ranked them according to their factual, moral and 
ideological propriety. Evaluations reveal an intention to tame the “unofficial” by keeping 
innocent small talk while directing the twin emphases on factuality and morality at the industry’s 
bottomless pursuit of entertainment. Whereas facticity pointed against the absence of any fact 
verification mechanism, morality aimed to stop the excessive indulgence in sensual pleasure. The 
                                                            
23  “Jiaoyu buzhang fuyuanshu zhici,” [The speech by the Minister of Education Mr. Fu Yuanshu], in 
Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disanci gongzuo baogao [The third working report of the Popular Education 
Research Society]. Special Document, 1. 
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three ranks defined an official view of proper political knowledge for ordinary citizens and 
ensured a top-down approach to knowledge popularization. 
  A selected model of the first class works is A reliable record of hearsay stories about the 
Empress Dowager Cixi (??????. The author Fei Xingjian’s (?????1871-1954) academic 
training and appointment as university faculty explain his scholarly approach. In the preface, Fei 
categorizes his book as a hearsay-based miscellaneous record and criticizes other gossip 
publications for their attention to everyday minutiae.24 A Reliable Record weaves secret power 
struggles behind major political events of the late Qing with entertaining gossip such as how an 
alcoholic imperial concubine sold her embroideries to trade in wines.25  For the author, “hearsay” 
is not only fun; it is a way to disseminate knowledge about the political twists and turns in the 
recent past. To present an organized historical narrative, Fei grouped short stories into 17 
chapters and three chronological parts in contrast to other “miscellaneous story collections.” 
Each part begins with a short criticism of Cixi’s shortsightedness, moral depravity or despotism. 
The strict chronological order and editorial evaluation of political figures resonated with the 
features of traditional historical scholarship. 
 The work was praised for the facticity of the court stories and the author’s just criticism. 
The PERS comment reads:  
When the Qing dynasty collapsed, some court secrets were heard by outsiders. 
Editors gathered miscellaneous stories but could barely make a book. The author of this 
book is Wang Xiangqi’s disciple. Wang was a well-informed scholar. His scholarly 
delivery of knowledge and morality do not conform to the reading habits of most of our 
nationals. Moreover, to collect stories from hearsay and then declare them to be 
trustworthy could not easily win his assent. However, this book proves the facticity of 
stories and makes impartial judgments. It seriously bestow its praise and censure, and 
                                                            
24 Fei Xingjian, “Preface,” in Cixi chuanxin lu  [A reliable record of hearsay stories about the Empress 
Dowager Cixi] (Taipei: Guangwen bookstore, 1980). Reprint. 
25 Fei Xingjian, Cixi chuanxin lu. 
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mindfully select reliable materials. Therefore it qualifies a good unofficial history.26 
 
By comparing Fei’s work to his teacher’s scholarly knowledge, the reviewer treated edited 
hearsay about palace secrets as a vernacular version of serious historical narratives for a broad 
national audience. The sources of the stories, as claimed in the author’s preface, were a Manchu 
prince and the author’s literati friends. In the opinion of the PERS, scholarly knowledge and 
official sources were reliable materials. This picture of late Qing court life and evaluation of 
political figures, in addition, conveys a pro-Republican political message. 
 Second-ranked works about political heads in the 1918 list were either disorganized or 
inaccurate. Frequent criticisms were “incorrect categorization,” “overly modified,” and “not fully 
trustworthy.” For example, Late Qing hearsay (?????? a documentation of the author’s 
experiences in the late Qing officialdom, received compliments for its factuality and originality. 
But the reviewer considered it as worthless because it glorifies the author’s political 
achievements without providing any moral or intellectual guidance.27  The Society criticized 
another compilation of secret stories of warlords around Yuan Shikai, Secrets behind the Xinhua 
Gate ? ???? for its unverified and partial information drawn from rumors. The reviewer also 
noted that “a few fact-based statements can be read as unofficial history.”28 A lack of moral 
guidance or accuracy would reduce the work’s value and rank in popular education. 
 Heimu collections, however, received the lowest grade and went onto the list for a 
proposed ban for transgressing the PERS’ moral lines.  The PERS censured the ambitious  
Panorama of Scandals in China for inventing stories, exposing people’s shameful secrets, using 
                                                            
26  Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disici gongzuo baogao. Beijing, 1918. Report I, 9. 
27  Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disici gongzuo baogao, 40. 
28  Ibid., 32. 
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vulgar language and inserting amatory descriptions.  The second volume was dismissed as 
“nonsense talkers” and “evil-deed advisor.”29 Another banned work was the novel A Record of 
Three Kingdom Ghosts Reviving (?????) which depicts contemporaneous political figures 
as reincarnations of Three Kingdoms-era militarists. The PERS banned the novel for its 
ridiculous premise and defamation of political leaders’ origins.30 
 As revealed by the evaluation criteria, the PERS’ principle of factuality had two 
dimensions. First, the factuality promoted scientific rationale to modernize popular knowledge 
and through which to raise people’s intelligence. The popular writings embellished stories with 
fictional, exaggerated or supernatural elements, such as popular themes of spirit travel and 
reincarnations. The PERS dismissed imaginary narratives and irrational explanations as 
superstitious and absurd. By narrowing the room for imagination, elaboration and exaggeration, 
the PERS pushed this body of public knowledge towards the May Fourth advocacy of scientific 
method and realistic writing. This evaluation and requirement reflected the treatment of science 
as a universal method of knowledge production in the late 1910s. As argued by Tong Lam, the 
advocacy of a new paradigm of knowledge was driven by political urgency to civilize Chinese 
culture.31  The PERS unconditionally saw surrealistic stories as backward popular knowledge.  
 Second, the emphasis on information verification manifested a view of factuality. 
Unofficial sources catered to the public distrust of official depictions of political figures and 
                                                            
29 Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disici gongzuo baogao, 42-43. 
30 Ibid., 40; Conference Minutes, 8, 17-18. 
31  Tong Lam’s study of the National Studies in Republican China argues for the use of a unitary scientific 
approach in the field of humanity in the 1920s. He argues that iconoclastic Chinese intellectuals embraced 
the epistemological shift with the awareness of their nation’s deficiencies and never truly negotiated on 
epistemological grounds. Tong Lam, A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the 
Chinese Nation-State, 1900-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 38-45, 95-103. 
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provided alternative truths. To counteract a willful understanding of truth, the PERS 
problematized unofficial information sources. The Society’s evaluations of A Record and Late 
Qing Hearsay recognized and promoted scholarly knowledge and sources from bureaucrats as 
the location for truth. The PERS kept imposing the authority of the traditional official historical 
knowledge production onto the Republican construction of popular knowledge: in the imperial 
system of historical writing. State documents and gazetteers were the only trustworthy sources 
with the legitimacy to frame popular textual production.32  The preference for official sources 
and elite knowledge was not simply due to a scholarly writing tradition but an attempt to control 
the destabilization associated with unofficial sources. The PERS perceived the danger of the 
power that had been granted to the society by means of public contribution. Conference minutes 
show that censors problematized the collecting method and the publisher-editor’s machinations. 
The section head suspected the editor or harboring some unknown agenda by involving people 
outside the editorial board.33  Underlying the insistence on official source was an intention to 
recentralize popular knowledge production and undermine the social powers. 
 Compared to the principle of factuality, the PERS’ moral censure was more 
straightforwardly directed to obscenity and privacy invasion.  The ethical values expressed in the 
official criticism of market-oriented popular products remained unchanged if compared to the 
ideas in the imperial moral guidebooks. Ostensibly, moral censure of the exposure of dirty 
                                                            
32 For more information about how the late imperial popular narratives of political figures prioritized the 
official sources, see Paul August Vierthaler, “Quasi-History and Public Knowledge:  A Social History of 
Late Ming and Early Qing Unofficial Historical Narratives” (PhD Diss., Yale University, 2014). For more 
information about how modern China continued the late imperial practice of official historical writing, 
see Yue Dong, “How to Remember the Qing Dynasty: The Case of Meng Sen,” in The Politics of 
Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China ed. Tze-ki Hon and Robert Culp (Leiden: Brill, 
2007), 271-80. 
33 Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disici gongzuo baogao. Conference Minutes, 22-24. 
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secrets in heimu publications reiterated the Confucian principle of “covering up other’s 
faults”  (??). Comments invoked Wang Yangming’s (?????1472-1529) saying that “all acts 
that attack other’s weakness and expose people’s shameful secrets in order to demonstrate one’s 
integrity could not be praised as criticism with goodwill.”34 Another charge of the genre for 
“instructing thieves and prostitutes” was very common in the traditional moral ledgers.   
 However, the ideology behind the attempt to restore the moral order changed. The late 
imperial scholar-official and social elites bound moral practice to social status. In the 17th 
century, scholars used status advancement to aid moral instruction but in the 18th, instructions 
suggested humbly following the moral codes associated with one’s status to reestablish a stable 
social system.35  In the 20th century, the correlation between the moral practice and the social 
hierarchy was replaced by a new link between the moral code and Chinese citizenship. The 
PERS moral critic conformed to the May Fourth discourse of a problematic Chinese national 
character. In 1918, Zhou Zuoren (???) found the root of the popularity of scandalous 
accounts in the sordid Chinese national character. “[T]hese so-called realistic works are even 
worse than fictional ones for they have unmasked Chinese people’s bad disposition to talk about 
others’ inner chamber secrets. They like talking filthy and maliciously gossiping. This is a 
decadent national character.”36 Starting with Lu Xun’s iconoclastic portrayal of Chinese national 
                                                            
34 Wang Yangming.”Jiaotiao shi tongchang zhusheng,” in Wang Yangming quanji [Complete Collection of 
Wang Yangming’s work] 26, ed. Wu Guang et al (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2011).  
35  Cynthia Brokaw has demonstrated how scholar-officials and local elites in the seventeenth century and 
the eighteenth century constructed the moral knowledge and instructed commoner how to behave in 
accordance to their (desired) social status. See Cynthia Joanne Brokaw, The Ledgers of Merit and 
Demerit: Social Change and Moral Order in Late Imperial China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1991). 
36 Zhong Mi, “Lun heimu,” [A discussion of heimu] Meizhou pinglun, no. 4 (1919). in Zhou Zuoren 
jiwaiwen [Zhou Zuoren’s articles not included by his anthology], ed. Chen Zishan, (Haikou: Hainan guoji 
xinwen chuban zhongxin ,1995), 285-287. This article was also republished in the New Youth and soon 
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character in the fictional Ah Q, this discourse became a weapon brandished against the 
deficiencies in the Chinese character as part of the intellectual endeavor to enlightening the 
public.37 During the New Culture era (the mid 1910s and 1920s), intellectuals believed that the 
nation might be saved by improving the national character.38 In his criticism of heimu products, 
Zhou did not treat immoral behaviors as individual wrongs but as the manifestation of the illness 
of the entire national community. To argue against writers’ claim of exposing the dark realities to 
heal social and political diseases -- a claim that ostensibly adhered to the discourse of national 
character -- Zhou elucidates that true reformist works should discuss the relationship between the 
decadent Chinese society and the wrongdoings of Chinese nationals.39 He spoke of public 
morality that served to construct the national consciousness.  
 An open letter from the PERS to the heimu writers in 1918 articulated the nationalist 
ideology as the new significance of the moral instruction. After denouncing the immorality of the 
ideology, the letter cited two drawbacks of the unconstrained production of these works. The 
overexposure of scandals would unleash people’s evil nature and destroy their faith in human 
goodness. In addition, “prevailing scandals would mislead foreigners to an impression of 
Chinese nation as despicable and they would think of us inferior to other civilized race.”40 This is 
                                                            
noticed by the local government. No. D2-0-825-162. Beijing Municipal Archives.  
37 Lydia Liu unpacks Lu Xun’s deployment of Arthur Smith’s concept of Chinese characteristics into his 
depiction and analysis of a fictional protagonist Ah Q. See Lydia He Liu, Translingual Practice: 
Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity--China, 1900-1937 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1995).  
38 Paul B. Foster, Ah Q Archaeology: Lu Xun, Ah Q, Ah Q Progeny and the National Character Discourse 
in Twentieth Century China (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 52-58. 
39 Zhong Mi, “Lun heimu,” in Zishan Chen, ed., Zhou Zuoren jiwaiwen, 287. 
40 “Jiaoyubu tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui quangao xiaoshuojia wuzai bian heimu yilei xiaoshuohangao” [A 
letter from the Popular Education Research Society under the Ministry of Education to persuade novelist 
from writing scandal fictions], in Dongfang zazhi [Eastern Miscellany], 15. no. 9 (1918): 172. 
 102 
why the PERS stopped the production and distribution of the genre: to maintain domestic moral 
order and to spread a positive international image of the Chinese nation. The Society exercised 
moral guidance in light of citizens’ patriotic awareness. The letter asked them to conceptualize 
the momentary phenomena they depicted collectively as vital components of the national picture. 
The rest of their national identity and responsibilities of protecting the national interest revealed 
a shifting of moral instruction from individual behavior to collective consciousness. 
 The official act of gathering, screening and evaluating imposed intellectual dominance in 
shaping knowledge and claimed state authority over popular knowledge production. The PERS 
looked askance at wild stories, incorrect organizations, untraceable sources, boundless exposure 
of ugly gossip, and ways of political discussion.Works that passed the censor fell into the new 
category of officially approved popular knowledge of high politics. State-sanctioned knowledge 
valued popular entertainment but demanded a rigorous approach to verification, to guiding moral 
behaviors, and ideally to distill some Republican messages. However, the PERS compromised its 
own standards with popular tastes and commercial interests of publishers. Its permission to 
circulation of middle-ranked works revealed a room for negotiation between entertainment value 
and scholarly accuracy, between popular practice and official rules. 
 
Regulation in Actions: Tactics of Persuasion and Moral Authority 
 The PERS attempted to interfere with production and distribution by rewarding the good 
and prohibiting the bad. Every year the PERS would compliment the one or two best books in 
popular magazines and newspapers. The annual best book award set a standard for worthwhile 
knowledge, publicized the evaluation criteria, and protected the publisher’s copyright.41 
                                                            
41  “Gongbu lianghao xiaoshuo yian,” [Proposal for Publishing the List of Good Novels] Tongs jiaoyu 
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Meanwhile, the MOE and PERS imposed prohibition through local booksellers’ associations (?
???) in a language of moral persuasion. In actuality, the book award was not even an 
important event in the print industry. But prohibition of problematic products was in effect. To 
check the heimu writings, the PERS sent an open letter to all the writers in Shanghai. The letter 
demonstrated both its disciplinary force and discursive influence on the intellectual debates 
surrounding the genre. Through the letter, the moral authority of the Republican central 
government, renewed and empowered by the nationalist discourse, mobilized supportive 
intellectuals and placed the gossip industry under pressure.  
 Official surveillance of print products relied on self-reports and book samples submitted 
by major publishing houses.42 A small police force available along with a limited monthly budget 
of 1000 yuan could not conduct labor-intensive and time-consuming investigations even in 
Beijing.43 In 1917, most of the 380 publications that the PERS reviewed were requested from 
publishers by administrative orders and a few from direct purchase from bookstores. In the 
Shanghai, foreign concessions that the Chinese orders could not penetrate and the completion of 
the gathering process owed much to the support of the Shanghai Booksellers’ Association  
(SBA). The SBA was an important intermediary agent between Beijing and Shanghai book 
publishers.44 It promptly delivered administrative orders to individual publishers and organized 
                                                            
yanjiuhui diyici gongzuo baogao. 
42 “Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui tongsu zhangcheng,” [Regulation of the Popular Education Research Society] 
in Tongs jiaoyu yanjiuhui diyici gongzuo baogao. 
43 Tongs jiaoyu yanjiuhui disici gongzuo baogao, Conference Minutes 51, 10-12. 
44  As an organization of bookstores and book publishers, the booksellers’ association worked as the 
supreme authority to settle down disputes among its members. In the absence of a copyright law, most of 
the disputes it handled were copyright issues. For more information, see Fei-Hsien Wang, “Creating New 
Order in the Knowledge Economy: The Curious Journey of Copyright in China, 1868–1937” (Ph.D diss., 
University of Chicago, 2012). 
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them to contribute reference books when the PERS needed them. Some publishers also showed a 
willingness to cooperate. The Shanghai Chinese Bookstore (???????) took the initiative 
in submitting the titles of more than 30 works upon hearing that the PERS was gathering the 
popular literary magazine Saturday.45 This self-report system connecting the state with the press 
via social organizations extended the reach of administrative force while limiting access to 
information. It came as no surprise that the SBA urged major publishers to censor their own lists 
and underscored the necessity of scrutiny before mailing copies to Beijing to avoid trouble.46 
Many small publishers and other opportunistic publishers stayed off the SBA list and thus 
avoided official contact. They could not form a network of informants that was loyal to the state. 
This porous surveillance network was vulnerable to manipulation by social forces. The 
publishers had space to negotiate with the state to protect their business interests. 
 The SBA mediated the PERS’ intervention in publication distribution in Shanghai. A list 
of prohibited book titles was regularly sent to the local Book Dealer’s Association which would 
then instruct newspapers not to advertise and booksellers not to sell any banned book. Backed by 
administrative orders, the PERS adopted a rhetoric of moral persuasion and displayed its kind 
consideration of the commercial interests of bookstores to smooth its communication with local 
associations. It repeatedly declared its goals of “persuading the society to purify the social 
custom and protecting commercial activities.”47 “Persuade,” (??) the most frequently word 
used, signifies an intentionally lowered position of the PERS that allowed it to rally the widest 
                                                            
45  Zhang Shewo. “shenme jiaozuo libailiu pai,” [What’s Saturday School?] originally published in 
Zuixiao [the Smallest] 13, in Wenxueshi ziliao quanbian [A complete collection of primary sources for 
history of Chinese literature: the modern period](Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2010), 172. 
46  “Tongsu jiaoyu zhi yian,” [A Proposal on Popular Education] Shi Shi Xin Bao, Mar 30, 1916, 3. 
47  Tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui disanci gongzuo baogao, Documents II, 1. 
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support from publishers and book dealers. One official letter stated that: “We hope that you 
forward the instruction with the list of prohibited books to all the booksellers as soon as possible 
so as to avoid any loss of commercial profits due to the ban.”48  
 The implementation of the new censorship system showed a regulatory body combining 
the government, cultural elites, and social organizations. During the first two decades of the 20th 
century, native place associations and merchant associations assumed quasi-governmental 
functions to fill the void left by the state in areas such as local militia, public fire control and 
charity activities. They formed the dominant forces in both decision-making and policy 
implementation.49 As in other cases, by mediating between the state and local publishers, the 
SBA legitimized its leadership in the publishing industry and elevated its status to the officially 
sanctioned representative of Shanghai publishers. But the SBA’s role assisted in enforcing the 
decision of the PERS. 
 With the heimu writings, the PERS tried an unusual measure: an open letter to all writers. 
This popular genre swept Shanghai in the late 1910s that scandal became the most effective way 
to publicize gossip collections but the SBA was unable to forward a message to opportunistic 
publishers who had never joined the association. The PERS resorted to private connections with 
foreigners in search of an administrative coalition with the foreign authorities to eliminate all 
heimu publications. The Jiangsu branch of the Society proposed an open letter and persuaded 
headquarters that attempts to ban would build public interest in the prohibited works.  In 1918, 
                                                            
48  Ibid. 
49  There are many works exploring the cooperation between state and local elites in the late Qing and 
early Republican China. Among these are Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China; 
Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970) and 
Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-
1937 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995). 
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the PERS published an open letter in Eastern Miscellany (????). On the one hand, the letter 
expressed its moral concern over the descriptions of “licentious,” “violent” and “deceptive” 
deeds with an eye to the interests of Chinese society and national prestige. On the other hand, the 
letter showed a friendly attitude towards the writers by reminding them of their reputation and 
appealing to their sense of social responsibility.?
 The letter brought attention to the presence of the state’s claim to moral authority. Some 
wording and the tone of the letter, such as the expression of concern for the moral decadence and 
the phrase “rectifying the people’s heart and improving customs,” were reminiscent of a Qing 
emperor’s edict on customs reform and moral rectification. But the early Republican central 
government lacked comparable compelling moral voices. Especially in the high Qing, the state 
was hegemonic to instruct the practice of moral reform. Imperial pronouncements could 
denounce moral problems including slander. Local magistrates toured their districts to investigate 
social behavior and launched campaigns for commoners’ moral transformation.50 The constant 
presence of the state at the local level not only reminded people of state-sanctioned values but 
more importantly routinized its civilizing mission in bureaucratic practice. As the late imperial 
officials were also expected to be models of rectitude, the bureaucratic body both symbolized 
and exerted the state’s unquestionable moral authority.51 Unfortunately, in the first decade of the 
Republic, the central government was losing its control over its bureaucratic machines below the 
provincial level. Besides its weakness in executive force to penetrate local societies, it lost its 
moral stature when questions about the moral sincerity and personal character of its ministers 
                                                            
50 Janet Theiss. Disgraceful Matters: The Politics of Chastity in Eighteenth-Century China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 40. 
51 See more in Huters, Theodore, and Roy Bin Wong ed., Culture & State in Chinese History: 
Conventions, Accommodations, and Critiques (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997).  
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and senior officials undermined its legitimacy. The state had to contest with social dissents and 
regional governors in many realms. 
 Against this backdrop, collaborations like PERS represented the central government and 
it claimed to be an arbiter of moral order.  The letter clarifies the official nature of the 
organization. It stated that the society’s policies were formulated and carried out by the Ministry 
of Education and Domestic Affairs. In case of issuing publication bans, it strictly followed the 
administrative procedures to obtain the permit from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Domestic Affairs. The Eastern Miscellany also explicated the nature of the Society as a 
government organ in the title “from the Popular Education Research Society under the Ministry 
of Education.”52 The early Republican state’s use of the cultural prestige and discursive power of 
a seemingly intellectual Society shows that even in a time of political fragmentation and 
uncertainty, the state still concerned the restoration of moral authority as its imperial exemplar. 
  By constructing a softened suasive force, the PERS presented a renewed moral authority 
premised on the emergence of the state moral rule, intellectual concerns of public good and the 
autonomy of the writers’ society. The nationalist discourse placed a new emphasis on the moral 
agency of writers and publishers. The letter began by saying that “rather than counting on state 
prohibition, we should rely on citizens’ self-consciousness.” It ended by reiterating the link 
between self-consciousness and national obligation:  
Dear writers, you are all Chinese citizens and you all have children. Please follow the 
dictates of your conscience. How could you bear with these works? We worried about it 
and respectfully ask all the writers to protect your individual reputation while preserving 
the value of our national literature… 
 
                                                            
52 “Jiaoyubu tongsu jiaoyu yanjiuhui quangao xiaoshuojia wuzai bian heimu yilei xiaoshuohangao,” [A 
letter from the Popular Education Research Society under the Ministry of Education to persuade novelist 
from writing scandal fictions]  Dongfang zazhi 15, no. 9 (1918): 172. 
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In contrast to the traditional view of self-cultivation, the PERS regarded every writer and 
publisher as a citizen equally responsible for maintaining the nation’s moral order. By respecting 
popular engagement and citizen capacities, the state could borrow social power, especially from 
within the gossip industry, to ensure the docility of society and to enhance the government’s 
disciplinary power. As the source of this disciplinary power came from several actors, this moral 
authority connected the state, cultural elites and lower-class writers in temporary cooperation. 
? ?he letter placed publishers under pressure. The genre creator the China Times was the 
first to respond. On November 7, 1918, it announced on its front page the termination of the 
heimu column. The newspaper affirmed the official criticism at the obscenity and privacy 
invasion of this genre while defending itself as follows:  
The heimu stories were realistic narratives that we created with the aim of reforming the 
society. In the past two years, it received compliments from various social sectors. The 
name of genre was thereby well established. Recently, various small opportunist-
publishers produced a great amount of heimu books. We calculated the number of book 
advertisements and found that more than a hundred types were available on the market. 
These imitators seemingly followed us but their book contents revealed them as either 
obscene publications or privacy invaders. Everyone sees the evilness…They went against 
our initial goals, which we never expected...53 
 
In this explanation of why good intentions had bad consequences, the editor blamed readers for 
using a good reformist tool for moral transgression. The end of the column demonstrated the 
newspaper’s social responsibility. The China Times’ defense of its reputation showed the strong 
impact of the letter and the disciplinary force of official moral suasion.  
 The letter fomented public discussion of the morality of the genre. In the ensuing years, 
intellectuals, popular magazines and tabloids published articles in support of PERS. Every writer 
and journalist who participated in the discussion added to the weight of state’s presence and 
                                                            
53  Selectively quoted from “Benbao caiche heimu lan tonggao,” [Announcement of our termination of the 
heimu column] Shi Shi Xin Bao, November 7, 1918, 1. 
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legitimized its moral authority. Besides Zhou Zuoren’s trenchant criticism, women’s magazines 
despised these works as worthless for the education of young citizens.54 Even the Crystal joined 
them by tracing the origin of this genre to amorous fictions echoing with the PERS’ accusation of 
obscenity.55  Public criticism confirmed Stephen Mackinnon’s observation that government 
censorship was acceptable to the reading public and that intellectuals and writers were concerned 
with the means by which censorship was imposed.56 Besieged by the state, cultural elites, social 
reformers and even some gossip producers, heimu publications and its unique way of gathering 
information waned in the early 1920s.57 The official view of the genre as decadent and harmful 
had been repeatedly noted in intellectual works and government documents from the warlord era 
to the Nationalist period.58 
 
Instruction on Good Citizenship   
 The state’s tolerance of public political discussion was accompanied by the extension of 
citizenship education to places like teahouses and temples and to the illiterate population. If the 
open letter publicized the citizens’ obligation to middle- and low-ranking writers, the national 
                                                            
54 Miaoran, “Xinzazhi he heimushu,” [New Magazine and Scandal Fictions] in Xin funv 3, no.6 (1920): 31. 
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lecture for popular education (????????) delivered officially sanctioned political 
knowledge in language that the commoners could understand. A model lecture on civic 
participation, which were reviewed by the PERS and delivered to urban commoners, allows us to 
take a glance of the government efforts at instructing people’s reception of political information 
to counteract the playful way of political participation in the late 1910s. The model lecture 
announced serious political news on newspapers to be the right venue for political knowledge 
and demanded citizens to discuss political affairs for the national interest. The institutionalization 
of open lectures declared the central government’s ambition of dominating the popular education 
but its instruction on political knowledge revealed its incapacity to establish itself as the 
knowledge authority.  
 After cleaning up the mess of the 1911 revolution, the central government nationalized 
and routinized the practice of open lecture that were initiated by social reformers in the late Qing 
to mint new citizens.59  The state erected national lecture halls for popular education in cities and 
wealthy towns of most provinces.60 Local educational bureaus supervised the training of 
lecturers and daily management of lecture events including lecture hours and the content. All 
lecture notes were subject to investigation of the PERS since its establishment. The lecture 
                                                            
59 Experiences were brought into the government by late Qing intellectual practitioners who experimented 
with open lectures to teach necessary knowledge about political affairs, social morality and national 
responsibility. The social education department head Gao Buying himself experimented with public 
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with the police office beforehand. Policemen were also sent to inspect the lecture content and the number 
of the audience. 
60 “Jiaoyubu xingzheng jiyao, 1916-1918,” [Administrative Records of the Ministry of Education, 1916-
1918] in The Second National Historical Archives. ed. Beiyang zhengfu dangan [Archives of Beiyang 
Government] 90 (zhongguo dangan chubanshe, 2010), 622. The system survived into the Nationalist era 
but the focus shifted from cities to rural side by the time of 1930.  
 111 
section of the PERS compiled and distributed collections of model lectures alongside reference 
books to local lecture halls. The review system guaranteed the official knowledge and the 
language of delivery to be examined, filtered and bestowed by the authority. Open lectures met a 
rapid expanding audience. Many open lectures held in large temple markets and teahouses 
attracted socially diverse visitors.61 
 As an integral part of must-have knowledge of a Chinese citizen, those on contemporary 
politics, law and citizen obligations were among the most frequent lecture topics. One modal 
lecture titled “Citizens should pay respect to state affairs.”  (???????? taught audiences 
where to find and how to process political information. The lecture speaks: 
 Nation and citizens are very closely associated. Citizens should pay attention to 
all political affairs, small or big, for state affairs concern people’s vital interest. Since we 
have the rights to petition the parliament, we can not renounce our rights. If the 
government had misconducts, we can petition the parliament to exercise our supervisory 
rights. If the government policy is beneficial to the public, we must give unanimous 
approval of it so that the government could advance its plan without hesitation. This is 
the national obligation that nobody should discharge. Paying attention to state affairs 
prepares us for fulfilling this duty. 
 The government is not capable to announce everything. So there exist newspapers 
to deliver important information. Newspapers inform us of what government did. 
Regularly, newspapers report what was heard and inevitably publish false information. 
Therefore, when a big event occurred, we should verify the information before taking 
actions. Hassle decisions and actions do not help but obstruct political operations. They 
would even connive at the government’s destructive acts…Be more prudent when you 
examine the consequences of the happenings. Our opposition to good policies or support 
of harmful polices would result in real damage and we Chinese would be sneered at by 
foreigners. Therefore, we must investigate the facts and then evaluate its consequences. 
Do not take precipitate actions and bungle the chance of solving problems. 62 
                                                            
61  According to a 1921 social survey conducted by an American scholar, the average attendance reached 
500 people a day in Beijing and included merchants, laborers, street idlers, and former Manchu officials. 
The audience composition must vary in Shanghai open lectures but it might be equally large and socially 
diverse. Sidney Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2011), 150.  For general 
information about open lecture in Shanghai temple market, see Shanghai Gazetteer, the Republican era 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node82368/node82378/node82430/userobject1ai111907.html 
(accessed on July.9. 2017).  
62 The Popular Education Research Society ed. Tongsu jiaoyu jianggao xuanlu [Selected collection of 
popular education lecture notes] 2 (Beijing: The Popular Education Society, 1916), 54. 
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The first paragraph articulates the state's advocacy of political discussion and endorsement of 
people's right to know. The lecture maintains that citizen obligations rather than casual pleasure 
should be one’s motivation of acquiring political knowledge. People in the gossip community 
were bound together by curiosity, shared pleasure and knowledge about individual behaviors. In 
contrast, the national membership and the concept of the national interest worked to provoke a 
different feeling of insiders whose real-life interest was closed bond with the government 
operations and those political figures. The lecture’s emphasis on the citizen obligation and rights 
to petition conveyed the basic concept of active participation and direct democracy that were 
taught in the middle school.63 By using a plain language, open lectures extended the formal 
citizen education to a broader and under-educated public. 
 The lecture ruled out story collections, novelist narratives and orally transmitted hearsay 
as the source of proper knowledge about state affairs, and acknowledged the role newspapers 
played in making government information available to the general public. The PERS 
recommended newspapers as the most crucial disseminator of information on political affairs but 
called into question the accountability of newspaper reports. Its repetitive reminders of cautious 
reading and rational analysis acquiesced the agencies of ordinary readers but leaving it 
unmentioned as where to find secure evidence to verify the information. The lecture thus frankly 
admits the government’s impotence of informing and publicizing official programs and policies. 
 The early Republican government was caught in an awkward situation between its 
promotion of a state-centered cultural view and its administrative limitation. In the 1910s, the 
central government continued the practice of on-board posting to publicize recent polices and 
                                                            
63  Robert Culp, Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern China, 
1912-1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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regulations but its low update frequency and use of classical Chinese language limited the 
circulation of the information. Officials were aware that the inadequate official channels of 
publicity impeded the public communication. The Beijing municipal Police Office who were so 
desperately fretting about the flying rumors proposed for establishing a government newspaper 
in 1921.64  But the ideal of a powerful platform of official political news was never realized. As 
late as in 1925, the Mayor of Beijing was still complaining about the lost function of public 
communication and urging to adopt vernacular language in official notices for the convenience 
of less educated commoners.65  Indeed, open lectures tried to fill the void by making official 
announcements of newly enacted laws and government policies to a wider audience including 
illiterate social groups. Lectures could also react quickly to unfavorable rumors than publishing 
an official reprehension to political scandals. In 1918, some large open lecture events added a 
section of “dementi.” (????66 National lecture halls usually allocate space for a newspaper 
browsing room where shelved major dailies that had been carefully selected. Even still, the 
coverage of the lectures and the amount of information to be annunciated were far from meeting 
the needs. Its inability to control information publicity forced the state to continuously 
problematize yet rely on political news in newspapers.  
 
Conclusion 
 Flowing information about political leaders tested the limits of the state and expedited the 
                                                            
64 The Second National Historical Archives ed. Zhonghua minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian  [The 
Collection of Archival Sources for Republican Chinese History] 3. Culture, 320-321. 
65 “Guanting gaoshi yao gaiyong baihua,” [Official Notices Should be Changed to Vernacular Forms]” in 
Nong Min, no. 9 (1925): 2. 
66 Beijing Municipal Archives. No. J004-001-00177.  
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official opening of the public political discussion to the bottom level of the society. If in the late 
imperial China public criticism of the political leaders and the state was seen as rebellious, the 
early republican authority publicly addressed the fact-checking, moral and nationalist aspect of 
the discussion. The evaluations, the letter and the lecture all attested to the official allowance of 
monitored and circumscribed political discussion. The PERS carved out a category of state-
sanctioned popular knowledge that favored scholarly and scientific approaches, emphasized 
information accuracy and moral decency with citizen obligations and sponsored the top-down 
transmission route. In the late 1910s, the disciplinary efforts went all the way into knowledge 
production, distribution and reception. 
 The practices of censorship and national open lecture did rejuvenate the state knowledge 
authority and made a visible presence of a central government in the field of cultural production 
and citizenship cultivation. The central government leveraged its resources to claim authority 
over information in the late 1910s. Although a state-controlled national communication that 
Liang Qichao (?啟???1873-1929) aspired to was still a fantasy for the early republican state, 
the government was able to ally with professional educators to lay an official hand on popular 
cultural products and modes of knowledge production. The central government’s 
institutionalization of its collaboration with cultural elites showed its intention to dominate the 
monitor of popular knowledge. It does not say that the official approval and guidance mattered 
much for the gossip society but the presence of the central government was important for the 
formation and consolidation of state authority in the chaotic era. More than having these elites 
function as mediators of state power, the central government borrowed the power from well-




A Failed Defamation Charge 
 
Introduction 
 While relying on its censorship apparatus to police information, the state resorted to 
defamation law under the condition that administrative order could not reach the troublesome 
newspaper in the treaty-port cities under the jurisdiction of foreign settlers.1 In the Republican 
era, the law of defamation (????) acknowledged people’s rights to reputation and provided 
a new legal instrument to protect individuals, social groups and institutions. Among cases 
brought by political figures and institutions, the most famous was the 1919 case filed by the 
Beijing government against the Republican Daily (????) in Shanghai Mixed Court for 
insulting the president and senior officials.2 This is the only time in Chinese history when the 
central government used defamation litigation to control the print media. By examining the 1919 
case, this chapter takes up the question of the nature and extent of state control of political 
discussion, and explores the relationship between legal and media practice. 
The defamation claim stemmed from a satirical article “Explanation of a lineage chart of 
the Anfu clique” (????????) published on Sept 15, 1919 in the political news column 
of Shanghai’s Republican Daily. The article depicted the internal power relations of the central 
                                                            
1 As for newspapers outside the foreign settlements, political leaders tended to directly spoke to police 
office or the Department of Domestics for administrative actions to close down the publishing house. In 
1917, Feng Guozhang requested the Department of Domestics to punish Central Daily in Beijing for 
spreading rumors about his political ambitions. See Beiyang zhengfu dangan 124, 144-164. 
2 “Yu laoxiang daguansi,” [Having a legal dispute with one from the same native-place] Chen Bao, 
October 2, 1923. 
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government as a five-generation family tree. It described the political relation between Prime 
Minister Duan Qirui (???, 1865-1936) and President Xu Shichang (???, 1855-1939) as 
that of a father and an illegitimate child. This news article crossed the line of what the state 
considered acceptable. If the central government’s soft measure of self-report censorship and 
moral persuasion reflected its tolerance of gossip, it was more determined to set a boundary 
between the lighthearted and serious political discussion. The 1919 case was a contest between 
the state that wielded legal force and commercial media institutions that insisted on their 
autonomy.  
The power relations between the state and the print media as well as the relations 
between the media and legal practice formed two inter-related themes that structure this chapter. 
The first two sections discuss the source of the friction and Chinese defamation laws since the 
late Qing to explain why the central state resorted to the rule of law and to the insult law. I argue 
that the ban on insulting officials enabled the Republican government to assert its political 
authority by using the language of reputational rights. The third section, the core of this chapter, 
examines the clash of visions of the information order in court and in the news coverage after the 
trial. The insult law, the discourse of freedom of expression, the commercial pursuit of 
entertainment defined the nature of the problematic article as insult, as political criticism and as 
entertainment. The Republican Daily’s contemptuous descriptions of these statesmen after the 
trial and some other magazines’ interest in litigation as amusing stories rendered the court’s 
verdict powerless. The chapter concludes by mentioning the growing power of the print media 
and the tabloid’s strategic use of defamation litigation in the 1920s. The print media’s arguments 
informed judicial practices as in the late Qing Yang Naiwu Case or in the 1930s Shi Jianqiao 
 117 
case.3 In the early Republican defamation cases, the press was unable to intervene the judicial 
procedures but the coverage of defamation suits, especially the tabloid’s use of the court system 
as a publicity ploy, distorted the popular perception of defamation. Eventually, political 
institutions and figures no longer turned to the insult law for justice, marking the failure of the 
insult law as an instrument of media control.  
 
Setting the Limits by the Rule of Law 
 This article containing the family tree came to the notice of Beijing for its straddling of 
entertainment and serious political discussion. The state’s intransigent reaction to this news 
article, even though the publication was protected by extraterritoriality, showed its determination 
to set limits on acceptable engagement. The state’s attempt to make the modern notion of 
reputational rights a keystone in the construction of the boundary of political discussion reflect 
both the state’s alignment with modern governance and the changing power relationship between 
the state and the society. 
The article about the family tree made a caustic criticism on the government’s pro-
Japanese policy and the off-the-table connections of these leading figures. The Japanese occupy 
the uppermost ancestral position while major political figures dominating the Beijing 
government are marked as father, sons and grandsons. The family tree recognizes the Prime 
Minister Duan Qirui as the father and real power holder of the government, President Xu 
Shichang as his illegitimate son because Duan had engineered the Congress election in which the 
                                                            
3 William Alford, "Of Arsenic and old Laws: looking anew at Criminal Justice in Late Imperial China." 
California Law Review 72, no. 6 (1984): 1180-256; Eugenia Lean, Public Passions: The Trial of Shi 
Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007). 
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president was elected. Duan’s honest subordinate and the power broker Xu Shuzheng is central 
in the third generation (figure 3).4  
 
Figure 3. The family tree in the political news column of Republican Daily. (“Anfu 
shixibiao zhi shuoming, ” [The explanation of a lineage chart of the Anfu Clique] Min Guo Ri 
Bao, September 15, 1919, 3.) 
 
The article showed the influence of the gossip culture on serious journalism in the late 
1910s. The news article begins by stating that the chart was “made by someone as a joke.” The 
statement reflects a jocular attitude seemingly unsuitable for the column of major political news. 
                                                            
4 “Anfu shixibiao zhi shuoming,” [The explanation of a lineage chart of the Anfu Clique] Min Guo Ri 
Bao, September 15, 1919, 3. 
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In addition, the author used the offensive word “sishengzi” (??? illegitimate child) to liken 
what it saw as an unlawful presidency to a sex scandal. The epithet questioned the legitimacy of 
the Presidency.5 The author here integrated a political criticism with a lowbrow phrase to 
embellish a well-known political message. This rhetorical style, which destabilized the political 
authority of these statesmen, was more commonly applied in popular novels in tabloids. For 
example, a novel “X ray” (????) serialized in the Crystal described national affairs as a 
sordid affair between a father-in-law and a daughter-in-law.6 Acknowledging the distinction 
between serious political news and unverified stories about political figures, state-led popular 
education programs promoted newspapers as a legitimate source of political knowledge. The 
article’s placement in the category of major political news was a threat to the realm of state-
approved knowledge and therefore struck a nerve. 
 Furthermore, the newspaper’s partisan stance and national influence aroused the 
government’s suspicions. The Shanghai Republican Daily managing in the Shanghai 
international settlement was a local branch of the Nationalist Party paper. The party’s propaganda 
committee developed and controlled a nationwide news reporting system. Local Republican 
Dailies, operating as separate entities, announced party programs under orders from Guangzhou. 
Unlike other branches that were subsidized by the Canton government, the Republican Daily in 
Shanghai, however, was self-supporting and thus sensitive to market demands. Its market-
                                                            
5 After James Scott, cultural historians usually see filthy words as political weapons used by the 
powerless to attack the powerful. See James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Tim Harris, The Politics of the Excluded, 1500-
1850 (Basingstoke New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
6 Jing bao, September 21, 1919. Quoted from Hong Yu, Jindai Shanghai xiaobao yu shimin wenhua 
yanjiu [Modern Shanghai tabloids and urban culture] (Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chuban jituan, 2007), 118. 
The fiction exposed the tabloid to civil penalty of of thirty yuan for violating the anti-obscenity law in the 
foreign settlement but the Chinese government never took any action against it. 
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oriented perspective obliged the editors to compromise with the party’s propagandist requests. 
Their tone was rarely strident and partisan pieces were usually scattered among news items of 
general interest. The chief editor Ye Chucang (???, 1887-1946) retained or revised party 
documents that seemed excessive in their criticism of imperialism. He also supported Zhejiang’s 
military governor in defiance of the Nationalist Party’s antimilitarism. The paper’s major 
concession to the party reorganization was the inclusion of a margin surrounding each page of 
newsprint that set out party policies and principles.7 A 1918 Japanese intelligence report shows 
that the Republican Daily in Shanghai was either short of correspondents or unable to afford the 
purchase of first-hand information from news agencies.8  But the newspaper developed its 
strength in political satire to compensate for its weakness in news reportage. It rapidly became 
the only party newspaper distributed nationwide that had a measure of influence outside of party 
circles.9 
 Two factors underpinned Beijing’s turn to the insult law. The Republican government 
recognized that the modern state and mass communication demanded new restrictions on 
political dissent. When announcing the end of Yuan Shikai’s press policy, the new central 
government declared: “As the Republican Constitution protects freedom of expression, the 
government now implements new policy following the popular will. It is not appropriate to 
                                                            
7 John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 222-223. 
8 Documents of the East Asia News Agency, No. 1.3.1 32, Japan Foreign Office Archives. 
9 In a poll conducted at Beijing University in December 1923, the paper ranked second overall in 
popularity behind the Beijing Morning Post (Chen Bao) and the first among female respondents. At the 
same time, it was among the five major newspapers from Shanghai exhibited in the reading room of 
middle schools in Jiangsu Province. See Xu Zhucheng, Baohai jiuwen [The old stories in the sea of 
newspapers] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2010), 27-28. 
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restrict press freedom. If the press acts illegally, it will be punished by law.”10   As shown in the 
declaration, the central government’s vision of sovereignty changed from a court-centered to a 
people-based authority. As the rising consciousness of nationalism and public opinion 
empowered news media, the imperial practice of literary inquisition and Yuan’s suppression 
policy both lost their legitimacy. Instead, the new government enacted Newspaper Regulation in 
1918 which ostensibly protected republicanism, individual privacy and public order.11  With this 
press law, the central government sought to authorize political discussion by drawing a line 
between legitimate and illegitimate coverage. The law did not govern the press strictly in the area 
under the government’s direct jurisdiction. In 1921, the Beijing police office was still 
complaining about its weak control over the media while the number of newspapers grew and the 
political discussion became increasingly rancorous.12   
 In practical terms, filing a lawsuit was Beijing’s last resort after a failed request for 
administrative collaboration with the foreign authorities in the international settlement. Shortly 
before the lawsuit, the Beijing government requested assistance from the Shanghai Municipal 
Council (the authority of the foreign settlement in Shanghai) to punish newspapers for violating 
the 1918 newspaper regulation.  On September 25, 1919, the negotiator of Jiangsu Province 
proceeded to the Municipal Council with an order from the Department of Domestic Affairs in 
                                                            
10 Nanjing The Second Historical Archives ed. Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian  [A collection 
of archival sources of Republican Chinese history] 4. Culture (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji cubanshe, 1994), 
315. 
11 Regional warlords also had discretion to make provincial press regulations. For more state regulation of 
press during the warlord period. Ma Guangren, Zhongguo xinwen fazhishi [History of the press law in 
China] (Shanghai:Shanghai shehuikexueyuan chubanshe, 2007), 122-125. 
12 “Jingshi jingchating niding jianshao jingshi baoguan banfa zhi neiwubu han,” [To the Department of 
Domestic: A proposal of decreasing newspapers in the capital city by Beijing Municipal Police Office] 
Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian [A collection of archival sources of Republican Chinese 
history] 3. Culture (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji cubanshe, 1994), 320-321. 
 122 
Beijing.13 He forwarded a list of nearly 20 titles published in the China Times, each with specific 
clauses in the Newspaper Regulation that these articles had violated.  Unfortunately, the Council 
was unresponsive and the newspaper continued its business.14 The Council’s decision not to 
cooperate left the Mixed Court the only option with the Beijing government. 
 The 1919 litigation displayed the Chinese state’s strategic use of foreign legal authority 
and experts to discipline the production of political knowledge. The Mixed Court, ruling legal 
disputes among foreign and Chinese citizens according to laws of their own countries as justified 
by the extraterritorial rights, embodied the unequal relationship between China and the treaty 
powers. Previous studies on Chinese legal reform often examined the Mixed Court as a constant 
source of friction between the Chinese authorities and foreign powers when the Chinese claimed 
jurisdiction over foreign settlement.15 Even the government representative in this lawsuit, the 
British-born Italian lawyer Mr. G.D. Musso, was a legal advisor who had been recommended and 
strongly supported by the Western powers since 1916.16 But this time, the Chinese state, 
assuming the role of victim, depended on the legal institution, judicial procedure and personnel 
coming along with treaty powers to exercise its rule under Chinese law. Moreover, by going 
through judicial proceedings and making legal statements, the Beijing government presented 
itself as a practitioner of modern governance. It conformed to the international legal norm, 
protected both national and individual interests, and fulfilled its obligation to guide Chinese 
                                                            
13 Negotiator was a formal position under the Foreign Office to deal with foreign-settlement-related 
affairs. 
14 Beiyang zhengfu dangan 127, 582-591. 
15 See Pär Cassel. "Excavating Extraterritoriality: The "Judicial Sub-Prefect" as a Prototype for the Mixed 
Court in Shanghai." Late Imperial China 24, no. 2 (2003): 156-82; Tahiri Lee, "Law and Local Autonomy 
at the International Mixed Court of Shanghai." (Ph.D dissertation, Yale University, 1990).  




State Dignity in the Chinese Insult Laws 
 To show its concern over the case and its impartiality, the Shanghai Mixed Court 
appointed British Deputy Consul Mr. Grant Jones as Assessor to adjudicate the dispute with the 
experienced Chinese Judge Mr. Yu Diansun (???).17 Despite the leading role of foreign 
jurists, the dispute was ruled in accordance with the Republican China Provisional Criminal Law 
(?华???????). On October 2, 1919, Musso on behalf of the Beijing government, filed 
suit against Shanghai Republican Daily of having printed and published “statements holding in 
contempt and ridicule H.E. the President of the Republic of China and other officers of the 
Government.”18 Musso’s initial articulation of his legal claim invoked the concept of “libel” to 
plead false imputation. The defendant’s American attorney Paul Myron Linebarger immediately 
objected by pointing out the nonexistence of this category in Chinese law.19  The legal 
framework of this suit rested on the Article 155 on insults to officials. Article 155 provides that 
“anyone who insults a public official performing duties or insult his public duties shall be 
imprisoned up to three years or punished with a fine up to 300 yuan.”   
The Republican state proclaimed a new legal regime over defamation to restrict the press. 
Although the legal prohibition on insults to officials remained unchanged from the Draft New 
                                                            
17 In the system of the Mixed Court, an assessor was legally appointed to observe the proceedings and had 
the right to object proposed verdict by the Judge. In Chinese-related cases, the Judge was usually a 
Chinese magistrate and the Assessor was a foreign officer who in fact had a larger power in deciding the 
verdict. 
18 The North China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette, October 4, 1919, 42. 
19 “Mango ribas being zhi jieguo,” [The result of the lawsuit against Republican Daily] Shen Bao, October 
4, 1919, 10. 
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Qing Code (???????), the legal interpretation and the context of implementing the law 
changed. Before turning to the trial, an examination of the historical transformation of the legal 
category of “insult” in terms of interpretations, punishments and rationales since its emergence in 
the new Qing Code would help us understand the state-society relationship underlying Chinese 
defamation laws. I argue that the crime of insulting Republican officials mingled the western 
discourse of reputational rights with imperial emphasis on political authority. Facing the surge of 
democratic ideas in the late 1910s, the prohibition on insults gave the Republican state a new 
means of limiting political criticism while legitimizing state power. 
 The legal concept of defamation (????) was introduced to China in the early 
twentieth century as integral to the Western ideas of individual liberty and equality. 
Constitutionalist and revolutionary periodicals had introduced human rights to reputation, life 
and property since the 1890s by translating Rousseau’s theory, the American Declaration of 
Independence and renowned Japanese philosophical texts.20 They hold the concept of innate 
rights for cultivating modern citizenry as well as for attacking Manchu conservatives.21 The 
famous 1903 libel dispute between a revolutionary newspaper and the Qing court further 
disseminated sedition, reputation and the freedom of press as legal concepts, in striking contrast 
with the Qing court’s language of literary inquisition.22 These early experiences and practices set 
                                                            
20 Many Chinese scholars have examined the early dissemination of the concepts of human rights in the 
1890s and 1900s. See Du Jiangang, Zhongguo jinbainian renquan sixiang [Ideas of human rights in the 
recent hundred years in China] (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2004). Feng 
Jiangfeng, Qingmo minchu renquan sixiang de zhaoshi yu shanbian (1840-1912) [The commencement 
and evolution of the idea of human rights in modern China, 1840-1912] (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian 
chubanshe, 2011). 
21 Marina Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
22 “The Supao Sedition Trial,” North China Daily News, Dec 4,5, 1903. Quoted from Wang Min, “Su bao 
an de shenxun yu panjue,” [The trial and verdict of Su bao Case] Shi Lin, no. 6 (2005): 51-65. 
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the agenda for legal reformists to incorporate criminal defamation provisions into the Draft New 
Qing Code. But the introduction of the legal category of insult in the late Qing presupposed the 
political hierarchy that allowed for prosecution of publications and publishers. 
 China’s incorporation of defamation law was part and parcel of Asian legal 
modernization. The Draft Code’s choice of insult laws, instead of other models of defamation 
laws in the West and in neighboring countries, gave courts more discretion to draw a line 
between defamation and criticism in favor to the plaintiff to curb criticism. Many countries had 
already been using defamation laws in the early twentieth century to restrict the constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression, in response to the emergence of public spaces. Britain and 
France had enacted slander and libel laws centuries earlier to discourage false news or tales.23 In 
Asia, Thailand issued a royal edict on defamation through falsely spoken or written words in 
1900.24  But the late Qing China followed Japan whose 1875 Defamation Statute (???) placed 
all kinds of defamation under a set of insult laws to protect reputation disregarding the truth of 
words.25 Since insult only concerned the potential effect of public allegation without placing any 
emphasis on the intention or the truth, in principle, it was able to criminalize any threatening 
discourse. Moreover, removing the aspect of truth defense, judicial deliberations could obviate 
further intensification of the public discussion of the statements and supporting evidence. These 
qualities of the insult law fit the need of the Qing state to constrain public discussion of politics. 
                                                            
23  Kaplan M. Lindsay, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). Emily Butterworth, Poisoned Words: Slander and Satire in Early Modern 
France (Leeds, U.K.: Legenda, 2006). 
24 David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and Lèse-Majesté (New York: 
Routledge, 2011). 
25 Yamaha bunko ed., Zhuge Wending trans. Nihon masu komyonikeshon shi  [A history of Japanese mass 
communication] (Guilin: Guangxi shifandaxue chubanshe, 2007), 23. 
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 The Draft Code argues for the distinctive anti-authority nature of defamation of court and 
government officials. Modelled upon the Japanese Defamation Statute, the draft of the New Qing 
Criminal Code identified three types of insult to justify heavier punishments: Defiance of the 
Royal Family, Insults to Officials, and Insults to Commoners.26 But unlike the Japanese law 
which placed all three infractions under a single category of defamation, the late Qing code 
couched them in different legal terms. Defiance of the imperial family, including injury to the 
imperial dignity still denotes sedition as in the Qing code, though the punishment is mitigated. 
Insults to public officials constitute “obstruction to the service of process” under Article 155 and 
therefore result a punishment of one degree higher than general insults. Only insults to 
commoners were defined as defamation.27 Still, provincial draft reviewer in the Qing legislative 
body was reluctant to take reputation as a legally protected individual right. In their opinion,  
defamation was a minor civil wrong that should be punished by moral reprehension.28 As the 
outcome of the negotiation between the traditional ideology that the society should be self-
regulating and the reformist effort to follow Western conceptual framework, the statute 
commission finally agreed to mitigate the severity by decreasing the maximum punishment to 
imprisonment of one year or a fine of 100 yuan.29 The Qing officials’ contempt for towards 
                                                            
26 Ibid. 
27 According to Section 31, Article 340, Political Studies Society ed. Daqing fagui daquan [Law corpus 
of the Great Qing] (Taipei: Kao Zheng Chubanshe, 1972), 2072. Originally published in 1909 by 
Zhengxue she. 
28 Gao Hancheng ed. Daqing xin xinglv lifa ziliao huibian [Collection of the Legislative documents of the 
New Qing Code] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 572. 
29 This view of defamation as a civil wrong continued into the nationalist era. As late as in 1932, 
provincial court in Zhejiang consulted the Supreme Court if a wrongful report in the newspaper should be 
criminalized. The local court tended to solve the dispute by asking the publisher to simply make a 
rectification. See Nanjing Library ed. Guomin zhengfu sifayuan gongbao [Gazetteer of the Department of 
Justice of the Nationalist Government] (Nanjing: Nanjingdaxue chubanshe, 2011) 19. No. 24 (1932). 
 127 
reputational right contrasted with the Japanese prosecutors who used the concept of defamation 
to suppress political criticism.30  The separation of criminal defamation from political crimes 
reflected the inconsistencies in late Qing jurisprudence. In the past, both moral codes and laws 
sought to inculcate the virtues of respect for authority and obedience to superiors. But the 
western defamation laws rested on the idea of equitable reputational rights. To categorize and 
explain insult to different targets separately helped to incorporate people’s rights without 
challenging imperial sovereignty. 
 The insult laws in the new code did not take effect under the Qing. The Great Qing 
Publication Law (大清印刷物專律) enacted in 1906 showed that the concept of insult meddled 
with traditional treason. The introduction of insult did not stretch the late Qing boundaries of 
public discussion of the court and officials. While the draft code remained vague about 
“Defiance of the imperial family,” the publication law described the act of defaming the emperor, 
members of the royal family and the government into “misleading the society and inciting rebel,” 
which revealed the century-long sensitivity to potentially dangerous subversion of authority.31 
Punishment was up to ten years of imprisonment or a penalty of five thousand yuan. Adjudicated 
cases showed that many newspapers had been banned for “discussing politics,” “spreading 
rumors” or “defaming the court” since 1906. The Sacred Capital Vernacular Newspaper (神京
白話報) that featured court news was forced to close in 1908.32 In 1909, Citizen Gazetteer (國民
                                                            
30 Mark D. West, Secrets, Sex, and Spectacle: The Rules of Scandal in Japan and the United States 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 74. 
31 Section 4, Article 4, Daqing yinshuawu zhuanlv [The Great Qing publication law] in Zhang Jinglu ed. 
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公報) was penalized for reporting on the palace chamber.33 It was nonetheless more liberal than 
in the high Qing, when people who uttered traitorous words about the emperor or misrepresented 
political affairs were accused of sedition, one of the ten abominations, and sentenced to death.34 
The reduction of punishment attested to the court’s tolerance of political criticism under the dual 
pressure of political newspapers and the abolition of cruel punishment under the new policy 
reform.35 
 It is not until the overthrow of the Qing court that the Chinese state redefined the legal 
understanding of defamation. The Republican Provisional Law (1912) abolished provisions on 
imperial privileges but retained stipulations of reputation injuries to public officials and to 
private citizens. The Supreme Court explained the nature of insults to officials from the 
standpoint of reputational rights by comparing it to that of insults to commoners. In 1912, the 
Beijing local court fined a newspaper fifty yuan for making defamatory allegations about the 
Office of Opium Prohibition.36 The fine was nine times higher than the outcome of another 
defamation dispute between a newspaper and a commercial theatre three years later.37 To justify 
heavier penalties for denigration of officials and offices, from 1914 to 1916, the Supreme Court 
                                                            
33 Shen Bao, November 24, 1909. 
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revise it.   
36 Fang Hanqi, Zhongguo xinwen shiye biannianshi 1, 583. 
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interpreted the crime of insult to officials into an offense to both the state dignity and individual 
reputation of the officials.38  The court drew on the discourse of equality to accentuate the 
officials’ innate rights to reputation as every citizen while expressing sympathy for the state’s 
dignitary interests on the ground that government officials represented state power. Drawing on 
reputational interest, the court explanation reimagined the state and the people as legally 
comparable entities and articulated the reason to protect state authority in the Republican 
sociopolitical order that legitimized popular sovereignty. As a result, the severity of insults to 
officials increased over what it had been in the new Qing Code. 
The idea of state dignity was still closely related to state authority rather than to 
“legitimate public interest” a term commonly used today to protect government officials.39 In 
judicial practice, lawyers could impose stately dignity as the central asset of authority to suggest 
a discretionary increase of punishment. In the 1919 trial, Musso suggested a more precise and 
contextualized interpretation of the offense and the public harm caused by the defamatory claim. 
The Beijing government’s attorney raised four considerations in the complaint: the high status of 
the victim, the method of insulting, time and place, and the low status of the accused. 40 The first 
and last considerations emphasized the different statuses of the state and the society and injected 
political hierarchy into his concern for state reputation.  
From the late Qing to the early Republican era, legal authority increasingly emphasized 
the protection of fame and reduced the political feature of the criminal defamation. Although the 
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insult provision seemed to be the only legal weapon available for the early Republican 
government to curtail political criticism after abolishing the crimes of treason and defiance to the 
court, the new defamation regime gave the state a legitimate means to address the issue of state 
authority in reaction to transgressive discourses.  
  
The Debates: Lines between Insult, Criticism and Play 
 The judicial procedures in a foreign court provided a site for the state and media 
institution to negotiate boundaries. The conversation between the government and the Shanghai 
press went on two tracks. Two legal standings, government reputation and the liberty of 
criticizing the powerful in the name of public good, structured the court debate and reports on the 
trial by major commercial newspapers. In addition, if we view the legal practice as one force vis-
a-vis other social powers, we observe the contestation on another level -- between the state’s 
attempt to curtail political discussion with legal rationales and the press’ unruly and sometimes 
even vengeful obsession with treating to political news as entertainment. Interactions between 
the spheres of law and cultural production revealed more than a mutual oppositional relationship 
between the judicial and other social powers in Bourdieu’s theory.41 Other than resisting the legal 
rule by declaring the constitutionally protected right to expression and their autonomy in 
knowledge production, the print media derived benefit from defamation litigation by using 
litigation to locate amusing news. One publisher used the public attention drawn to the 
defamation suit to resell the family tree article. The 1919 case and its aftermath opened a lasting 
dialogue between visions of a Republican information order. The Chinese state won the lawsuit 
                                                            
41 Pierre Bourdieu. “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” The Hastings Law 
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but failed to check the press.  
Previous studies have demonstrated the influence of print media on the legal practice and 
court decisions. Alford’s study of the Yang Naiwu case demonstrates the influence of news media 
by appealing to public opinion upon formal criminal justice process since the late Qing period.42 
Asen describes two ways in which the print media engaged in legal practices in the early 
Republican period: some publications provided the arena for legal professionals to claim their 
competing knowledge authorities and to coordinate different practices in the judicial procedures; 
some were merely sensational news coverage.43 Lean’s Shi Jianqiao case offers another example 
of how the Republican media sensation authorized Confucian morality and powerfully 
influenced the court decision.44 But none of these cases could reveal such complicated interactive 
and enmeshed relationships between legal and media practice in defamation litigation. The media 
was deeply involved in defamation litigation as the key actors; it not only combatted the insult 
law in and out of the court but also strategically merged the process of litigation with that of 
publicity to increase fame or generate profit. In addition to rational discussion of scientific and 
legal knowledge, emotional support for old morality, this case demonstrates that the playful 
discussion, regardless of how baseless it appeared to be, could empower political criticism and 
defy the value of reputation and state authority. 
 The primary issue between the lawyers was whether the article was a serious defamation 
or mere public criticism. In the trial, the government’s attorney fired his first volley at the 
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defamatory language, especially the term “sishengzi” in the article. Fully aware of the sensitivity 
of defamation to milieu in which it occurred, Musso was well prepared to substantiate his 
argument based on Chinese legal knowledge to avoid pitfalls brought by the information gap 
between the Western and Chinese cultures.45 He cited Chinese customary law, which legitimized 
the murder of one’s own illegitimate child, to demonstrate the extremely low social status of such 
children in Chinese society. As he stated, using these epithets was a scurrilous attack on the 
President.46 To protect the dignity of the state in a more substantial way, Musso inserted the 
consequence of the injuries to the government reputation into domestic political fragmentation. 
He reasoned that the public vilification altered citizens’ impression of government officials 
which led to public contempt for state authority. He contended that the contempt is detrimental to 
Beijing’s political negotiations with the Canton government and thus would hinder the peaceful 
reunification of the country.47 By linking reputation interest to the pragmatic political interest of 
the nation, Musso called for the press’s responsibility to protect government reputation to bolster 
national unification.  
Predictably, the defendant’s attorney Linebarger countered with the defense of good 
intention and fair criticism.48 To invalidate the defamation charge, the lawyer and the newspaper 
                                                            
45 Musso’s careful examination of the implications of illegitimate child placed a big contrast with the 
embarrassing performance of legal experts in the previous Su bao case. In 1903, the defendant Zhang 
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48 Mr. Paul Myron Linebarger performed as a Judge and lawyer in the U.S before coming to China. He 
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chief editor repeatedly addressed the benign motivation of the newspaper to improve Chinese 
governance and to advance peace. To make a viable counter-argument on Chinese legal terms, 
Linebarger cited the Republican Constitution, whose protection of the rights to expression would 
liberate newspapers from the rule of the insult law.49 The defense seized on the conflicts between 
the constitutional rights of political criticism in a Republican nation and an insult law that sought 
to set limits on public discussion. It framed the case as a dispute between the government interest 
and the will and the rights of the public.  
The Mixed Court’s verdict balanced reputational rights with freedom of expression but 
neither party was satisfied. The judge voided the defendant’s points and found the newspaper 
guilty of insulting the government officials. The court fined the newspaper manager and the chief 
editor 100 yuan each under the Provisional Law. Although the verdict showed that the press 
freedom had yielded to the defamation law, Musso’s demand for a heavier punishment was 
rejected. Even worse for the government, the adjudication in favor of reputational rights did not 
impair the autonomy of the Shanghai press. Republican Daily won the support of almost all other 
commercial newspapers in Shanghai who amplified the defendant voice for their collective 
interests. The case outraged the Shanghai news media who took a firm stand against the 
guideline of political discussion laid out by the insult law. 
 Immediately after the trial, the Republican Daily, the Shanghai News and the China 
Times formed a defensive alliance and extended the debate to the public realm. From the 
standpoint of press freedom, they projecting themselves as the righteous, reasonable and law-
abiding victims of the state’s arbitrary insult law. Immediately after the trial, a report on the 
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judicial proceedings and the court debate appeared in the local news. The report offered a 
detailed summary of the defense statements and a translated official report of the case from the 
English-language Shanghai Gazetter (????) in its entirety.50  The newspapers’ statement 
reiterated the defensive claims on the rights to political criticism, press freedom and good 
intention while only hinting at the government’s attorney’s accusation of “serious injuries” to 
reputation in two short lines.51 As stated in the report, Duan Qirui’s government took political 
criticism as personal insult and the foreign judge buttressed the government’s repressive press 
policy. Moreover, the Republican Daily openly derided the President on December 5. It jeeringly 
likened the President’s clothing in a state ritual of worshiping Confucius to Yuan Shikai’s 
monarchical garb to imply that the new government acted no differently from Yuan who silenced 
public criticism.52 The collective action exhibited the news media’s determination to denounce 
the state’s violation of press autonomy and, moreover, compellingly rewrote a public record of 
the case from its point of view.  
The Shanghai press had already seen defamation lawsuits as providing the space to 
produce competing interpretations of who had attacked whom and expressed their concerns 
about the blurry line between insult and criticism. As early as 1915, someone foresaw the clash 
between criticism and insult and pointed out potential misuse of the insult law in a parody 
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published in Shanghai News. Presupposing the ancient philosophers of the warring states period 
living in the modern time, the author fabricated a defamation suit brought by Mozi against 
Mencius to the court.  In the complaint, Mozi cited Mencius out of context to evince that 
Mencius was despicable for molesting unmarried girls. He also alleged that Mencius had insulted 
him by portraying him as someone who disrespected his father and master.53  
The parody raised two questions. First, the insult law would become a tool of defamation 
especially when one maliciously misinterprets publicized words. Like Mozi in this fictional 
account, a plaintiff would harbor impure motives of filing an insult suit to attack an enemy rather 
than to protect one’s reputation. Second, Mozi’s allegation of being insulted addresses the worry 
about confusion between criticism and insult. Since the defamation law disregarded intention and 
factuality of claims, whether a statement was criminal or not depended on the judgment of the 
jurists and the feelings of the plaintiff. The legal boundary between criticism and insult could be 
manipulated. As the conflicts between the legal discourse of insult and the media practice of 
criticism culminated in the 1919 lawsuit, the press turned veiled resistance to an open challenge 
to the defamation regime. The press declared that the state’s abuse of defamation law was 
silencing the media rather than exacting justice. They hence rejected the balance between 
reputational rights and expression right meted out by the courts.  
 In addition to the conflict between insult and criticism, the trial provoked another clash 
between law and play. In response to Musso’s legal reading of “illegitimate child,” the 
newspaper chief editor Ye claimed that the article was simply a political critique using 
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deliberately hyperbolic language.54 Seeing the use of offensive language merely a way to 
entertain readers, Ye suggested the irrelevance of the legal definition of insult in the realm of 
such writing. The media’s reaction to the defamation case also demonstrated its placement of 
entertainment above legal discourses. Chinese Christian Advocate (??), a Christian magazine, 
when reporting on this defamation case, skipped the exchanges in the legal debate yet described 
detail the structure of the family tree. The editor considered the fact that powerful people charged 
the newspaper to save face as “the amusing part of this litigation.” Its commercial interest in the 
most attractive parts of the story buried legal principles on the value of reputation and deflected 
public attention to the family tree. The article used the lawsuit to facilitate locate the most 
appealing materials for sale and reduced the defamation litigation to some inflammatory details 
that made the story interesting. In this case, entertainment legitimized insult.  
The Republican Daily’s and the magazine’s coverage of the lawsuit showed different 
rationales for circulating the information and hence two distinctive ways of engaging the public. 
If the major dailies’ advocacy of press freedom was structured by and legitimized the legal 
principles and rationale, the entertainment press treated the lawsuit no more than it would 
another piece of juicy material from which to extract entertaining facts. Although the practice of 
reselling the defamatory article also declared their support of Republican Daily, publications like 
Reviving China generated laughter without drawing the attention of the state.  
Post-trial narratives about the president and prime minister captured the hostilities and 
playful jabs. One month after the trial, Republican Daily hurled another epithet – Anfu fish -- at 
Duan’s political clique and humiliated Xu Shuzheng by directly calling him a pig’s brain.55 The 
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clear contempt for government in the political news crossed the legal boundary of political 
criticism. Other writers followed. A serialized political novel A new dream in the capital city (?
???) incorporated Anfu people’s manipulations of the Congress and their visits to prostitutes 
into the narrative. In the chapter “Catching Anfu fish in the peace lake” (????????), 
the novelist describes politicians in the Anfu clique as members of the fish club and calls their 
leader Duan Qirui “General Clam.”56 The invention and spread of “Anfu fish” in other political 
satires announced the failure of the rule of law.  
 The 1919 case showed that, as early as the first decade of the republican period, the 
central government had started to use defamation law to constrain media practices.  But this 
attempt to define legitimate and illegitimate political knowledge backfired. Unlike in other 
countries where prosecutions for defamation greatly influenced the social definition of scandal, 
the ruling in the 1919 insult case did not persuade the public that the article was insulting.57  The 
popular desire to be entertained together with the elitist discourse of constitutional spirit claimed 
for their own authority over the production of political knowledge.  
 
Defamation for Strategic Publicity 
The 1919 lawsuit became a media event. The urban print media questioned judicial 
practice, constituting the public record of events, and made information into a commodity. The 
Republican Daily’s dispute with the state displayed its higher status and contributed to its rising 
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fame.58 Probably since then, the gossip industry had realized that defamation suits were a 
convenient way to attract attention. More gossip sellers drew on the non-legal dimension of 
defamation litigations for the high visibility associated with the disputes in the 1920s. Publicity 
affected the meaning and function of defamation litigation which then became a mechanism of 
publicity.  
In the 1919 case, both the Shanghai press and the central government came to understand 
the publicity consequences of defamation litigation. The state realized that the intense media 
coverage of the lawsuit only spread the defamatory statements. Musso sued the China Times for 
republishing the troublesome article and once again defaming the central government. The suit, 
dismissed by the Mixed Court, was an attempt to intimidate the Shanghai press. In response, the 
China Times posted a translation of Anton Chekhov’s “The Scandalmonger” to make gentle fun 
of the government’s stupidity. In this story, a middle school teacher, afraid that someone was 
spreading rumors about his relationship with a maid, decides to explain himself in advance, 
inadvertently spreading the rumor that he had hoped to prevent.59 The newspaper implicitly 
likened the protagonist to the Beijing government. Chekhov’s novel, read in the context of the 
1919 case, hinted that the government had done more to publicize the “scandal” than anyone 
else.  
 The tabloid press turned defamation litigation into a moneymaker in the 1920s. A guilty 
verdict usually resulted in a smaller material cost which could be offset by the increase in sales. 
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In 1926, a German doctor sued the Crystal for an article about the doctor’s attempt to improve 
Kang Youwei’s sexual prowess.  As the Christian magazine reported on the 1919 case, the tabloid 
discussed the case because it was salacious. It only incurred a fine of one yuan and some time 
commitment but the tabloid benefited a great deal from 1000 more copies sold thanks to this 
dispute.60 The doctor also benefited for the publicity of the defamation raised his fame in the 
medical market. The defamation litigation became both the supplier of scandalous accounts and a 
sales gimmick.  
 Media coverage spread the idea of reputation right but also discouraged political 
authorities or citizens from filing defamation charges in the 1920s. By the late 1920s,  plaintiffs 
in defamation cases had included celebrities, politicians, businessmen, and doctors.61 Some 
medium-size publishing houses even created permanent position to handle defamation disputes.62 
But the role of defamation law in restraining political criticism declined. Political figures avoided 
using the defamation law to attack the press. In 1923, instead of filing an insult case with the 
Mixed Court, Li Yuanhong accused a man who had distributed defamatory pamphlets in the 
international settlement of intending to injure his life and property.63  
 If we place the 1919 case in the context of modern Chinese legal reform from the late 
Qing insult law to the 1928 nationalist libel law, the failure of the early Republican state 
contributed to the emergence of a new defamation category and more strictly defined freedom of 
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expression under the Nationalist government (1928-1949).  The Penal Law of Republican China 
(1928) added a new category of libel which criminalized only maliciously false allegations and 
allowed truth defense if the defamatory claim concerns the public interest.64 The seemingly more 
liberal attitudes came with more conditions: it was legal to express an opinion with benign 
intention only for “self-defense, duty reports of government officials, issues that allow public 
criticism, reports on conferences, court debates or public gatherings.”65 The deliberate ambiguity 
of public criticism gave more discretion to the Nationalist authority. 
 The 1928 libel law acknowledged the change in the function of defamation law.  The 
fact-finding aspect of libel trials shifted the focus of court debate from effect assessment to 
content examination. Defamation trials became a process of verifying and publicizing official 
truth as ruled by the court. The government was then able to use libel litigation involved 
government officials to refute political rumors, even if the court decision could not change the 
media practice. But it is another story in the 1930. Before the nationalist party grew stronger 
enough to regulate the gossip industry, the party and the political leader in 1927 explored into 
publicity in multiple forms, which is the theme of the final chapter. 
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Romance and Revolution under Jiang Jieshi 
 
Introduction 
 Jiang Jieshi (???? better known as Chang Kai-shek, 1887-1975) made frequent 
appearances in the print media as the promising new national leader after the Northern 
Expedition (1925-1927). The expedition was a military campaign against regional warlords and a 
political campaign against warlordism. The propaganda department, Jiang and collaborative 
media made his private life into official propaganda, tabloid articles, novels and a movie. These 
products calculated the proportion of entertainment and nationalist ideology, designed the 
character, and chose the media platform. Jiang’s revelation of elements of his personal life 
became a hallmark of Nationalist leadership construction in the late 1920s.  
 I distinguish this political visibility in a form of authorized gossip from commercially 
driven cultural products and official propaganda. I highlight the role of authority and a control 
mechanism that used the dissemination power of gossip. These party-made products showcased a 
different relationship between romance and politics from what Lynn Hunt saw from the French 
revolutionary family romance. If in the French revolution the images of private relations 
facilitated the construction of revolutionary political authority, in the accounts of Jiang’ personal 
life and love stories the revolutionary authority defined private relations.1 Subjugating romance 
to ideological values,  both fictional and real-life accounts of Jiang’s love story assimilated 
personal and national interests to make Jiang personify the nation and revolutionary spirit. I 
address it as a process of nationalizing the private — the result of the nationalist adjustment of 
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propaganda to a political culture in which people engaged with political discussion by means of 
gossiping. The purpose of the party and its leader was to convey revolutionary messages to a 
politically engaged but ideologically disengaged populace. The emergence of authorized party-
made gossip demands us to re-examine the nature of gossip production and of the political 
propaganda in the late 1920s. 
 Firstly, the collision between the official and unofficial greatly impugned the independency 
of the industry and its legitimacy of being an open and unofficial realm of political engagement. 
The strategic deployment of popular cultural forms for political propaganda was both the 
consequence of the popular engagement brought by the gossip industry and of political agencies 
playing in the transformation of gossip production in the late 1920s. The penetration of the 
political party into Shanghai’s tabloid press brought about a significant change. Shifting away 
from its claimed political impartiality, the gossip published by leading tabloids in 1927 adopted 
an interpretive approach that explained or commented on the leader’s private behaviors from 
political angles and become a political message carrier.  
 Secondly, tensions between the political and commercial interests call for an analysis of the 
Jiang’s publicity of his wedding and marriage life as a fluid and complex cultural practice at the 
intersection of party propaganda, self-disclosure, public political discussion, entertainment and 
even consumerism. The propagandist blending of their political agendas with public interest in 
this rising leader’s private life remained controlled in the producing process. But when Jiang 
decide to publicize his wedding ceremony with the involvement of a commercial film studio,  
the insertion of ideological messages conflicted and compromised with entertaining, fragmented 
ways of making meaning. This model of political propaganda as a dialectical process in which 
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multiple voices collide more commonly appears after mid-1980s in China. 2 
 Primarily from the perspective of the Nationalist Party and Jiang Jieshi, this chapter 
explores strategic deployment of popular romance fiction, tabloid articles, and commercial 
newsreel as vehicles of nationalist revolutionary messages in 1927. The first section provides a 
glimpse of the growing consciousness of publicity among political leaders from Qing to early 
Republic. By situating the Nationalist approach into a longer history of self-revelation, I suggest 
the Nationalists’ ideological insertion and the extent of disclosure were different from those of 
earlier political players like Li Yuanhong’s construction of his individual leading style. Section 
two discusses the gossip industry given Nationalist interference in the late 1920s. The Crystal 
offered an official interpretation of Jiang’s controversial private behavior. I show that the strong 
presence of the party not only changed the power dynamics behind gossip production but also 
transformed gossip from fact-based narratives to politicized explanations. The chapter brings 
attention to Jiang’s revelations about his new marriage in 1927. The coordinated effort to 
describe a romantic relationship in revolutionary language and the couple’s use of commercial 
media at their wedding make the event an interesting site of investigation. With the union of 
commercial film studios and the press, media portrayals of Jiang’s courtship of and marriage to 
Song Meiling (1898-2003) incorporated the nationalist discourse in a party-made love story, his 
justification of social reform, and the spectacularity of upper class social life. Mobilizing both 
print and film media, the media-savvy couple imprinted Jiang’s image of a new national leader in 
popular consciousness. In this era, political authority through strategically mediated self-
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exposure was rejuvenated in a commercialized way and created new visual pleasure for Chinese 
urbanites. 
 
Towards a New Culture of Self-disclosure 
The Nationalist Party and Jiang Jieshi’s flexible sense of and instrumental approach to privacy 
should be situated in the popular perception of a political figure’s privacy and the changing 
practice of political publicity. In the imperial time, emotional attachments between husband and 
wife were considered private. While gentry men openly wrote about their courtesans, they did 
not write about intimacy with wives and only rarely about their concubines.3 The early 
Republican focus on the wives, concubines and family relations of political figures redefined the 
relationship between the private and the public. By the mid-1920s, the mediated culture of 
lighthearted political engagement had demonstrated the capacity of printed gossip to expand 
visibility. Bao Tianxiao once expressed his opinion on the practice of trivializing contemporary 
political figures in popular narratives.4 In his political novel Remains of the fragrance (留芳記), 
a member of the political elite bragged about being written into a novel: “The author wrote me 
into his novel too…On that day, he visited me in Nanjing and mentioned about a planned closure 
of the novel at the twentieth chapter. I responded, Why? We feel fortunate to be written into a 
book as long as the descriptions are not too embarrassing.”5 Bao saw the publicity of personal 
lives as an effective way to acknowledge one’s position and to extend one's social influence, not 
                                                            
3 Bonnie S. McDougall and Anders Hansson, ed., Chinese Concepts of Privacy (Leiden Netherlands; 
Boston: Brill, 2002). 
4 Flower is a late Qing top-selling political novel about the travel and life experience of a Qing diplomat 
with his concubine, known for its seamless weaving of contemporaneous events into the narrative. 
5 Bao Tianxiao, Liu fang ji [Remains of fragrance] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1925), 52. 
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as an invasion of privacy. The flourishing gossip industry both owed itself and contributed to a 
new receptivity to the disclosure of political figures’ personal lives.  
 Compared to Li Yuanhong’s restricted sharing of his domestic life, Jiang’s strategic 
projection of his marriage showed his deeper comprehension of the political significance of 
gossip and the social impact of personal information. In the post-nationalist era, according to 
Merkel-Hess’s study on Feng Yuxiang’s wife’s use of intimacy in the 1930s and the 1950s, 
family and conjugal relations as a political resource empowered elite women.6 The different 
media environments, political cultures and political agendas led to differences in self-disclosure 
among political players.  
 Self-disclosure as a means of self-defense and public image construction is not a new 
phenomenon. In the early eighteenth century, Emperor Yongzheng (???, 1678-1735) 
launched a nationwide campaign to defend his succession against rumors that accused him of 
having usurped the throne by murdering his father and brothers. The emperor ordered the 
compilation and dissemination of Records of great righteousness resolving confusion (?义??
?) which revealed many palace secrets. The court ordered every official from the capital to 
county offices to reveal the contents to the public.7 But the emperor’s self-disclosure was soon 
recognized by his successor as extremely inappropriate. Emperor Qianlong (???, 1711-1799) 
prohibited the circulation and prohibited the people from discussing the life of an emperor.8 
Since then, the state banned the discussion of any palace stories outside the forbidden city. 
                                                            
6 Kate Merkel-Hess, “A New Women and Her Warlord: Li Dequan, Feng Yuxiang, and the Politics of 
Intimacy in Twentieth-Century China,” Frontiers of History in China, No. 3 (2016): 431-457. 
7 For more information of this case, see Jonathan D. Spence, Treason by the Book (New York, N.Y.: 
Penguin Books, 2002). 
8 Ibid. 
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Although the court gazette (??) transmitted information about the daily activities of the 
emperor to the gentry, it was limited to describing imperial gifts and celebrations to depict a 
beneficent ruler.9 This distance between the rulers and their subjects sustained the imperial 
political hierarchy and the mysterious greatness of the emperor.  
 In the 1910s, the gossip industry encouraged the consensual disclosure of a leader’s 
personal life as an intimate form of political self-presentation. President Li Yuanhong laid bare 
some aspects of his self and personal life to construct a positive image of commoner president.10 
In 1919, a news report described what at he wore and ate: “When he met me for the interview, Li 
was wearing a common military uniform as if he never forgot his origins. His kind and humble 
manner was just like an everyman… He did not celebrate birthday. Nor did he eat birthday 
noodles. He only had a regular meal prepared. The daily food expense for the whole family does 
not exceed one Yuan.”11 His appearance articulated both his political identity and his military 
self-discipline. The simple birthday meal demonstrated how he shunned material comfort despite 
his elevated political status.  
 Li’s exposure of his daily life was a reaction to gossip that associated him with the pleasure 
quarters and caricatured his self-indulgence. The above newspaper report depicted a former 
president who rejected the impersonal aloofness and greatness that were associated with a 
monarch. Li thus gained the capacity to appear before the national audience as someone who was 
                                                            
9 Mittler briefly discussed the depiction of the material wealth and daily activities of the emperor in the 
court gazette in the nineteenth century. See Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China? : Power, Identity, 
and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872-1912 (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 194. 
10 Li was on the position of President from 1916 to 1917 and from 1922 to 1923. 
11 “Li Yuanhong zhi pingmin shenghuo,” [Li Yuanhong lives a commoner’s life], Shi Shi Xin Bao, 
November 18, 1919, 3. 
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just like them. Li’s ways of appealing to audience was rare in the warlord era but it is reflected 
mentality of a political leader who surrendered his privacy. Instead of showing one’s acceptance 
of the mandate of heaven as the Yongzheng Emperor had, twentieth-century political leaders 
galvanized support by demonstrating their moral rectitude and style of presidency. Their 
legitimacy rested on popular sovereignty. Li understood the effect of his behaviors on the public 
assessment of his character.    
 While Li’s exposure of his daily details kept the public attention away from his family, the 
Nationalists talked about their intimate relationships. A Complete History of Jiang Jieshi (??
???) showed Jiang’s willingness to submit parts of his personal life to public scrutiny. The 
author says: “Mr. Jiang also keeps a diary. Even the war did not interrupt this habit. All the 
records were very exhibit-able. We can see how perfectly honest and openhearted man he is!”12 
The Nationalists were eager to prove that the new political leader had nothing to conceal behind 
the people, in sharp contrast to figures in the warlord era who had always been associated with 
behind-the-scene operations. Also, the Nationalists more carefully strategized the media visibility 
of these personal factors for political purposes. Ray Huang contends that after 1927 Jiang kept 
diaries that he intended to publish.13 Archival documents reveal Jiang’s plan to publish five 
diaries and his correspondence. In one diary, The Record of Love (愛記), Jiang expressed his love 
for Song Meiling and made it consistent with his earlier declaration of love and his wedding in 
                                                            
12 Simingxiaoyaoke, Jiang Jieshi quanji [A complete history of Jiang Jieshi] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 
1927), 46-47.  The author’s pen name “Siming Rambler” hinted his close relations, possibly kinship, with 
Jiang and therefore guaranteed the reliability of this account. Siming is the alias of Jiang’s native place. 
13 Huang Renyu, Cong dalishi de jiaodu du Jiang Jieshi riji [Reading Jiang Jieshi diary from the 
perspective of grand historical narrative] (Beijing: jiuzhou chubanshe, 2008). 
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1927.14 Family and marriage became important in promoting national leadership.   
 Jiang’s resort to the private realm happened amid the political rivalries and power-shuffling 
within the Nationalist party. He wanted to refute public speculations of his political intrigue, to 
correct the narrative of his marriage, and to develop a national consciousness. He also wanted his 
leadership to be remembered after he stepped down. When Sun’s death created a power vacuum, 
the party was split between its left and right wings. After the Canton Coup, twin nationalist 
governments appeared in the south: the left-leaning Wuhan government led by Wang Jingwei 
that collaborated with the communists, and Jiang’s conservative faction that purged them. The 
northeastern warlord Zhang Zuolin was the major political and military threat. After careful 
calculation, in August 1927, Jiang resigned from his official positions to reunify the government 
and the party. Despite his resignation, Jiang remained in the public eye. 
 Jiang’s personal story was also a part of the party’s organized leadership building and 
ideological propaganda. Under the first united front (1923-1927) between the Nationalists and 
the Communists, the Nationalists adopted mass propaganda to reach the urban and rural working 
classes.15 The party’s propagandists used public excitement to introduce revolutionary romances 
about Jiang Jieshi’s love story. The acceptance of privacy disclosure, the robust presence of the 
gossip media, Jiang’s situation and the nationalist need for propaganda during the Northern 
Expedition all gave rise to this distinctive type of official gossip in the late 1920s. The Ministry 
of Education of the Beiyang government never expected the Nationalists to produce educational 
readings with the techniques learned from unofficial histories. 
                                                            
14 No. 002-060200-00016-003, Folder of Jiang Zhongzheng, Academia Historica, Taiwan. 
15 John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 95-102. 
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Changing the Nature of Gossip Production 
The military success of the Northern Expedition flamed media enthusiasm for the campaign and 
its leader, which smoothed the party’s entrance into the gossip industry. Ten boxes of books from 
Shanghai sold out in only three days in Wuhan. Publishers and booksellers who strategized 
marketing along the route of the military campaign from Guangzhou to the North became 
wealthy.16 To better serve the need of wartime propaganda, the Nationalist Party partnered with 
Shanghai’s tabloid press. After failing to create a revolutionary tabloid to attack regional 
warlords, the Nationalist Party cooperated with The Crystal in 1926.17 The tabloid hoped to 
create enthusiasm for Jiang by publishing a series of articles on his military expertise and filial 
piety.18   
 The Nationalists transformed the political and commercial dynamics of the Shanghai 
gossip industry. Increasing political machinations intensified the politicization of gossip. Pressed 
by powerful political forces, leading tabloids turned from entertainment and documentary work 
to political endorsement and criticism. Meanwhile, rectification notices appeared in the tabloid 
papers to combat rumors. The Crystal claimed to practice serious journalism and professional 
fact checking. The change happened in 1926. In 1929, Diamondine (???) expressed fears of 
                                                            
16 Zhang Jinglu, Zai chubanjie ershi nian, 126-127. 
17 The Nationalist tabloid failed to market the paper. The Crystal's chief editor was then reportedly to be 
advised to align with Jiang by Feng Shuluan, a regular contributor of the tabloid who also worked for the 
Guangzhou government. See Zhuomin, “Beifa sheng zhong zhi beifa bao,” [The northern expedition 
tabloid during the northern expedition] Fu Er Mo Si, August 12, 1926, 1. Tanzibao, “Jingbao yu Jiang 
Jieshi,” [The Crystal and Chang Kai-shek] Fu Er Mo Si, September 12, 1926.  
18 To list a few, Xingyun, “Jiang Jieshi chunxiao ji,” [A Record of Jiang Jieshi’s filial piety], Jing Bao, 
September 6, 1926; Guanxin, “Jiang Jieshi zhi qi,” [Chang Kai-shek's wife ] Jing Bao, September 9, 
1926. 
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losing their political independence: “Now people used tabloid for political propaganda. I guess 
this is the doomsday of the tabloid papers.”19 The changing approach to gossip attracted serious 
newspapers to join as gossip commentators, which dragged the industry away from its tradition 
of entertainment and political neutrality.  
 The public discussion of Jiang Jieshi’s love life and familial relations in the summer of 
1927 embodied this change. Gossiping about the leader’s private life became a contest of 
interpretations mixed with political propaganda and criticism. It was rumored that Jiang 
abandoned his spouses and was intriguing with the Song family, a clan with incomparable 
wealth, political fame and foreign connections. To stop the press from badgering him about his 
marriage, Jiang Jieshi announced that he had already divorced his wife, Lady Mao, and sent 
away two concubines because of his fierce opposition to arranged marriages and concubinage.20  
This explanation did not stop the press from criticizing him and questioning his intentions. The 
Crystal and The Holmes, the two most powerful tabloids in Shanghai, took opposing positions.  
 The Crystal tried to reconcile the conflicts between Jiang’s marriage and his image as a 
modern national leader. To support Jiang, the tabloid published a lengthy article which indirectly 
quoted Jiang’s claim to have abandoned wife-concubine marriage and to respect the lifestyle 
chosen by his wife and concubines. The article began by clarifying that his marriage to Lady 
Mao had been arranged. Although she gave birth to Jiang’s eldest son, the long-time departure 
after Jiang devoted himself to the revolution drained away their emotional attachments. The 
article also went into details of the divorce. Jiang had discussed it with the lineage head and 
                                                            
19 “Zhitan fengyue,” [Only to talk about amorous affairs] Jin Gang Zuan, March 3, 1929. 
20 “Jiang fouren furen chuyang,” [Jiang denies that his wife traveled abroad] in Fu Er Mo Si, September 
14,1927. 
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Mao’s brother and generously allowed her to stay with the Jiang family for the sake of their son. 
According to the article, Jiang’s relationship with his concubine Lady Yao ceased after Yao 
converted to Buddhism. Jiang kindly supported Chen, his other concubine, when she went to 
study in the U.S. The article describes the divorce as a way of setting women free from social 
restrictions and mentoring them.  After explaining the status of Jiang’s former spouses, the article 
concludes that “Jiang is now seeking for a virtuous wife to alleviate the increasing burden he had 
shouldered alone in the nationalist revolution.” The sentence compares Jiang to Sun Yat-sun on 
the point that their devotion to revolution was compatible with their personal loves.21 
 This narrative synthesized Jiang’s private life, Jiang’s personal statement of his marital 
status and the propagandistic description of a revolutionary romantic relation. Juicy details 
evince the virtuous and lofty political concerns of the national leader. To justify Jiang’s divorce, 
the article fits his behaviors into the anti-Confucian discourse of marriage based on love and 
women’s emancipation. The divorce thus carried significant social meaning. The article then 
pictures a supportive revolutionary-minded wife who would share Jiang’s political responsibility.  
According to this interpretation, Jiang’s choice for a new wife was a result of his commitment to 
the national revolution. The comparison to his predecessor elevated Jiang to the status of a 
revolutionary leader. This article attributed social and political meanings to gossip to support 
official statement.   
 Combating The Crystal as its major commercial rivalry, The Holmes discredited the 
authoritative explanations. It kept selling vivid and racy stories about his formal and informal, 
past and present conjugal ties to tempt popular interest. The paper introduced Lady Chen as Ms. 
                                                            
21 “Jiang furen zhi guoqu xianzai ji weilai,” [The past, current and future Mrs. Jiang] Jing Bao, September 
24, 1927. 
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Jiang, his favorite concubine in Guangdong, and questioned Jiang’s intention to secretly send her 
to the U.S.22 Another article constructed a timeline of Jiang’s love affairs to show that his 
relationship with Song had started six years before his divorce. It implied his culpability for 
abandoning his spouses and leaving unmentioned the real reason for the divorce. The tabloid 
claimed to have found a secret marriage agreement between Jiang and Lady Song:  
 Due to their divergence in political opinions, Song Ziwen (aka T.V. Soong) stood 
against Jiang during the crisis of Jiang-Wang split and therefore was discontented with 
Jiang's relationship with his younger sister. It was not until Jiang resigned from his 
position that Song Ziwen adopted a milder attitude toward their espousal. Ms. Song 
found it a right timing and proposed three essential preconditions to Jiang: 1. dissolve 
original family; 2. Never be the commander-in-chief of the nationalist army; 3. live 
abroad. Although Jiang accepted all these conditions, Song Ziwen still remained in doubt. 
Song suspected that if Chang could discard his family for his sister, it is possible that in 
the future Chang could also abandon his sister for someone else. Ms. Song therefore 
added one more condition to secure her financial rights in this conjugal relation and 
attempted to persuade her brother that Chang would not be able to pursue other women 
with his purse strings held by her. Thanks to Ms A’s attempts to grease the wheel, Song 
then approved.23  
 
The article more moralized and politicized his marital choice. It used the secret agreement to 
describe the Jiang-Song union as a trade. Jiang would retire from politics to have a blessed 
conjugal relationship with Ms. Song. He also surrendered his financial freedom to ensure Song’s 
position as his only spouse. The article mocked Jiang’s deal with the Songs in exchange for the 
support from China’s wealthiest and most prestigious family. If the Crystal was an advocate, the 
Holmes was a social and political critic. 
 Articles on both sides featured explanations and opinions instead of fact-based narratives. 
                                                            
22 Zhesheng, “Jiang furren liumei zhenxiang,” [The truth about Ms. Jiang’s travel to America] Fu Er Mo 
Si, August 13, 1927. 
23 Weiweng, “Jiang Jieshi jiang furi jiehun,” [Jiang Jieshi will get married in Japan] Fu Er Mo Si, 
September 27, 1927. 
 153 
Both tabloids elevated the political significance of Jiang’s private behaviors by linking it to 
political goals. The political alliance transformed Jing Bao’s prior value since gossip served as 
the vehicle of political indoctrination. The issue of credibility became a concern. In July 1927, 
the Crystal declared that wrongful reports stained the professional integrity of journalists.  The 
tabloid reprimanded rumors as the conspiracy of evil intentions to besmirch others, more severe 
wrongdoings than simply disseminating misinformation.24  The same paper, which had 
announced itself to be the playground for any untrue and incomplete reports, seven years later 
placed factuality far before entertainment.  
 The contestation over the political meanings of the marriage not only bombarded the 
audience with competing interpretations but also fueled more speculations about the power 
relations underneath private connections. People used their knowledge of national affairs to 
dissect the marriage. There were rumors that Jiang was under control of the Green Gang who had 
forced Song Ziwen into the marriage.25 Some believed that Jiang Jieshi's union with Song Meilin 
was nothing more than a customary arranged marriage for her family to benefit from Jiang’s 
military and political assets.26  Public critics drew attention to the nexus of economic interests 
and political calculations.   
 The nationalist penetration into the tabloid world and the later join of serious journalism in 
gossip production had profound consequences. On the one hand, political and social meanings 
loaded onto a leader’s martial and amorous affairs weakened the playful tone in narratives. In the 
                                                            
24 Tianma, “Zaoyao yu cuowu” [Rumors and errors] Jing Bao, June 21, 1927. 
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late 1910s and early 1920s, gossip columnists familiarized their readers with politics by 
publishing trivia as about topics such as Li Yuanhong and opera singers. A different mechanism 
of the gossip industry engaged readers in political discussion in the late 1920s. While some 
gossip columnists were still profiteers, the interaction among political interests turned gossip into 
a medium of political critique. After the Northern Expedition, official and unofficial voices 
competed with and influenced each other. Public concerns over political issues mounted. Gossip 
constituted the evidence for argument construction rather than a commodity of fun.  
 On the other hand, gossip brought trivial affairs outside of entertainment. Many news items 
titled “miscellaneous record,” (??) “leftover news,” (??) or “secret curtain” (??) 
frequently appeared in pages of serious news. A Tianjin-based commercial newspaper, Dagong 
Bao editorialized on the divorce and exposed the correspondence between Jiang and his 
relatives.27 It condemned him for discarding old companions and bullying disadvantaged 
women.28 The fact that major newspaper dabbled in gossip realm further pushed gossip 
production towards serious political discussion and legitimized entertainment in political news.   
 
Defining a Revolutionary Couple 
 Under these conditions, Jiang modeled his relation with Song after an ideal of 
revolutionary love and emphasized their partnership in advancing China’s nationalist revolution. 
The theme of a revolutionary couple had already been a part of the party’s construction of Jiang’s 
leadership before Jiang’s wedding statements. In both the fictional and factual accounts of 
                                                            
27 “Jiang Jieshi banli lihun zhi yihan,” [One of the letters regarding Jiang’s divorce] Da Gong Bao, 
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Jiang’s love story, the revolutionary propaganda subjugated a romantic relationship and tightly 
bonded personal desires with national salvation. The Nationalist disclosure of the personal lives 
differed from the process of intimidation that scholars of contemporary political communication 
have theorized to address the transfer of value from the private sphere to the public sphere.29 In 
contrary, Jiang and his collaborators sought to transplant the ideas of nationalism, anti-
warlordism, and pro-revolution into what had been private information and imagery. The 
nationalists’ new political authority determined the idealized image of a couple. 
 Jiang published two statements about his wedding in the Shanghai News. In the first 
statement, published four days before the ceremony, Jiang claimed that the nation and the people 
were his top priority and shaped his personal life. To fulfil his “personal wish in the military 
years,” he announced to scrimp on his wedding in order to save the money for a sanitarium for 
disabled soldiers. Jiang also urged his friends and guests to donate to the sanitarium instead of 
sending wedding gifts. The statement set off by using a familiar discourse of self-sacrifice for the 
revolution and ended with a calling for public support for soldiers.30 The Crystal interpreted this 
charitable deed from a more personal perspective. It juxtaposed a panegyric of his generous 
donation to help the wounded and the disabled with a detailed description of the wedding 
ceremony (figure 4). The writer exalted Jiang’s humanitarianism and linked his caring for the 
soldiers to his devotion to country and family.31 Unlike Jiang’s portrayal, the tabloid emphasized 
private and the public aspects of the national leader.  
                                                            
29 James Stanyer, Intimate Politics: Publicity, Privacy and the Personal Lives of Politicians in Media 
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30 Jiang Jieshi, “Qishi,” [Announcement] Shen Bao, November 27, 1927. 
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Figure 4. The article about Jiang’s generous donation to the construction of a sanitarium for 
wounded soldiers was placed next to the report on Jiang-Song wedding ceremony. (Jing Bao, 
December 3, 1927) 
 
  Jiang’s wedding-day statement explicated the relationship between his marriage and 
revolution. It was both a display of his love for Song and a speech on the importance of happy 
families for revolutionaries and Chinese society. He formally introduced her as his soulmate and 
spoke about their commitment to the nationalist revolution as the basis of their union: 
 Today is the most honorable and happiest day in my life. I am marrying Ms. Song 
Meiling whom I respect and love mostly.  When passive thoughts sometimes occurred to 
my mind, my fellow revolutionists asked when I could truly concentrate on the 
revolution... Eventually, I can give a good answer today: I am assured that after marrying 
Ms. Song Meiling my revolutionary career will definitely progress well. From now on, I 
can keep my mind on my responsibility for the revolution. I studied philosophy and 
social problems and deeply believe that without happy marriage people could not live 
meaningfully. Without happy and peaceful families in the society, the nation would by no 
means have improved. Revolutionaries who pay little attention to social reforms do not 
comprehend the real meaning of revolution and thus do not make a complete revolution. 
Families are the foundation of the society. Family reform should be the first step of the 
social reform. Ms. Song and I used to discuss Chinese revolution and we agreed on this 
point. I sincerely wish that our marriage will bring a little change to the old society and 
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contribute to the building of a new one. We do not only celebrate our own happy 
marriage but also wish to advance Chinese social reform. I will make a great deal of 
efforts till our dream comes true. Therefore, our wedding today also builds up the 
foundation for our revolutionary courses. Upon the first time when I met Ms. Song, I 
thought of her as my ideal life companion and Ms. Song also expressed that she would 
not marry anyone else. Our sacred union is incomparable to ordinary cases....32  
 
The statement iterates the linkage between the couple from two dimensions: the emotional 
attachment between two individuals goes in tandem with their consensual view and practice of 
social reform and national revolution. The view of family as a miniature version of the nation 
dates from the early Republic.33 The leader’s marriage serves a public model of family reform, 
guides social reform and thus national progress. Many books and magazines published this 
wedding statement and praised it as “the most valuable article in the Chinese marriage history.” 
 The image of a revolutionary couple and public interest in a personal event were not 
Jiang’s invention. They had already appeared in story about Jiang’s revolutionary and love 
experience, The Romance of Jiang Jieshi (?????). The story was published by the 
Nationalist Bookstore (????) in April 1927, as a popular novel combining entertainment 
and propaganda. It was one among many revolutionary novellas produced by the nationalists 
from 1925 to 1927.34 Through a biographical account of how Jiang grew from an anti-Manchu 
adolescent to a Nationalist hero and successor of Sun Yat-sen, the novel tells the history of the 
nationalist revolution from the anti-Manchu uprisings to the Northern Expedition. It engraved 
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pro-revolutionary ideas including nationalism, anti-warlordism and political activism into a 
character-driven narrative. The concluding chapter about a meeting of martyrs killed in an anti-
Manchu insurrection reveals the intention to legitimize Jiang’s singular leadership during the 
party’s split between left and right. The chapter lends voice to these revolutionary spirits who 
elected Jiang for his literary and military talent to ritualize the intergenerational transmission of 
national revolutionary leadership.  
 Jiang’s discussion of the public interest and his personal life resembled the interlacement of 
romance and revolution in the novel. The Romance of Jiang Jieshi dedicates much space to the 
love between Jiang Jieshi and Zhang Qianhong. Zhang was to be a maid in the household of a 
local governor. She followed Jiang’s advice to enter the school established by the national 
heroine Qiu Jin (??,1875-1907). A conversation in Chapter 21 describes the connection 
between Zhang’s affection for Jiang and her goal of rescuing the nation:  
 Qiu Jin said to her student: “I heard from Huanqin that you and Jieshi love each 
other. Jieshi is a promising man. I’m so glad that you admire him. No one could compel 
other people against their own will. I am happy to know that you will be faithful to him 
till the end. But with only one body, how can you devote yourself to both the nation and 
this man? If you sacrificed yourself to the nation, what could I give him when he want 
you back?” 
 Upon hearing these words, Qianhong turned her head to hide her blushing face. After 
a while, she replied: “You do have a point here, my dear teacher. But you don’t know 
much about us. I am the only person who deserves his appreciation and he is the only one 
deserving mine. The love between us is not like normal romantic passion that aims at 
lifetime companion. Therefore, I have to go for my own destination and only by doing so 
I will not disappoint him. I do not want to disobey my teacher but your view of love was 
too boring and narrow like a countryman. You should know that my devotion to the 
nation merges with my love for him. Because he is the soul of the nation!”35 
 
Qiu Jin’s question comes from a common view of the conflict between patriotic commitment and 
love. From the famous constitutionalist Liang Qichao to May Fourth intellectuals, intellectuals 
                                                            
35 Tao Fengzi ed., Jiang Jieshi yanyi [The Romance of Jiang Jieshi] (Shanghai and Guangzhou: Guomin 
shudian, 1927), chapter 21. 
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all rang the alarm of the immersive harm love story would cause ﹣ to encourage lewd desires 
and weaken one’s love for the nation.36 Many novels illustrated this tension. What Haiyan Lee 
calls “the Confucian structure of love” in butterfly novels subordinates romantic love to national 
loyalty and uses sufferings from sacrificing the precious love to authenticate the hero’s patriotic 
passion.37 The Romance found another compelling way to convey nationalist consciousness. It 
undermines this tension by making nationalist sentiment the core of romantic love. When Zhang 
sees Jiang as an epitome of the nationalist spirit, she merges her personal yearnings with 
revolutionary devotion. Unlike Qiu Jin, the older generation of revolutionaries who sacrificed 
their personal desires for the nation, Zhang conceives a new revolutionary ideal in which 
personal and national goals converge.  
 This model of revolutionary couple became available to nationalist tabloids and Jiang 
Jieshi himself to frame his relationship with Song. The novel had already build the connection 
between reality and this fictionalized depiction of Jiang. In-chapter commentaries such as “this 
depiction is very close to facts,” “Jiang is truly a hero” lend the novel a sense of authority and 
gave an impression of Jiang as the true embodiment of the “soul of the nation” and the cause of 
revolution.38 Jiang’s wedding statements authenticated the novel’s message. The novel, tabloid 
explanations and Jiang’s personal statement forged a coherent narrative under the collectively 
planned theme of national consciousness. The political party and the male leader had 
transformed intimate relationships into a legitimate political domain to generate political capital. 
                                                            
36 Cathrine Yeh, The Chinese Political Novel: Migration of a World Genre (Cambridge, Massachusetts ; 
London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 135-141. 
37 Haiyan Lee, Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900-1950 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 87-92. 
38 Tao Fengzi, ed., Jiang Jieshi yanyi, 110. 
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Controlled Visibility and the Object of Consumerism 
Jiang turned his wedding into a media event and inserted political messages into commercial and 
entertainment culture. The Jiang-Song couple, the mass media and manufacturers who took 
advantage of the event to promote high-end commodities all made the Jiang-Song wedding into 
an event. The ceremony was overtly political and commercial at the same time. It therefore 
linked political propaganda, popular culture and consumerism in a new way. This analysis of 
Jiang’s wedding shows the tension between propagandist appropriation and commercialization. 
The tension suggests a relationship between entertainment and politics that was unprecedented in 
the public discussion of the private lives of political figures in the warlord era. A private event as 
a political performance created visual entertainment and was strategically used as a political 
resource. Commercial players stripped the visual representations of their political meanings but 
reinforced Jiang’s leadership in the language of consumerism.  
 Combining national rituals and a private event, the semi-public ceremony as new form of 
publicity extended the political ideas and imagery of the leader. Visual symbols of national 
revolution and speeches addressing Jiang’s statement resembled the national ceremonial 
vocabulary in the early Republic to deliver political messages.39 Sun Yat-sun’s portrait was hung 
in the ceremonial hall, draped with the national and party flags.40 During the ritual of oath, the 
priest's words repeated the point that they were united for both individual and national happiness: 
                                                            
39 Scholarship on the political culture in modern Asia have discussed the discursive powers in the national 
political ceremonies to create collectivities, nationalism and to educate citizenry. See Henrietta Harrison, 
The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in 
Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
40 “Jiang Jieshi xinhun hunli chuanwen,” [Jiang’s new marriage and hearsay about the wedding 
ceremony] Jingjin huabao, December 4, 1927. 
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“May the god bless them to build a happy family as a good foundation of the Chinese society. 
May the god give them courage to sacrifice for the nation and to endeavor to establish a new 
China.”41 Newspapers circulated the signs and meanings. The Shanghai News gave more than 
half a newspaper page for the guests’ congratulation letters, the preface to the marriage license, 
words of the priest and the witness speeches in their entirety.42 
 Jiang brought this political performance to a full display and generated excitement by 
making a commercial newsreel of the ceremony. Unlike other propaganda documentaries, the 
Jiang-Song wedding movie was a part of Jiang’s political agenda and a commodity that catered 
to the public enthusiasm for the visual and material dimension of the ceremony. The movie, 
newspaper reports and advertisements about the event turned the political performance into 
objects of urban consumerism and restyled it with its material spectacularity. They generated 
larger social impact at the expense of Jiang’s full control.  
  In the 1920s, political leaders used visual entertainment as a means of political 
propaganda. They favored documentary film for its capability of enacting powerful rhetoric in 
factual representations.43 Unlike printing, filmmaking still allowed control by a small group of 
experts for it pre-requested possession of equipment, the mastery of the camera language and 
considerable financial investment. Sun Yat-sen and other regional warlords had experimented 
with the motion pictures and newsreels since 1921, under the influence of the Soviet and World 
                                                            
41 Shen Bao, December 2, 1927, 13. 
42 “Jiang Jieshi Song Meiling Zuori Jiehun Shengkuang,” [The Spetacular Occasion of the Jiang-Song 
Wedding Ceremony Yesterday] Shen Bao. December 2, 1927, 13. 
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War I propaganda films.44 Regional warlords participated in making documentary films about 
themselves. Among these films were “Wu Peifu” (1924), “Feng Yuxiang” (1924) and “Sun 
Chuanfang” (1925). Contemporary analysts have grouped them into a sub-genre of strong man 
films characterized by the militarist and propagandist narratives.45 In May 1927, the party 
propaganda committee made its own film, A record of Jiang Jieshi's Northern Expedition (??
????) to appeal to urban middle class.46  
 The strong man films reflected and participated in the creation of the self-revelatory culture 
at the permeable boundary of fiction and reality in the 1920s. Unlike a playwright and storyteller 
who could compose a story without obtaining any sanction of the target person, political figures 
took back the power of fact-making.47 Depictions of private behaviors and daily routines were an 
integral part of the cinematic representation of strong men. The first reel of A Record of Feng 
Yuxiang’s work in the Northern Expedition (馮玉祥北伐工作記) idealized the commander-in-
chief’s parenting skills through a collage of quotidian events. The camera lingers on how the 
general dined with his men in the open air and how he tended to an ill soldier like a father. These 
representations are comparable to the image o President Li Yuanhong eating a bowl of noodles. 
                                                            
44 The famous cinematographer and earnest revolutionary Li Minwei followed Sun Yat-sen, making film 
footage of Sun’s political activities to propagandize the northern expedition. More information about 
early propaganda films, see Fang Fang, Zhongguo jilupian fazhanshi [The history of Chinese 
documentary films] (Beijing: Zhongguo xiju chubanshe, 2003), 44-47. 
45 The notion of strongman films was raised by a Chinese television program “Dianyingyan kan 
zhongguo,” (Looking at China through the Lenz of Cinema) episode 2 in 2013. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iBvEkHt_XdU (accessed in December 1st, 2016). 
46 Shan Wanli. Zhongguo jilu dianying shi [A history of Chinese documentaries] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
dianying chubanshe, 2005). 
47 For example, Feng Yuxiang’s approach is to manufacture facts in his own play script instead of 
representing through reenactment of prior events, a staple of documentary representation more common 
in the earlier years. 
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But filming a real person in a real place conferred authenticity and motion pictures were popular 
with the middle class. Because of this controlled political presence, compelling factual 
representation and entertaining form, political leaders were interested in making films. 
 The Jiang-Song movie centered on the groom and the bride, their families and the guests. 
The only comparable example of a publicized wedding came from Japan. The Japanese 
government had ceremonial events such as the Imperial Wedding (1900) to spread symbols of 
modern monarchism.48 The royal wedding of the Crown Prince Hiroshito in 1924 was an event 
that reinforced a picture of a rejuvenated monarchy.49 Photos and reports on the royal wedding in 
Chinese news media showed a crowd outside the palace. It is unknown if Hiroshito’s wedding 
inspired Jiang but the extensive media coverage showed how to use a wedding for propaganda.   
 Moreover, Jiang bravely embraced the commercial producing and distributing tactics 
different from those of dominant strong man films. The film Feng Yuxiang fused Feng’s interest 
in filmmaking and the expertise of the motion picture department in the Northwestern Army. It is 
a 20-reel sequence written by and featuring Feng himself.50 Feng’s high level of control and 
limited exhibition of the private aspect of his military work gave the film a strong personal hue 
and political meaning. The problem lay in the chasm between the ambition for cinema 
propaganda and the limited circulation within his army. The strong man films were simply not 
competitive with commercial films.  
 The involvement of a commercial film studio with a market  strategy broadened the 
                                                            
48 Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 116-121. 
49 Sandra Wilson, “Enthroning Hirohito: Culture and Nation in 1920s Japan,” The Journal of Japanese 
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50 Cai Chusheng, “Xibeijun dianyingtan” [A Talk on the Northwestern Army’s filmmaking practice] Shen 
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diffusion of the film effect. The Jiang-Song couple invited renowned film studios in Shanghai to 
screen the product of Star Film Company (????) in a public theatre. Only two days after the 
wedding, an advertisement in the front page of Shen Bao invited readers to enjoy the movie 
Jiang-Song wedding ceremony ? ?????). 51 Proud to be the only company that was 
permitted to set up the lighting equipment at the wedding, the Star Film Company claimed to 
have the most complete and the best quality footage. The company released the two-reel movie 
on December 4 in the Central Theater (?????) the leading theater for China-made films of 
the time in Shanghai. It is likely that the couple chose the partnership with Star after full 
consideration. As the industry leader in the 1920s, Star balanced profiteering with a propensity 
for moralizing. It was particularly adept at incorporating the May Fourth spirit of social reform 
into butterfly narratives and appealing to female audiences.52 This expertise perfectly served 
Jiang’s need to disseminate his points on revolution and social reform and his anticipation of a 
broaden spectatorship. Given the political implications and the couple’s conscious exhibition of 
themselves, the movie was still a piece of subtle propaganda.   
 The Star Film Company marketed the wedding movie as entertainment. Seeking more 
profit, the company promoted a bound-sale of the wedding newsreel with an action movie, Ma 
Yongzhen (???) about an underground gang leader. The first advertisement obfuscates the 
bonding by briefly introducing Ma Yongzhen in the last sentence. But from the second day on,  
the film company changed promotion priority. The new advertisement reserves only one short 
final line for Jiang-Song couple and introduced the wedding movie as a lead-in to Ma 
                                                            
51 Shen Bao, December 3, 1927, 1. 
52 For more discussion about the company’s strategies, ideology compromise and contributions to early 
Chinese cinema, see Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2004), 23-30. 
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Yongzhen.53  It is unknown whether the alteration was made due to the movie’s unexpected 
unpopularity, expiration of some agreement with Jiang or their plan to use the wedding to sell the 
other film. For whichever reason, the company never considered compromising its commercial 
interest. The politician’s wedding movie and the underground fight club movie targeted the same 
urban middle-class audience who sought sensation, novelty, and western kind of fun.   
 To market the movie, the newspaper advertisement underscored the private aspects and the 
spectacularity of the event. It quotes Jiang's statement that those days were the happiest of his 
life.  Drawing upon private relations instead of politics, the advertisement accentuates the 
brother-in-law relationship between Jiang and Sun Yat-sen. The spectacularity of the event was 
another feature in promotion. The advertisement emphasized “the Song House” and “Majestic 
Hotel,” the most sumptuous wedding venue in Shanghai. “Hundreds of the important persons of 
the party-state attending the wedding,” inviting a closer look at the couple.  
  The wedding publicity drew on the tradition of public enthusiasm for the lifestyle and 
sociability of the political elites. Before the movie was released, portraits of the venue, 
decorations, guests, clothing and etiquette had already been divulged. The Young Companion 
Pictorial (????) showed photos of the bride and groom, the guests and the automobiles 
(figure 5).54 A news report combined information about the wedding preparation with the details 
of the wedding gown.55  It named the new Madam Jiang as a fashion icon. Compared to simple 
introduction of guests, gifts and rituals in weddings of the warlord families in earlier gossip 
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books, representations of the Jiang-Song wedding were much more informative as the couple 
invited journalists, photographers and filmmakers to record the event.56 Local businesses 
enterprises used the ceremony to encourage material consumption. 
 
 Figure 5. Photographs of the wedding ceremony selectively published in Liangyou (“Jiang-
Song jiehun,” [Jiang and Song getting married] Liangyou huabao, no. 21(1927): 4.) 
 
 
                                                            
56 For example, in The Amorous History of Republican China published in 1914, depictions of the 
wedding ceremonies of Yuan Shikai’s son and of Liang Qichao’s daughter introduce the venue, the 
guests, the gifts, and the etiquette, underscoring the interesting incorporation of foreign elements. See 
Xiuzhu xiangren ed. Minguo yanshi  [The amorous history of Republican China], in Zhang Yan and Sun 
Yanjing ed. Minguo shiliao congkan [Historical resources of Republican China] 869 (Zhengzhou: 
Daxiang chubanshe, 2009), 265-269. 
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 When popular cultural producers and business minds all participated in the construction of 
a media event, political prominence was translated into a brand of material and social life, 
commercial promotion and urban entertainment. The audience received the multi-mediated 
representations of the couple, and a fragmented experience of their wedding. Inevitably, the 
political messages of Jiang’s contribution to national revolution were less evident and sometimes 
were buried under all these layers of mediation which themselves created new attractions. The 
intensity of the event fits Tom Gunning’s description of “attractions” as it “solicit[s] spectator 
attention, incites visual curiosity and supplies pleasure through a exciting spectacle.”57 “Cinema 
of attraction” underscores authenticity and vivid realism rather than rational understanding.58  
The fragmentation of images and facts interrupted the circulation of strong opinions or complete 
narratives. Sensorial affect also hindered logical reasoning. While the sense of amazement 
decreased the political meanings that infused the wedding rites, the entertaining representation 
and promotions also deflected attention from political and moral criticism of Jiang’s marriage 
issues. Even The Holmes, Jiang’s most ardent critic, was distracted enough to report on the 
design of the wedding invitations, the fashion sense of the new Madam Jiang and the gifts she 
bought for the family.59 The Shanghai media during the wedding week was so chasing 
information about the wedding and the couple that their Northern counterparts accused them of 
having being bought by the Nationalists. Only a few newspapers in Beijing and Tianjin still 
expressed sympathy for the dispatched concubines and criticized Jiang’s wedding statement that 
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associated his marriage with his revolutionary career.60  
 Commercial involvement generated an affect of de-politicization but did not submerge all 
the political messages. As shown in the movie advertisement, the promoter hinted at a connection 
between Jiang and Sun. The advertisement praised Jiang by ascribing historical significance to 
their relationship. Although the emphasis was on the private side, the linkage between the private 
relationship and the history of the nation had already explicated Jiang as Sun’s the rightful heir. 
From the perspective of the film producer, more important the central character, the more 
interested people would be in his personal life. Hence, the theme of national revolution still 
managed to permeate the wedding.  Even if the political meanings attached to the wedding 
ceremony were refracted, the seemingly apolitical sociability represented in pictures and texts 
still invested the imagery of the newly married couple with political and cultural prestige. 
 Jiang took advantage of the commercial force and the new media form of entertainment to 
maximize his visibility and his social influence. The fragmented information and pleasure 
appealed to commoners. Even though the movie itself was not shown outside of cities, the 
advertisements together with other reports reached a much wider audience in the nationwide 
news distribution network. Visibility on such a scale eventually turned a private event into a 
major historical event in the popular memory. The new couple’s smart turn toward 
commercialization and the participation of commercial forces made this process different from 
the customary understanding of propaganda as a top-down and monolithic practice. The multi-
mediated presence of Jiang and Song crossing into the political, cultural and commercial spheres 
enabled multiple perspectives and disparate interpretations. Later, to solve this problem, the 
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standardized narrative in the official propaganda identified Jiang’s marriage as an important 
episode in the Northern Expedition.61   
 This publicity illustrated a different dynamic between the commercial and the political as a 
political figure gained a say in the disclosure of his private life. The political leader and the mass 
media formed a mutually dependent relationship. This cooperation squeezed the autonomy of the 
media content producer. Commercial players had to work on apolitical aspects of the narratives 
and add-on commodities to generate profit.  Even if the political meanings attached to the 
wedding ceremony were refracted, the seemingly apolitical sociability represented in pictures 
and texts still invested the imagery of the newly married couple with political and cultural 
prestige. The two forces, which seemingly went om opposite directions and disabled each other, 
were in fact entangled, reinforcing Jiang’s leadership in the public mind. 
 
Conclusion 
 The nationalist construction of the party leadership in the late 1920s was characterized by 
the utility of the public interest in the leader’s personal life. Unlike purely commercial products, 
gossip novels and articles that were tailored to the need of the party exerted tremendous efforts in 
explaining the reasons behind the facts and inserting ideological messages into private scenarios. 
This political penetration formed a control mechanism from within the industry effectively 
changed the nature of gossip production and reduced its entertainment aspect. 
 In 1927, Jiang’s disclosure of his relationship with Song Meiling conformed to the theme 
of national revolution and formed a coherent part of the party propaganda. The media-savvy 
couple wielded commercial force to maximize the visibility of the wedding ceremony by diluting 
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its political meanings. As their marriage became a significant episode in the history of the 
Northern Expedition, these attractive aspects including Jiang’s passionate love, the label of 
modern upper class lifestyle, and spectacularity of their social life addressed by commercial 
advertisements all transformed into their political and cultural capitals. The publicity of Jiang’s 
love life demonstrated the permeability of the boundary between propaganda and entertainment.  
 The reactions from the lower society to Jiang’s public display of his affection were quite 
opposite to the party propaganda. The New York Times journalist Harlett Abend recalled that 
people gossiped about the Jiang-Song couple in the bazaars in 1928 and a popular saying was 
circulating: “If (Song) Meiling were at he bottom of the Yangtsze, then China would suffer less” 
(??????????).62  But the saying revealed that the association between Jiang’s 
marriage life and the national interests was very well received. 
 This attempt to nationalize gossip to tame social engagement in political discussion lasted 
only 1927 to 1928. Upon the establishment of the Nationalist government in Nanjing, the party 
introduced a pre-publishing news censorship system in 1929 and more strictly regulated the 
tabloids press in 1933. With the growing power of the Chinese state, the gossip industry shrank.
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EPILOGUE 
Nationalist Regulations and the Gossip Business in the 1930s 
 
The previous chapters have discussed gossip in print media from the late 1910s to late 
1920s, and its involvement in commercial, political, legal, and cultural issues. This robust and 
light-minded engagement existed owing to the loose state regulation and the dissemination of the 
powerful discourse of popular sovereignty. The changing political dynamics and party practice 
since the late 1920s led to a new research question that this dissertation attempts to answer: How 
did a once prosperous gossip industry influence the political and social practices in the post-
warlord era and what happened to the industry then?  
Many tabloid papers survived the new era, but the publishers were unable to ignore the 
decline of gossip industry as early as 1929. An article in the Holmes notes that: 
Years ago, the best-sellers used to be anecdotal accounts for popular readings, 
martial art, and detective fictions. Scandal books flourished at this time. Various publishing 
houses competed with each other to launch secret stories. These vulgar and sensational 
works appealed to the most ordinary readers. Currently, new learnings are the most popular 
publications. Young people nationwide enjoy discussing the new culture. Some books 
target political topics, while others usually belong to the romance genre. Readers were 
eager to follow intellectuals such as Zhou Zuoren, Yu Dafu and Guo Moruo.1 
 
Although the marginalization of gossip publications, along with the rise of intellectual 
literature in the Shanghai market, could not be attributed to only one factor, government control 
was a major cause. Under the pressure of news censorship, tabloid papers had to praise the new 
nationalist revolution for leading them into a new era and to publicize the frugality of the 
Nationalist leaders. Some tabloids reported scandals of ministers but seldom wrote anything 
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negative against top leaders like Jiang and Wang. Moreover, the formalization of bureaucratic 
regulation in the Nationalist Government made it increasingly difficult for informants to collect 
materials for gossip publications. The installation of tightened control served the party state's goal 
of building a coherent body of nationalist-minded citizens under the leadership of a highly 
centralized party-state. The press had to find other solutions in the new political environment to 
make better use of gossip materials for either profits or implicit political expressions. 
 
Stringent Censorship and Controversial Laws 
A direct consequence of the flourishing warlord-era gossip industry was the tightened 
control of Nationalists over the information sphere. At the establishment of a new Nationalist 
Government in 1928, the new party-state supported the dominance of the Nationalist Party in 
regulating the press. The party states penetration into urban playgrounds was unprecedented. 
Besides popular libraries, lecture halls, and newspaper reading rooms, the Ministry of Education 
also established official teahouses and amusement parks where live performances were designed 
for popular education and political mobilization.2 A series of administrative regulations and a more 
comprehensive censorship system placed the media products and journalist operations under strict 
and constant state surveillance. Publishers were required to register with the local government 15 
days prior to the release of their first issue. In particular, they had to be honest while reporting if 
the content was concerned with the Party or political affairs. With reference to those who planned 
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to discuss the Party and other politically sensitive issues, registration with a provincial government 
was required, which was then reported immediately to the Central Propaganda Department of the 
Party.3 
The party placed the tabloid press under stricter control. In 1933, the Propaganda 
Department of the Party Central Executive Committee, which took charge of the regulations of all 
publications and news agencies, ordered provincial governments to examine all the tabloids and 
to prohibit the spread of misinformation or blackmail.4
 
In essence, it was a large campaign against 
false information and immoral narratives, laying out the principle of factuality and morality, 
similar to the guideline of the PERS in the late 1910s. According to the new regulation provision, 
misinformation included absurd opinions and erotic descriptions, which were deemed harmful to 
the society’s mental being. Moreover, the 1933 campaign extended regulatory efforts onto 
misconducts in tabloid management, such as unjustifiable funding and blackmailing. The new 
request of reporting on budget and financial sources aimed to prevent sponsorship coming from 
other political forces, especially the communists.5  
In addition, the strong call for the abolishment of extraterritoriality backed Nationalist 
stretch into the center of print industry. In 1927, the Mixed Court was transformed into Shanghai 
Temporary Court of the Foreign Settlement, officially under the Jiangsu Provincial Court. 6 
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Thereafter, the Police Office in the Shanghai foreign settlements also helped in the prohibition of  
publications denigrating the government and political leaders. In 1929, a book titled Can not be 
seen (kanbude), published by an unknown bookstore, captured the government’s attention. The 
book ventures into the personal grudge between General Bai Chongxi and Jiang Jieshi to explain 
the hidden reasons behind Bai’s reluctant resignation.7 Jiangsu Provincial Government asked the 
Shanghai Municipal Council for assistance to have all the volumes of the said book confiscated. 
In the letter, the Nationalist government almost instructed the SMC to prohibit sales the book, 
since it was "falsely defaming the leaders of the Nationalist Government and the Party." The 
Municipal Police Office acted accordingly and investigated by the publishing company, although 
eventually failed to trace the publisher.8
  
This case demonstrates that the Nationalist Government 
developed an effective working relationship with the foreign authorities more successfully than its 
predecessor. Besides the Nationalist presence of a stronger government, their common anti-
Communist interests should also be counted on the basis of such cooperation on the press 
censorship.  
Jiang Jieshi also swiftly changed his attitude towards the exposure of his and Song Meilin’s 
private life, which announced the termination of the previous publicity policy that appealed to the 
popular taste. Jiang himself turned another side of his public face to the press immediately after he 
regained the power in January 1928. In an interview, he expressed his concern of too much media 
coverage of his “familial affairs.” He told the journalist not to produce news from his private acts, 
such as “stories like the arrive of Madam Jiang to the capital city or Jiang Jieshi saw a doctor are 
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all my familial affairs, not newsworthy at all.”9 Compared to several months ago, when he invited 
the media to publicize their wedding ceremony, the newly-wed leader’s denouncement of 
reportage on his familial affairs not being newsworthy sounds contradictory. But the publicity 
function of gossip was no longer valuable for constructing his public role as a powerful national 
leader when he returned to the political center.  
In the following years, the Nationalist authority drew a more stringent line between the 
public and the private. In the 1935 revision of the press law, the Nationalist government added one 
provision to protect one’s individual and familial privacy from being publicized. Article 21 
specifies that there should be no publication of private information about one’s family life.10 
Chinese press questioned and resisted the new revision nationwide. In their appeals, Journalist 
Associations contended that the new rule was overly generalized and inapplicable. Guangdong 
Journalist Association argued that "if any private behavior affected social order, the society should 
document and criticize the act with benign intentions." Shanghai Journalist Association further 
claimed that "for a news publisher, it is difficult to differentiate the private from the public. Many 
reports could be caught in the middle of the public and the private. Moreover, in many cases, 
individual cases affected the entire social morality". Furthermore, the letter stated that “the 
provision provided local officials opportunity to use the discretion in defining whatever with 
private information to punish the news publisher.”11 
The press was indeed turning to the defamation clauses stated in the 1928 Nationalist Penal 
Law to argue against the new press law. Article 326, regarding a new category of libel, 
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criminalized only maliciously false allegations and allowed truth defense if the defamatory claim 
was concerned with the public interest.12 Expressing an opinion with benign intention was only 
legal for “self-defense, duty reports of government officials, issues that allow public criticism, 
reports on conferences, court debates or public gatherings.”13 The press interpreted the clauses in 
a liberal light, which gave them a certain degree of freedom to expose and criticize public-related 
deeds. However, the deliberate ambiguity gave more discretion to the Nationalist authority to 
decide what qualifies as “public interest” and what constitutes a proper “public criticism.” The 
state wanted more say in the scale of the public, and thereby place limitations on public discussion. 
Ironically, in contrast to the stringent line between the public and the private, the changing 
approaches regarding officials’ privacy in the Nationalist internal regulations revealed the official 
acknowledgement of the public dimension of an official’s private realm. As another significant 
effect of the circulation of gossipy information on the ensuing government, regulations upon the 
personal lives of officials was growing stricter. The government from central to local levels kept 
an ever closer eye upon private behaviors of formal government position holders. In 1933, the 
party central committee promulgated new regulations, which would restrict government officials 
from holding a lavish private banquet.14 One year later, the New Life Movement, which took the 
shape of century-old Confucian terms while serving the new purpose of political mass mobility, 
more strictly requested officials to abstain from gambling, concubinage, and visiting prostitutes. 
Since 1935, provincial governments deemed an official’s private behaviors as one out of three 
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ziliao huibian 5. Culture, ed. the Second National Historical Archives (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 
1999), 440. 
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categories of assets to evaluate one’s work performance.15 The new regime’s increased focus on 
private morality was a politically-motivated restoration of the traditional view of state officials as 
a moral example for society. Scholars have argued that, by dictating everyday personal behaviors, 
the Nationalist state tried to transform Chinese body and morality.16 The New Life Movement 
starting in the early 1930s, in particular, accentuated that building a disciplined social body 
certainly requested a renewed bureaucracy body in accordance to serving as a public model. 
Moreover, the regulation was also a response to the extensive media exposure of political figures' 
lives, since the mid-1910s, which had already intertwined moral with political integrity. 
Consequently, these new regulations affirmed and further amplified the public dimension of an 
official’s private behaviors, and affirmed that a public official’s morality played a part in the public 
judgment of the trustworthiness of the government.  
 
The New Commercial Turn 
The late 1920s witnessed a new tendency: that gossip about political leaders shifted away 
from its dual emphasis on entertainment and political meaning, while the rise of a new class of 
celebrities and film stars also drew new public attention. These twists and turns in the production 
of gossip were the results of the interaction between the less-open political environment, business 
interests, new mass media development, and the changing social composition of the consumers.  
                                                            
15 Shanghaishi zhengfu gongbao [Shanghai municipal gazetteer] no. 162 (1935): 38-39. “Dangzhengjun 
jiguan gongsi shenghuo xingwei fudao banfa,” [Instructions on the public and private behaviors of 
officials in the party, government and the military], No. 1-1-291, 1939, the Second National Historical 
Archives. 
16 To list a few, Federica Ferlanti, “The New Life Movement in Jiangxi Province, 1934–1938,” Modern 
Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (September 2010): 961–1000; Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations of the 
New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution,” The Journal of Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (August 
1975): 945–80. 
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Entrepreneurs were fully aware of the commercial value of gossipy information about 
political leaders and used gossip more often in advertisements. As already shown in the media 
event of the Jiang-Song wedding, business people commodified the everyday material dimension 
of the eye-catching political figures’ private lives and promoted their products as an essential 
component of high-quality urban lifestyle. Subsequently, fashion companies indeed used the 
images of Song Meilin in the glamorous wedding gown to show the association of an upper-class 
identity with their clothes. Noticing public interest in the daily tidbits of political figures, other 
companies without any immediate connections with these national leaders also started to explore 
similar means of promotion. In July 1928, the Singapore-based international medical company, 
Yongantang (???, the hall of forever peace), made use of this public attention for political 
leaders to advertise their product: Tiger Balm ointment. In the center on the second page (the 
advertising space) of the Shi Bao (??),  the company posted a news article titled, “The weather 
in Beiping and major political figures.” It describes the health conditions of General Yan Xishan, 
Feng Yuxiang and Jiang Jieshi from the time they entered the former capital city. After speculating 
the reasons behind Jiang catching a cold there, the article naturally introduces Tiger Balm as the 
best medicine to cure the disease.17 Unlike the entrepreneurs who used the image of a leader for 
the high-class characteristic, Yongantang’s story about lives of these big guns merely intends to 
capture readers’ attention towards the medical product through the relation between these 
significant bodies of the nation. 
In the 1930s, a new class of celebrities and film stars dominated tabloid reports, replacing 
political figures. It was the result of political censorship, the emergence of this more glamorous 
                                                            
17 Shi Bao, July 19, 1928, 2. 
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class of celebrity, and the popularity of pictorial publications of the time. Even in the late 1920s, 
leading tabloids, including the seemingly riotous ones, did not dare to discuss anything negative 
about the top leaders. Articles about Jiang Jieshi were either boring stories, like him losing his hat 
or a flattery piece to extol his willpower and altruism. As tabloid papers persisted to expose 
scandals of some ministers and local rules, these reports did not attract as many readers as the 
amorous affairs of film stars. Both pictorial publications and conventional tabloids seized chance 
on the images and private lives of these new stars. In this period, for example, the most eventful 
gossip no longer surrounded political elites, but film stars. People widely discussed the 
complicated love life of a popular actress Ruan Lingyu (??? , 1910-1935), who was 
posthumously remembered as the greatest star of the Chinese silent film era.18 As a result, the 
rumors and gossip lead the actress to suicide, which became the front page news of both serious 
and tabloid press. Similarly, the mixture of propagandist messages and loquacious stories gave rise 
to the political celebrity gossip that constructed Ruan’s star image combining her on-screen image 
of suffering Chinese women with the off-screen tales of a miserable movie actress.19  
Meanwhile, the warlord stories continuously appeared in newspaper columns, books and 
films. Preferring to brush the stories in a nostalgic hue, writers usually reduced the political 
implications. Many gossip collections also removed critical opinions and mockery. For example, 
in Zheng Yimei’s (???, 1895-1992) collection, he brings together stories about Yuan Shikai’s 
                                                            
18 Mette Hjort, “Ruan Lingyu: Reflections on an Individual Performance Style,” in Chinese Film Stars, 
ed. Yingjin Zhang (London: Routledge Press, 2010), 32–49. 
19 There are quite a few studies on gossip about Ruan and its relations to the issues of morality and 
stardom. Michael Chang, “The Good, the Bad, and the Beautiful: Movie Actresses and Public Discourse 
in Shanghai,” in Cinema and Urban Culture in Shanghai, 1922-1943, ed. Yingjin Zhang (Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 128-159; Sabrina Qiong Yu, “Vulnerable Chinese stars: from Xizi to film 
workers,” in A Companion to Chinese Cinema, ed. Yingjin Zhang (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
2012), 218–238. 
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poetry talent, Song Jiaoren’s kindness towards his servants, Li Yuanhong’s delightful moments 
with his pets, and so on.20  Owing to this, the public attention and criticism of Yuan’s restoration 
of monarchism, Song’s amorous experience in Japan, and Li’s visits to the entertainment quarters 
faded away. The writer rediscovered personal aspects of these famous figures, detaching them 
from the political context of the warlord era and previous public opinion that contributed to the 
portrayals back in the day.  
Another notable change is the gendered shift from male public political figures to female 
ones.21 One example is the cinematic adaptation of the romance between General Cai E (??, 
1882-1916) and the courtesan Xiaofengxian (???, 1900-1954). Unlike the version produced in 
the 1910s, in which Cai took advantage of Xiaofengxian to escape from Yuan’s house arrest, the 
new version centers on the character of Xiaofengxian and her clever reactions to Cai’s secret 
escaping plan. In the movie, Xiaofengxian discovers Cai’s plan by overhearing the conversation 
between two subordinates and then pretends to be his lover to finally facilitate and implement the 
escape. Moreover, in an attempt to create a happy ending to compensate for the heroine’s self-
sacrifice, the movie concludes with the heroine coming across a subordinate in the battlefield, and 
consequently with them falling in love.22 The romanticized adaptation of the original narrative 
about Cai’s courage and wisdom now placed the heroine in the spotlight, catering to the growing 
female audience. A large number of women's magazines and cosmetic product advertisements had 
                                                            
20 Zheng Yimei, Chashu xiangwen lu [A record of cooked tea with warm scents] (Shanghai: yixin shushe, 
1931). 
21 Lean also notes the growing anxieties over women issues in the 1930s. Eugenia Lean, Public Passions: 
The Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007). 
22 “Zuijin gongying zhi guochan xinpian juben neimu zhi zongfenxi,” [A general examination of the play 
script and other unknown facts of the recent domestic film] Kaimaila, no. 3 (1932): 8–13. 
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already attested to the increasing female consumers in the 1930s. The new urban woman now 
constituted a large part of print product readers and spectators in theatres. Accordingly, the changes 
in consumption behaviors and interests had an impact on market-oriented media products. 
Similarly, tabloid papers also reported on the wives of political leaders more than a decade 
ago. People like Song Meilin, and Feng Yuxiang’s second wife Li Dequan (???, 1896-1972), 
opened another window to gossip about the marital lives of political leaders. It wasn’t just a 
politically safe strategy played by the press; news about celebrated female figures attracted more 
female readers, whose interest the tabloids captured through their clothes, diet, daily activities, and 
relationships with parents-in-law. Moreover, Kate Merkel-Hess’ study on Li Dequan demonstrated 
the consciousness of these female figures to make a gendered political narrative by displaying their 
private lives. She argues that Li interwove the private intimacies of love, marriage and family life 
into her public image, which became her political capital in the early PRC period.23 Although Jiang 
himself no longer invited the press into his private events, his strategy in the late 1920s inspired 
others and continued to interact with both the official and unofficial narratives to cultivate public 
support.  
The early Republican gossip industry’s legacy was visible during and post the Nationalist 
decade. In fact, both the press and the government agreed upon the presumption of the private 
behavior having a public dimension, even though the conflicting concerns of privacy, moral rule, 
and rights of public criticism led to an understanding of privacy for the public riddled with 
inconsistencies and paradoxes. Elements such as nostalgia, the visible trend of de-politicization, 
                                                            
23 Kate Merkel-Hess, “A New Woman and Her Warlord: Li Dequan, Feng Yuxiang, and the Politics of 
Intimacy in Twentieth-Century China,” Frontiers of History in China 11, no. 3 (2016): 431–57. 
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and the spotlight on female celebrities, could all be found in contemporary Chinese media 
products and social communications of high politics under strict state surveillance. The 
persistence of frivolous products in various media forms, from different historical periods, 
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